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The paper challenges the mainstream stance in the study of applied ethics in international development. Applied ethics is positioned at the macro-social level of global ethics while a specific codification is attempted by formulating international development based on its structural synthesis, in a threefold level: First, the structural synthesis -associated with the framework of existing international development policy-can be found in the 'market relations'. Second, the analysis specifies the policies applied at the national level and the role of nation-state policy. Third, the paper criticizes the international development institutions' policies. In each of the levels mentioned above, the analysis reveals the fundamental policy theory issues of neoclassical economics, as the intellectual defender of free market economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceives of the market as an institution, and contrasts two theoretical approaches: Institutionalism, with an evolutionary and analytical bias, whose theoretical basis comes from "Old/Original" Institutionalism, and New Institutional Economics, with an analytical, contractual approach, linked to mainstream economics. Both approaches have given relevant contributions, as they consider the importance of institutions for economic performance. The limits of New Institutional Economics are particularly relevant, whose analysis of the operation of markets is centered on the logic of transaction cost economics as a determinant of economic performance. Evolutionary Institutionalism, in turn, sees the market within a broader scope, in which cost economies only partially explains economic performance, but it is not necessarily seen as a determining factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The market economy can be defended using the lens of virtue ethics. Modern virtue ethics was developed originally by the English philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. Virtue ethics rejects consequentialism and focuses on the virtues. And human nature appears to be collaborative in both language and economic relations exemplified by exchange. By adapting the concept of 'characteristic virtues', developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it follows that collaboration has its own particular virtues. These virtues can produce prescriptions which mitigate the costs of economic transactions and collaboration. The development of behavioural economics has shown human beings sometimes fall short of the rationality described by neo-classical microeconomics. But virtuous action tends to correct these deficiencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the benefits of economic freedom. Components used in measuring economic freedom; Importance of economic freedom for economic growth; Importance of income equality; Neoclassical explanation of economic growth.

The article presents the author's comments on the book "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy," by Joseph A. Schumpeter. The book is best known for arguing that by virtue of its success in cranking out goods and services, capitalism would undermine its own social, organizational, and moral foundations, setting the stage for the ascendance of socialism. Presently, as the tumultuous changes in Eastern Europe unfold, that warning appears wildly off the mark. The book embodies Schumpeter's most complete characterization of "plausible capitalism," contrasting the dynamics of the system, as he viewed them, against the essentially static conception emphasized in contemporary neoclassical economic analyses, both at the time he wrote and fifty years later. The hallmark of capitalism, Schumpeter argued both in 1912 and 1942, was not the equilibration of supplies with demands for an unchanging array of goods and services, but dynamic evolutionary growth, which permanently increased the output available for consumption and further growth.

This paper presents redistributive taxation and economic growth as a noncooperative differential game in which the politically powerful poor (workers) control redistribution whereas the economically powerful rich (capitalists) control accumulation. Both groups are assumed to be interested in maximizing the sum of their own discounted consumption over an infinite horizon. The players use trigger strategies which permit the construction of threats designed to sustain cooperation as an equilibrium, The properties of the trigger strategies and the dependence of sustainable cooperative policies on the technology preferences and development history of the economy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]