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Countless socially responsible trade initiatives have emerged in recent years offering an uncertain mixture of token and substantive changes. After decades of battles over free trade, this marks a significant shift, challenging established debates over free versus regulated markets by promoting labour, gender, human, and environmental rights through trade agreements. This reorientation contains complex contradictions, with trade justice groups conceding to the popularity of trade while simultaneously insisting on a new vision of what trade is 'about.' Drawing on the idea of trade fetishism, this article argues that the desire for trade involves not only its material motivations, but its seductive content as a fetishised object of global capital, offering the fantasy of 'trade' as a symbolic source of pleasure. Through the case of the new NAFTA 2.0, it points to the relevance of trade politics that aspires not to overcome trade fetishism, but, as Lucas Pohl (2022) suggests, to 'get with' it. Through a trade justice ratchet mechanism, advocates have pushed for unanticipated changes, while also ceding to the limitations of the current order. The outcome is a process of contesting the symbolic content of what trade is and is not about, with significant material and policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on EU trade policy by introducing insights from the political economy literature on development to the study of how EU trade liberalisation affects development in trading partners. Drawing on a comparison of EU trade liberalisation with Moldova and Georgia, we argue that the type of coalition between public and private actors in partner countries' top export sectors determines which firms benefit from better market access to the EU, as indicated by their ability to increase their exports. We show that liberalised trade with the EU tends to contribute to achieving the EU's declared objective of inclusive development if the presence of inclusionary development coalitions ensures that a broad range of firms is enabled to increase their export capacities through a mechanism that we call 'inclusive empowerment'. Otherwise, trade liberalisation contributes to exclusive development, benefitting big, mostly foreign firms, or, at worse, consolidating rent-seeking practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists of the transnational cleavage, defined as a political reaction against European integration and immigration, also regularly conceptualise international trade preferences as a component of this contemporary societal divide. Yet empirical analyses of this cleavage focus on the former two topics, while trade and the transnational cleavage has not been systematically investigated. Making use of a new item in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey that measures party support for protection of domestic producer groups versus support for trade liberalisation, we examine the applicability of explanations for European integration positioning for the topic of trade. The results show that party positions on international trade correlate with parties' underlying two-dimensional ideology: parties of the economic left and culturally conservative parties support trade protection. The findings advance previous studies on the transnational cleavage and party positioning on trade, and demonstrate the continued importance of economic factors in driving patterns of trade protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its emphasis on trade, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has been perceived as a liberalisation agenda motivated primarily by strategic concerns with fewer economic benefits. This article analyses the strategies of Indonesia's trade policymakers to legitimize its leading role in RCEP. It is argued that Indonesia's legitimation strategy is implemented through the invocation of two discourses: Indonesia's historical position as a regional leader and bridge-builder and the internationalisation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). While the former is utilised as a coordinative discourse to provide an overarching vision for other state agencies with a protectionist bent, the latter is employed as a communicative discourse to challenge domestic contestations, especially those from civil society and business interests. This article contributes to the study of trade policy discourse by investigating the role of policymakers in mobilising discourses as a strategy for legitimising a strategically-driven liberalisation agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade policy and negotiations have lain at the heart of the Brexit process. Initial UK trade policy has been characterised by: (1) the need to limit the impact of changes in trading relations (mainly with the EU) to minimise challenges for businesses and the possibility of economic losses; (2) a strong ideological commitment to free trade, and related to that; (3) symbolic and 'placebo' actions designed to show that the UK can enact an independent trade policy. Negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs), thus, became a priority of trade policy. This article explores how approaches to FTAs have evolved, focusing specifically on post-Brexit FTAs with Australasia. Overall, the desire to complete speedy agreements has at times trumped business and societal interests, and precluded the development of a coherent long-term UK FTA vision, revealing the symbolic motivation of being seen as 'delivering Brexit' behind the initial years of post-Brexit trade policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviewing Marc Lavoie's comprehensive and well-structured discussion of open-economy macroeconomics allows us to revisit some key Post-Keynesian contributions and confirm their continued relevance to our understanding of international economic, financial and monetary relations. In the process Lavoie draws a consistently sharp contrast with standard-theory concepts and models, much of it organized around his elaboration of endogenous money in an international context and modern trade flows embedded in a highly globalized and financialized world economy which have little to do with comparative advantage. He thereby provides us with a conceptual road map for a meta-economic revolution which recognizes that the world economy has a growth dynamic all of its own rather than being just the sum of its parts, the two-hundred or so national economies connected to each other through their balance of payments and exchange rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic populism said to be represented by the votes for Brexit and Donald Trump and the breakdown in trade and investment following the COVID-19 outbreak have rekindled interest in the redistributive consequences of trade liberalisation. Against this backdrop, the authors in this Special Section consider the broader drivers of inclusion and exclusion in trade governance, focusing on the trade politics of Canada, the European Union and the United States. This short introduction spells out the importance of considering the interplay between redistributive and deliberative drivers of inclusion and exclusion in producing trade policy contestation. It focuses on the three key drivers of inclusion and exclusion that the authors subsequently draw on in their contributions: discursive factors; institutional mechanisms and inter-scalar and multi-level dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theoretical and empirical accounts of trade politics focus on political conflict among competing private interest groups and over policies between the dichotomy of trade liberalization and protectionism. This article challenges this conceptualization by arguing that issues of antitrust, market power, and competition are central to the politics over free trade, and that in this domain state actors are comparatively more important. Original archival evidence from the American New Deal and post-war foreign economic policy shows that post-war free-trade policies were heavily influenced by views, formed in the 1930s, about domestic industrial organization and antitrust. These preferences were then pushed into international economic policy during and after World War II through trade negotiations, extraterritorial application of American law, and pressure for domestic competition laws abroad. In one of the most prominent episodes of trade liberalization, an antitrust campaign and debate permeated trade issues, based in independent state learning and economic preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New Zealand's structural development has been dominated for the last generation by a strongly neoliberal, market-focused orientation. The country has signed several neoliberal free trade agreements, and for long periods largely abandoned active or strategic industry policy. It has seen the steady decline of manufacturing as a proportion of total production and of higher value manufacturing as a proportion of exports, and failed to significantly diversify its exports, retaining high dependence on a few primary commodity exports. Productivity performance has been notably poor. The Labour-led government elected in 2017 has demonstrated its willingness to at least partly break with neoliberal precepts in other policy areas; this commentary surveys its approach to date in industrial and trade policy reforms, and the role of unions in these developments. There are initial promising steps but the free trade agreements place significant restraints on what is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies suggest that globalization is a process initiated by corporations and states in advanced countries that pressures or encourages developing countries to open themselves to the globalized economy. This paper illustrates, with the case of China, that developing countries have significant power to initiate and shape trade liberalization. Using sources from both the United States and China, it delineates how the Chinese state, driven by its aspiration to move China to an export-oriented economic model, mobilized and coordinated dominant US corporations to lobby for US–China trade liberalization in the critical period of 1993–1994. China's "lobbying by proxy" efforts led to the Clinton administration's rejection of its 1993 policy that constrained free trade with China based on human rights considerations in 1994. This research shows that the origins and evolution of trade globalization involved many contingent actions of actors in the core and periphery. We should not underestimate the agency of actors from the periphery, even though they are not always in the driver's seat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1870 s and 1880 s, the scientist, logician, and pragmatist philosopher Charles S. Peirce possessed an advanced knowledge of mathematical economics, having mastered and criticised Cournot as early as 1871. In 1884 he engaged in a multi-round debate with the editors of The Nation over the economics of trade liberalisation in the case of a proposed trade treaty with Spain concerning import tariffs on Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar. While the mathematical underpinings of Peirce's intervention in the debate are not explicit, they are evident in light of Peirce's unpublished writing on Cournot. The debate is reconstructed and related carefully both to Peirce's understanding of mathematical economics and to his philosophy of science. Peirce's intervention is one of the earliest intricate applications of mathematical economics to public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies present the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as one of Africa's most new trade issues. Previous assessments show that this AfCFTA will catalyze Intra African trade. The cumulative impact on Côte d'Ivoire's exports in the long term is positive for other African countries without indicating potential partners. This study seeks to identify a potential partner to help policymakers to map out a better strategy. We use exports data from 2001 to 2016 on 45 African countries, and we compute an index to assess the gap. When asked if there are potential customers on the continent for Côte d'Ivoire from the perspective of the AfCFTA, it appears that yes. The results reveal great trade potentials for Côte d'Ivoire in Africa, at least in 25 countries. Among them, there are 8 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address a central question about the integration of developing countries into the global economy: what factors affect public support for such globalization. Do public preferences toward trade correlate with its economic consequences or sociocultural resonances? Using a nationally representative survey experiment in Tunisia, a majority Muslim, developing country, we investigate whether providing information about trade's distributional consequences causes respondents to connect their economic self-interest to their trade policy preferences. Respondents seem to understand their economic self-interest, and information provision enhances this. Information about the likely benefits of trade causes people in the export-oriented sector to respond more positively to trade liberalization, as economic theory predicts. Information about its costs has confounding effects on those in import-competing sectors; those involved in global value chains maintain support for trade more than those outside such production chains who become protectionist. We find scant evidence that sociotropic, political, or cultural variables influence trade attitudes. Contributing to the recent debates over trade policy preferences, we show that public preferences align most strongly with their economic self-interest as derived from recent trade theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relations between workplace and local labor regimes, global production networks (GPNs), and the state-led creation of expanded markets as spaces of capitalist regulation through trade policy. Through an examination of the ways in which labor regimes are constituted as a result of the articulation of local social relations and lead-firm pressure in GPNs, the article examines the limits of labor provisions in European Union trade policy seeking to ameliorate the worst consequences of trade liberalization and economic integration on working conditions. The article takes as its empirical focus the Moldovan clothing industry, the leading export-oriented manufacturing sector in the country. Trade liberalization has opened up a market space for EU lead firms to contract with Moldovan-based suppliers, but in seeking to regulate labor conditions in the process of trade liberalization, the mechanisms in place are not sufficient to deal with the consequences for workers’ rights and working conditions. Indeed, when articulated with national state policy formulations seeking to liberalize labor markets and deregulate labor standards, the limits of what can be achieved via labor provisions are reached. The EU’s trade policy formulation does not sufficiently take account of the structural causes of poor working conditions. Consequently, there is a mismatch between what the EU is trying to achieve and the core labor issues that structure social relations in, and labor regimes of, low-wage labor-intensive clothing export production for EU markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Doha Round on multilateral trade liberalization, originally intended to better integrate developing countries into the world economy, has been largely considered a failure. With the Doha outcome falling short of expectations, North-South trade remains underdeveloped. Embedding the political economy and the resulting importance of reciprocating trade liberalization in an evolutionary model along Axelrod-Rapoport lines indicates that factor endowments are crucial in triggering trade policies. Their pivotal nature gives rise to bifurcations, thereby tilting policies towards or away from liberalization trajectories. The theoretical insights are reflected in an empirical analysis, thus strengthening the case for a variable-geometry approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wine is the highest valued product in the agricultural, food, and beverage sector traded between the United States and the European Union (EU) and wine faces a range of tariffs that are differentiated by country and product category. In addition, the production of wine grapes is heavily regulated within the EU and there are complicated state-level policies in the United States designed to limit the retail availability of wine. There continues to be economic and political pressure for reform to the tariffs between the United States and the EU, and to the domestic regulations in each region. We carefully develop parameters to characterize the effects of tariffs and domestic regulations that affect production and consumption of wine in the two regions. Simulation results show that reductions in tariffs would have relatively small effects in EU and U.S. wine markets, whereas reductions in EU domestic policies that affect wine grape production would have much larger trade and welfare implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016) argue that the politics of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations are entirely new and that it will lead to 'regulatory chill'. We think these two statements are untenable from a logical and empirical standpoint. While distributive political conflict is relatively absent because of firms' integration into global value chains, civil society organizations voice value-based opposition to the prospective agreement, just like in the past. TTIP is also unlikely to undermine contracting parties' ability to regulate the market to promote fundamental social values, because regulatory convergence is generally decided upon in a piece-meal fashion, and is subject to a super-majoritarian (dis)approval threshold in the Council, the European Parliament and national parliaments. Moreover, we show why it is plausible to expect TTIP to result in an upgrading of world trade rules, a benign development on the global level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the Korea–United States (KORUS) free-trade agreement negotiations were concluded in 2007, and ratified in 2011, the agreement has remained deeply controversial. Labor unions, civil society groups, and opposition politicians in South Korea have criticized the agreement as being unfair, and also in the United States have voices spoken out against the agreement. The process of negotiation by South Korea was deeply flawed, and the conclusion of the agreement, that included a unilateral ratification by the ruling party in National Assembly, was forcefully opposed by many groups in South Korean society with violent demonstrations leading almost to the collapse of the Lee Myung-bak government. This article argues that it was not only the perception of potential economic damage to, in particular agricultural, domestic interest that was the main cause of the public resistance to the agreement, but that the unique nature of the relationship with the United States, and how this influenced the progress of negotiating and ratifying the agreement in South Korea, was a leading course of the divisiveness of the agreement and the massive resistance it faced. This is also why while the conservative Park Geun-hye government has expressed its willingness to re-negotiate other free-trade agreements, it has remained adamant in its refusal to even consider reopening the KORUS agreement. It is not only the apparent trade benefits that accrued to South Korea that is behind this refusal. With the ruling party having lost the April 2016 National Assembly elections and presidential elections scheduled for December 2017, the conservative elite, concerned about its electoral fate, has no interest in re-opening such a divisive issue as the KORUS free-trade agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper empirically examines the impacts of trade liberalization policy on the sophistication level of Vietnam's exports from 2001 to 2010. The export sophistication measure proposed by Hausmann and co-workers is computed by using the disaggregated trade data. By descriptive analysis, this indicator reveals that Vietnam's export structure was similar to that of Indonesia and the Philippines and then became much more similar to Thailand after Vietnam's accession to World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, this paper econometrically analyzes the effects of trade liberalization on Vietnam's industry-level export sophistication with the additional consideration of its WTO accession in 2007. This paper suggests that tariff reductions have a positive impact on the sophistication level of Vietnam's industry exports. Trade liberalization has a stronger impact on the nonmanufacturing sectors than on manufacturing sectors. However, the results also imply that the WTO membership does not have any additional effects on Vietnam's industry export sophistication. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

New generation trade agreements reach far behind borders, affecting many areas of domestic policy not previously associated closely with trade. One of the most uneasy of these areas is intellectual property, particularly patent monopolies. The USA has been a major force behind the extended reach of patent monopolies using preferential trade agreements. The patent and data exclusivity provisions of the AUSFTA were proposed by the USA. This paper provides detailed evidence about how such ‘TRIPS+’ policies compare to a balanced patent policy—one equally favouring creators and users of technology. Australia has never had an active patent agenda, but since AUSFTA has been willing to accept in its bilateral and regional trade deals highly prescriptive rules that tie the hands of future governments. The overall trend has thus been toward increasing imbalance, with Australian patent policy now having a very broad reach and very low eligibility standards. This particularly affects the cost of medicines, where large numbers of relatively uninventive patents surround a blockbuster drug and delay the market entry of generic alternatives. In addition to outlining the costs of Australia’s current patent policy approach, the paper concludes by highlighting a more balanced and less costly way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyzes an agricultural pressure group's publicity campaigns for protection of their industry. If the group knows the positive externalities of domestic production of their goods, they may educate voters on these before an election to induce a favored trade policy. Modeling this situation shows that the expenditure on such campaigns is an increasing convex function of the true externalities. It also shows that, when the farmer population is relatively large, a marginal decline in that population makes the per-capita campaign effort more intense; however, when the farmer population becomes small, a further decline makes the effort less intense. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How can a state with dysfunctional trade politics spur the negotiation of major free trade agreements (FTAs)? Using the case of Japan's participation in the trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), we develop an analytical framework on FTA diffusion that takes into account multidimensional (economic, legal and political) competitive pressures, and the ability of states to act as pivots in triggering FTA cascades. We disaggregate the makeup of a pivotal state into two main components – capability and credibility – and underscore Japan's significant latent capabilities, but also its serious credibility shortcomings. The TPP's boost to Japan's credibility raised the possibility of significant economic, legal and political externalities for specific countries which responded by accelerating FTA initiatives that had long stalled: the trilateral China–Japan–Korea FTA, a 16-state East Asian FTA and the Japan–European Union trade negotiations. This study extends the theoretical frontier in policy diffusion studies by clarifying the combination of factors that allows some states, but not others, to activate the externalities behind the dissemination of defensive FTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many public-choice models have a problem explaining why governments support free trade policies in the face of interest-group lobbying. A common assumption is that interest groups tend to be rent seeking and therefore protectionist. In this empirical case study I find the interest groups to be anti-protectionist. The study shows that many interest groups have a more complex analysis underlying their trade policy preferences than what many public-choice models so far have allowed for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs an oligopolistic dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) model of a small open economy to analyze the relationship between the saving rate and the upgrade of the trade commodity structure. The analysis shows that the saving rate determines the trade commodity structure of a country in the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, a developing country with a low capital–labor ratio in the initial state will change from exporting labor-intensive goods in the initial state to exporting capital-intensive goods in the long-run equilibrium if it has a higher saving rate, and this upgrade of trade commodity structure has a social welfare effect under an oligopolistic market structure. The effect of trade policy on the upgrade of the trade commodity structure is uncertain in our model; therefore, a high saving rate is the irreplaceable driving force for trade commodity structure upgrades in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]