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In this paper, I will examine the influence of nationalism and colonial racial theories on modern Islamic thought in Muslim South Asia and the Middle East. I argue that modern Islamic thought —a new way of conceiving Islam that began in the late nineteenth century—has some basic features that reveal the influence of Western colonial discourse, racial theories, and nationalism. I will provide many examples that show how contemporary Islamic thought has internalized the colonial discourse on religion, nation, and state. In particular, I will discuss the influence of nationalism on Islamism and how Islamists believe that a "true" Islamic life requires the creation of an Islamic state. But modern states are essentially limited, and national interests determine their relations with the outside world. An Islamic state cannot be an exception to the latter rule. Therefore, Islamic principles cannot determine an Islamic state's domestic and foreign policies; ultimately, it would have to function like a nation-state. Through a brief discussion of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and Turkey, I will also show how the discourse of these states is nationalist in practice and that the national interest of these states determines their foreign and domestic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of AURUM: Journal of Social Sciences / Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Altinbas Universitesi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bulletin of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL: Series 'International Relations & Regional Studies' is the property of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations & World Languages and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the beginning of the XIXth century the relations of dependency and inter-dependency between the Iranian monarch and foreign officials became an integral part of Iranian political life. During the Iranian Constitutional Movement (1905–1911) nascent Iranian nationalism harshly condemned the Qajars as tyrants and lackeys of foreign powers. Muhammad 'Ali Shah (r.1907–1909), the first Qajar sovereign who had to share his powers with the representative assembly, was quickly discredited by his political opponents as despot and Russian puppet, an accusation that seemed to be proved when the deposed Muhammad 'Ali returned to Iran from his exile and launched a military campaign. This study represents an attempt to shed more light on the relations between Muhammad 'Ali and Russian officials, especially in the context of his return campaign of 1911. Relying mostly on unpublished Russian archival sources, this paper proposes a critical assessment of Muhammad 'Ali's link with Russia, avoiding the habitual reductionist scheme of 'patron-client' relations and putting more emphasis on the role of agency in Russian foreign policy in Iran as well as the proper intentions and ambitions of the Qajar princely elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Historical research on western racial theories has grown exponentially in the past few years. A number of scholars have also investigated various cases of ethnic prejudice beyond the western pale, for instance against Koreans in Japan or Muslims in India. Yet, little attention has been given to the modalities in which European nineteenth-century racial thought was adopted in other parts of the world. This article attempts to broach a discussion on this under-analysed aspect of race studies by reviewing one case, that of Arab-hatred in modern Iran. I argue that the intense hatred of Arabs in Iranian nationalist texts derives from a racialized vision of Iranian history born in nineteenth-century European texts. Racialized historiography was selectively imported by the ideologues of Iranian nationalism as it allowed them to explain Iran's weakness in terms of a loss of racial purity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iran-Iraq war remains one of the longest conflicts in the history of the modern Middle East. The war would define Iran's foreign policy orientation, as the exigencies of the conflict conditioned its approach to the United States, the Arab world, and even Israel. Along the way, Iran's leaders made a series of mistakes and miscalculations that ensured a stalemated conflict. Subordinating strategy to ideology and misplaced hopes that Iraq's population would rise to welcome Iranians as liberators contributed to prolonging a devastating war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April and May of 1932, Rabindranath Tagore traveled to Iran on an official visit. He had been invited to Iran as the official guest of Rezā Shah Pahlavi. Using an array of primary source material, this article examines the cultural, political, and ideological implications of this trip for the emerging discourse of nationalism in interwar Iran. The article argues that Tagore's visit played an important part in promoting the new official nationalism of the Pahlavi state. The emerging interwar ideology of “Pahlavi nationalism” sought to dissociate Iran from the Abrahamic-Islamicate “civilizational ethos” that was now understood to have long dominated Iranian culture, and instead sought to associate Iranian nationalism's claim of cultural authenticity to a newly emerging notion of “Indo-Iranian civilization” rooted in the pre-Islamic culture of Zoroastrianism and Aryanism. Tagore's visit to Iran was seen as an opportunity for his Iranian hosts to present him to the Iranian public as a living personification of this newly conceived idea of national authenticity. The public ceremonies and pronouncements that accompanied Tagore during the four-week trip all reinforced this basic message. The paper therefore argues that the Tagore visit to Iran was closely tied to the Pahlavi state's policy of cultural nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a perspective on the history of the rivalry between Iran and Iraq. According to the author, the aspect of culture, which was the perpetuation of myths through cultural introjection, was central to the production of the Iranian enemy image in Iraq. Furthermore, The history of the rivalry of nationalism was even more dramatic in relation to the language of the Gulf.

The Abadan crisis was the initial phase of the protracted crisis in Anglo-Persian relations 1951-54, precipitated by Persia's nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in May 1951. For many in the Tory party, it provided the test run of British policy in the Middle East. It seemed to demonstrate what should be the appropriate British response to the challenge of indigenous nationalism to British strategic and commercial interests in the region: namely, a robust assertion of British interests by all means necessary, including the use of force. This article examines Conservative perceptions and behaviour during the Abadan crisis, as the experience proved a vital formative influence upon the later Suez Group, the vociferous Tory backbench pressure group which played a contributory role in the Eden government's decision to confront Nasser in 1956. It seeks to show how the crisis contributed to the emergence of a clearly identifiable faction of imperial-minded Conservative MPs who cared passionately about Britain's place in the world, and specifically in the Middle East. The article looks at the relationship between the Conservative leadership and the nascent backbench faction and considers whether Conservative front bench policy and behaviour in this crisis in any way contributed to the emergence of the Suez Group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue in this article that the 'Azeri' question, that is, the reemergence of ethno-nationalism in Azerbaijan-Iran and in the Republic of Azerbaijan, has become a major factor in the politics of the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and in the Caspian Sea Basin countries during the past decade. This article situates the growth of Azeri nationalism and the Azeri question in its historical context and then focuses on those aspects that have most directly affected relations between Turkey and Iran during the past decade and particularly the first three years of the twenty-first century. The article then discusses the local, national, regional and international manifestations of the recrudescence of Azeri ethno-nationalism and the role that it has played in the ascendancy of Turkey vis-à-vis Iran in the two countries' bilateral relations and what this bodes in the future for the politics of the wider Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author focuses on the future of the U.S.-Iran relations. He reports that in 1953, the U.S. conspired to overthrow an Iranian nationalist leader, Mohammad Mossadeq, and restore the shah to the throne. He also focuses on the U.S. strategic dependence on Iran, that created reluctance in Washington to acknowledge the power of growing revolutionary sentiment in Iran. He also discussed the Iranian attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage crisis that went on for over a year was a major factor in the electoral defeat of President Jimmy Carter.