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As the pivotal figure of information transmission in the capital market, the mainstream financial press has a significant impact on the operation of the stock market. Based on the mainstream financial press, this study obtains the news reports of 945 China A‐share listed companies in 2010–2019 and analyzes the relationship between the attention of the mainstream financial press and the efficiency of stock pricing. Further, we explore the mediating effect of corporate governance in this correlation. The empirical results show that the more reports on listed companies from the mainstream financial press the lower the delay level of the stock price of listed companies. At the same time, the characteristics information of the stock price increases, the higher the stock pricing efficiency. The attitude of press reports of listed companies also has an impact on the efficiency of stock pricing. The improvement of pricing efficiency will be achieved through neutral reporting. Mainstream financial press reports indirectly improve the efficiency of stock pricing by reducing the agency costs of the two types, and corporate governance plays a significant intermediary role in it. Finally, compared with market‐oriented media, the effect of policy‐oriented mainstream financial press on pricing efficiency is more significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inefficiency observed in investment within state-owned enterprises presents a significant practical challenge that can affect the sustainable development of China's economy. To address this issue, this study comprehensively explores the intricate mechanisms underlying the governance implications of mixed ownership on the investment efficiency of listed companies. Drawing on unbalanced panel data encompassing Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share listed companies in China spanning the period from 2008 to 2022, this study employs a fixed-effects model to unveil the nuanced ways in which mixed ownership influences investment efficiency through the lens of agency costs. This study transcends the boundaries of traditional agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. It delves deeper, illuminating the diverse effects of agency conflicts between significant controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The results revealed a noteworthy positive correlation between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, and verified the intermediary role of agency costs between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, which is an important result of our research. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the relationship between the two can be affected by external events, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic, investment efficiency is not the most concerned issue for enterprises. The findings have practical implications for practitioners and policymakers, as they offer avenues for optimizing investment strategies and fostering efficient and effective corporate governance practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop an endogenous growth model with public consumption and infrastructure services provided by two-tier governments. Growth performance and welfare implication are compared under the centralized and decentralized fiscal federal systems. In general, there is a trade-off between welfare and growth due to conflicts of interest and asymmetric information between central and local governments. By numerical simulations, we show that the optimal fiscal federalism should impose restrictions on expenditure−GDP ratio, rather than on expenditure−budget ratio or central−local expenditure ratio, because expenditure−GDP ratio can align the incentives of the two-tier governments. Furthermore, it is suggested that decentralized fiscal systems are generally superior to the centralized system because the efficiency loss overweighs the agency cost. The model is then applied to analyzing different growth experiences in the West and China by institutional and cultural differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, the call for sustainable development is becoming stronger in all countries of the world, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, as a vivid practice of this concept, has gradually received extensive attention from enterprises and investors. Financial institutions have an important position in the national economy as an important tool for the state to regulate the macroeconomy. Whether ESG performance can improve financial institutions' efficiency is of key significance for boosting sustainable development. Based on data from China's listed financial institutions from 2015 to 2021, this study aims to investigate the impact of ESG performance on financial institutions. The robust nonparametric boundary model and fixed-effects model are employed for analysis. The empirical results demonstrate that ESG performance and its sub-indicators of environmental performance and social responsibility performance can significantly enhance financial institutions' efficiency. In particular, this effect is more pronounced in the securities industry and diversified financial industry, as well as in non-state and small-scale financial institutions. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, the mechanism tests indicate that ESG performance can enhance financial institutions' efficiency by reducing downside risk and agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate cash holdings in China. We propose a collusion theory in which D&O insurance can exacerbate the conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders by shielding directors and officers from shareholder litigation in emerging countries. Consistent with our expectation, we find that insured firms tend to have high cash holdings that are appropriated by both controlling shareholders and directors/officers rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. Moreover, the positive relationship between D&O insurance and cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with high litigation risks, whereas the effect is attenuated in firms with political connections, strong external monitoring mechanisms and strong controlling shareholder power. Compared with uninsured firms, the market discounts the value of cash holdings for insured firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate governance (CG) is the system of rules, procedures, and processes by which an organization is operated and controlled. Effective corporate governance helps mitigate risk by ensuring the company complies with applicable laws and regulations and maintains appropriate internal controls. CG is an essential aspect of the overall management of companies and can have a significant impact on their Financial Performance (FP). In China, CG practices have undergone significant modifications over the last few years as the country shifted from a centrally planned economy to a market‐based economy. The study's novelty evaluated the effect of corporate governance on finance and Chinese‐listed firm creation. Data obtained from 345 employees working in 8 firms in China, the relationship between CG, financial performance, and innovation is investigated. The study adopted PLS‐SEM analysis and the findings of the study indicate that CG is positively related to better FP and innovation output. The study analysis found that firms with stronger governance structures have better access to external financing, lower agency costs, and higher levels of innovation investment. Also, the result identified that improving CG can lead to better FP and innovation, which in turn improves the firm's competitiveness and long‐term sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The survival of zombie firms severely crowds out healthy corporate investment and employment growth, eventually undermining economic growth potential. Hence, how to properly address the problem of corporate zombification is an essential part of achieving high‐quality economic development in China. In recent years, the phenomenon of common institutional ownership has become increasingly widespread in the capital markets and has a significant impact on the strategic decisions of companies. There are currently two views on the corporate governance role of common institutional ownership: the synergistic governance effect and the collusive fraud effect. Using data from Chinese‐listed firms from 2009 to 2021, this paper finds that common institutional ownership can significantly inhibit the formation of zombie firms. The higher the degree of their linkage and the greater the shareholding, the more pronounced the synergistic effect. The findings remained valid after considering the endogeneity issue and conducting robustness tests. Furthermore, the mechanism test suggests that common institutional ownership inhibits the formation of zombie firms by improving internal control quality and reducing agency costs. This paper contributes to the study of how to inhibit the formation of zombie firms by identifying common institutional ownership from the perspective of external governance mechanisms. In addition, this paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of common institutional ownership. Finally, various practical implications for policymakers may be realised, which may help curb the trend of corporate zombification through equity‐based instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of data from listed enterprises in China between 2011 and 2022, we investigate the influence of digital transformation on the governance efficiency for minority shareholders. The results show that the extent of digital transformation exert a negative effect on the agency costs incurred from related-party transactions. The mechanism examination elucidates that digital transformation augments the governance efficiency for minority shareholders by boosting attendance at shareholders' meetings and enhancing the exit threat for minority shareholders. Subsequent analysis reveals that non-state-owned enterprises, compared to state-owned enterprises, exhibit a more pronounced effect in diminishing the second type of agency costs through digital transformation. Furthermore, the impact of digital transformation in curtailing agency costs is more significant in the eastern regions than central and western regions. The better the equity checks and balances in listed enterprises, the more effective digital transformation is in reducing agency costs. This study offers valuable insights for bolstering the governance capacity of minority shareholders in the context of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How corporate strategic disclosure affects investor evaluations is a crucial and widely discussed question. Although prior literature has spent efforts analyzing the information effect of strategic alliances on investor reactions, whether this effect can extend to the cost of equity capital still needs to be explored. Using data from China's A‐share listed firms from 2007 to 2021, we examine the impact of disclosing strategic collaborative agreements on equity capital costs. We find that disclosing strategic collaborative agreements relates to lower equity capital costs. These results hold after several robustness checks. The mechanism test reveals that announcing strategic collaborative agreements alleviates equity capital costs mainly through the information effect. Moreover, this effect is more salient in firms with lower agency costs, lower media coverage, positive media sentiment, and higher media quality. These findings suggest that strategic collaborative agreements provide investors with valuable information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms cannot utilize capacity probably rooted in factors beyond technical constraints, like corruption. This paper systematically investigates the causal effect of the anti-corruption campaign (ACUC) on corporate capacity utilization. Based on the financial data of China's state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2018, we calculate the firm-level capacity utilization rate and employ central committee inspection (CCI) as a quasi-natural experiment to come to the following findings. Firstly, we find that the anti-corruption campaign significantly increases the capacity utilization of SOEs by 10.4 percentage points, which remains robust across a set of robustness checks. Secondly, anti-corruption campaign affects corporate capacity utilization by diminishing agency cost, improving investment efficiency and promoting technological innovation. Thirdly, the positive policy effects are more pronounced for firms with a lower level of capacity utilization and weaker motivation for political promotion. Finally, we find the impact spillover through the supply chain, but only for suppliers to customers. And the multiple-treatment effects are insignificant. Our findings highlight the evidence of having an anti-corruption campaign for enhancing the operational efficiency and performance of SOEs and provide new views for emerging markets on how to supervise SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking China's A-share listed manufacturing enterprises from 2014 to 2020 as objects, this paper discusses the impact and mechanism of corporate digital transformation on supply chain relationship transactions from the perspectives of information asymmetry and agency costs. The findings show that digital transformation significantly inhibits the supply chain relational transactions; the mechanism testing results reveal that digital transformation is conducive to the alleviation of information asymmetry and agency costs, which thereby reduces the degree of supply chain relational transactions; the regulatory effect analysis demonstrates that the impact of digital transformation on supply chain relationship transactions becomes more significant in non-high-tech enterprises and enterprises with less fierce industry competition. Finally, this paper confirms that a decline in the proportion of supply chain relationship transactions can significantly reduce the operational risk of enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The optimal preventive maintenance timing of traditional asphalt pavement is based on the maximum benefit-cost ratio. For cost evaluation indicators, mainly agency cost and user cost, use life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) to determine. The environmental impact of pavement preventive maintenance activities is often overlooked. For the benefit evaluation index, only the new area under the performance curve is used to express the maintenance benefit, and the benefit evaluation index is single. This study proposes an integrated approach combining life cycle assessment (LCA) and LCCA to model preventive maintenance timing decisions considering economic, social, and environmental factors. In this paper, LCA is used to quantitatively analyze the energy consumption and emissions in the pavement operation and maintenance process, and the environmental costs are also included in the accounting scope of the costs. The costs that constitute pavement use are analyzed from three aspects: the agency cost, the user cost, and the environmental cost. At the same time, in the process of constructing the cost model, the costs caused by the maintenance construction process to users and the environment are also taken into consideration. Aiming at the benefit index and comprehensively considering the economic benefits, social benefits, and environmental benefits brought by maintenance, a comprehensive evaluation model of maintenance benefits was constructed based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). On the basis of accurately calculating the cost and benefit of maintenance in the life cycle, the model of the optimal preventive maintenance timing of asphalt pavement is constructed so as to calculate the optimal timing of preventive maintenance and provide certain information for the formulation of expressway pavement preventive maintenance programs. For reference. Taking a highway project in China as an example to verify the applicability of the model [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid growth of leverage is one of the risk factors for China's economy. To explore social credit's impact on corporate leverage's growth rate, we conduct the staggered difference‐in‐difference (DID) approach based on a quasi‐natural experiment of the social credit system reform. Our findings indicate that social credit significantly suppresses the growth rate of corporate leverage, which remains robust after some robustness checks. In addition, this effect can be attributed to alleviating agency costs and information asymmetry. Finally, our analysis reveals that the above effects are significant only for firms with poor corporate governance, high bankruptcy risk, low investment efficiency, and a low proportion of tangible assets. In summary, our study provides micro‐level evidence on the economic consequences of social credit system reform in China and policy insights on how the government can effectively control the growth rate of corporate leverage to prevent risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To contribute to the research on the role of financial activities in corporate development, this study addresses the critical issue of short-term debt financing for long-term investment (SDFLI) and its impact on the sustainable development of carbon-intensive enterprises in China. By analyzing panel data from the A-share listed carbon-intensive enterprises in China spanning from 2010 to 2021, this study aims to shed light on the significance of this phenomenon and its implications. The empirical findings reveal the existence of a maturity mismatch between investment and financing in carbon-intensive enterprises, which exerts a significant negative impact on total factor productivity (TFP) and poses challenges to their sustainable development. Furthermore, the adverse effects of maturity mismatches vary across different types of enterprises based on factors such as ownership, industry characteristics, financing constraints, and internal controls. The results of the mediation effect model demonstrate that maturity mismatch hampers the sustainable development of carbon-intensive enterprises by reducing investment efficiency and increasing agency costs. Additionally, the moderating role of innovation in carbon-intensive enterprises between maturity mismatch and sustainable development is also examined. This research provides insights to establish policies for facilitating sustainable development in carbon-intensive enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study studies whether the Social Insurance Law implemented in 2011 affects the stock price crash risk. Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2018, this study uses the difference-in-difference method to show that the Social Insurance Law significantly reduces stock price crash risk, and when the tax department collects social insurance premiums, this inhibitory effect still exists, which depends on its taxation efforts. Mechanism analysis find that Social Insurance Law reduces agency costs and improves the transparency of enterprises, indicating that the behavior of enterprises to hide and hoard bad news is reduced. Finally, these effects are more pronounced for enterprises with poor corporate governance, enterprises in regions with poor marketization, and enterprises with lower media attention. Overall, this study provides new insights into reducing systemic financial risks and improving financial market stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a crucial component of internal corporate governance, remuneration controls possess the potential to influence the cash holdings of firms. However, identifying the causal relationship between these controls and such holdings presents a considerable challenge. To address this research gap, this paper leverages the implementation of China's Guidance on Further Regulating the Remuneration Management of Heads of Central Enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration controls and firms' cash holdings, utilizing a double-difference approach. Based on an analysis of a sample of listed companies from 2007–2012, the results indicate that firms subject to regulated executive compensation exhibit lower cash holdings. To ensure the robustness of these findings, various statistical techniques such as parallel trend tests, variable replacement, propensity score matching, and placebo tests were employed. Additionally, a mechanism test was conducted, whereby the mediating effect of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was examined, revealing a reduction in internal agency costs. Finally, the analysis of heterogeneity demonstrated that the impact of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was more pronounced in companies with high-quality internal controls, stronger management oversight, and lower information asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically investigates the effects of the green credit policy (GCP) on the total amount, quality, and quantity of green innovation in renewable energy enterprises (REEs) by employing the difference-in-differences (DID) model. Analyses examining the channel, moderating, and economic effects are conducted using a sample of Chinese listed companies between 2008 and 2021. The results indicate that the GCP significantly promotes the total amount, quality, and quantity of green innovation in REEs. This impact on REEs is mainly through a reduction in green agency costs and an increase in research and development (R&D) spending. In addition, the promotional effects are more predominant in firms subjected to intensified environmental enforcement and benefiting from increased governmental subsidies. Moreover, this positive impact is particularly evident in regions with less environmental pollution and lower economic development. Overall, the adoption of green innovation in REEs, facilitated by the GCP, substantially enhances not only the enterprise value but also the environmental performance of the participating companies. Our findings offer a novel perspective for research related to green innovation within the context of the GCP. This could further contribute to the realization of green development strategies and the construction of a low-carbon society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We make contribution to the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and innovation by studying how CSR affects corporate innovation activities. Using data from listed firms in China, we find that CSR derived from legitimacy has a significant positive effect on corporate innovation. Specifically, our evidence shows that firms' internal responsibility and business partners' responsibility can facilitate innovation activities, and the corporate strategy is the potential channel for this positive association. From the perspective of the impact of external environmental pressure, the environmental uncertainty and the shock of the industry prosperity weaken the positive effect of CSR on innovation, namely, in the case of fewer environmental uncertainties and less industry prosperity, CSR plays a stronger role in promoting corporate innovation. From the point of the influence of heterogeneity, for firms with high employee loyalty, low agency cost and few financing constraints, CSR have a stronger impact on innovation. Overall, our results suggest that CSR does have a measurable impact on corporate innovation and contributes to understanding the special role of "legitimacy" in corporate decision-making in emerging markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the impact of stringent environmental regulation on the investment behavior of firms. Using panel data for Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we take the implementation of the new environmental protection law (NEPL) in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment and identify its impact on reducing overinvestment of high polluting firms. Further, for the potential mechanism, we find that the reduction in agency costs and the decrease in the financing caused by NEPL can help to alleviate overinvestment problems. Considering the heterogeneity of firms, NEPL has a greater effect on state-owned firms and large-scale firms, which have serious overinvestment problems. Our empirical evidence strongly supports that NEPL can realize a win-win situation for the environment and the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking the change of provincial leaders in 31 provincial administrative regions in China as the breakthrough point, we choose China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2019 as a research sample to empirically test the impact mechanism of political uncertainty on firm cost stickiness. The study reveals that local companies will reduce their cost stickiness when officials' replacement increases political uncertainty, and this cost decision is directly related to the heterogeneity of officials' characteristics. After eliminating time and economic variables from political fluctuations, we discover that the political features of official change have a significant impact on cost stickiness both in the year before and after the official change. Furthermore, through a detailed examination of the three drivers of cost stickiness, we demonstrate that political uncertainty exacerbates managers' pessimism and establish the path of management sentiment, excluding the drivers of adjustment costs and agency problems. This paper opens up the black box that political uncertainty affects firm cost stickiness by introducing the heterogeneity of officials' characteristics into the study and presenting empirical evidence of political uncertainty and cost stickiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the enactment of Document No. 18 as a quasi-natural event, we take a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 to test the impact of depoliticization on stock price crash risk based on the difference-in-differences (DID) model. Our results show that depoliticization reduces future stock price crash risk more significantly among non-state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, depoliticization can mitigate stock price crash risk through the effects of financing needs, censorship risk and agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) plays a governance role in the Chinese capital market. We hypothesize and find that D&O insurance restrains corporate misconduct and that this phenomenon is much more significant in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We think purchasing of D&O insurance can import supervisors to mitigate agency costs caused by owner absence. When agency costs are high, SOEs with D&O insurance experience less corporate misconduct. Our study also finds that when the agency problem caused by owner absence is more serious in SOEs, the role of D&O insurance in corporate governance becomes increasingly important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borrowing debt has impacted on the financing effect and governance effect of investment entities. Borrowing debt has become an important financing channel for the investment and construction of municipal infrastructure in China. In this paper, panel data from 2003 to 2018 in cities above the prefecture level in China are used to study the impact of borrowing debt on the efficiency loss of municipal infrastructure investment and construction. First, the results indicate that financing constraints have a greater impact than agency costs for the investment and construction of municipal infrastructure in China. Second, borrowing debt can effectively reduce the efficiency loss of municipal infrastructure investment and construction due to financing constraints. Third, the governance effect of borrowing debt is not very positive, but the rigid repayment of debt and interest to international banks will play some positive governance effects in the later stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether social trust mitigates both principal-agent and principal-principal agency costs. Using data from China, we find that those firms headquartered in regions with high levels of social trust have a lower level of perk consumption, a high asset turnover ratio, and a low level of financial tunneling. Thus, the findings provide strong evidence that social trust serves as an invisible hand mitigating agency costs. Additionally, the results demonstrate that social trust's effect is attenuated when external monitoring is already in place, suggestive of a more pronounced monitoring effect of social trust when firms lack formal governance mechanisms. Additional analyses on State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) and non-SOE subsamples reveal that social trust has a more pronounced effect in reducing managerial perk consumption in SOEs than in non-SOEs, whereas the constraining effect of social trust on tunneling is stronger in non-SOEs than it in SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-quality economic development can be achieved if a major strategic direction for China are delivered from the macro level to the micro level. Taking A-listed enterprises in China from 2005 to 2018 as samples, this paper studies the impact of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the highquality enterprise development. The research results show that D&O insurance can promote high-quality development. In addition, the mechanism test shows that D&O insurance can reduce agency costs and improve innovations and high-quality enterprise development. Further analysis shows that when stateowned enterprises including their internal controls has no major defects, D&O insurance has more significant positive impact. Thus, this paper suggests that the insurance should be promoted for realizing high-quality enterprise development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem definition: This paper investigates and compares two types of food safety auditing structures: decentralized and centralized audits. Academic/practical relevance: Decentralized food safety auditing systems are common among developing economies, that is, different tiers of a food supply chain are audited by separate government agencies. Such an auditing structure has been widely criticized as ineffective at mitigating food safety risks. Some developing countries began implementing centralized auditing systems as a remedy for the mis-coordination across local auditing agencies. We compare food safety outcomes and economical payoffs of the two auditing systems. Methodology: We study a parsimonious game-theoretic model of a one-supplier, one-buyer supply chain and two agencies auditing each tier of the supply chain, respectively. Under decentralized audits, each of the two agencies minimizes its individual cost, and their decisions are sequential; under centralized audits, the agencies minimize total agency cost and make auditing commitment up front. Results: We identify forces that drive equilibrium decisions under decentralized audits. The penalty-shield effect of an agency's auditing capability may lead to risky behavior by the supplier. The free-riding effect between the two agencies may lead to less auditing. A centralized commitment makes the agencies the leader in the game at the expense of them losing the flexibility to respond to the actions of supply chain members. The common objective under centralization strengthens the incentives for at least one agency to conduct an audit, but it may also induce the lower-cost, less-capable agency to audit. Hence, centralized audits can be detrimental to performance regarding both food safety outcomes and system payoff. Managerial implications: Changing the auditing structure from decentralization to centralization may fail to improve food safety and system payoff insofar as it may replace one form of inefficiency with another. Addressing the new inefficiencies should be part of the ongoing effort to enhance the efficacy of centralized audits. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on Responsible Research in Operations Management. Funding: The work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1058. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of pay gap on the quality of the internal control. Using state-owned enterprises listed in China from 2012 to 2019 as samples, we find new evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the pay gap and internal control quality, which includes the executives' internal pay gap, external pay gap, and executives-employees pay gap. Furthermore, we also find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the pay gap and the internal control quality in state-owned enterprises with commercial competition, but we don't find similar results for the samples of state-owned enterprises with specific functions. In addition, we provide evidence that the pay gap not only has a direct impact on internal control quality but also has an indirect impact on internal control quality through agency costs. This study supplements research on internal control quality from the perspective of incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the long cycle of innovation, more investment, high risk and other characteristics, Chinese innovative firms tend to have a higher degree of information asymmetry, leading to frequent stock price 'flash crashes'. This study investigates the impact of innovation information disclosure on stock price crash risk by examining the supervisory effect and insurance effect of innovation information disclosure for Growth Enterprises Market(GEM)‐listed firms in China from 2015 to 2019. We find that innovation information disclosure helps reduce firms' future stock price crash risk. The mechanism test finds that innovation information disclosure can exert both supervisory and insurance effects to reduce stock price crash risk. Specifically, after dividing innovation information disclosure into three categories: innovation advantage, content and risk disclosure, a vertical comparison reveals that the insurance effect of innovation advantage disclosure is more significant than the supervisory effect, while the opposite is true for innovation risk disclosure; a horizontal comparison reveals that the supervisory effect of innovation advantage, content and risk disclosure increases and the insurance effect decreases in order. The more types of innovation information disclosure, the more significant the effect of reducing stock price crash risk. Further analysis finds that the inhibitory effect of innovation information disclosure on stock price crash risk is stronger in firms with higher agency costs and higher innovation intensity in the industry. Our research has some insights into how to reduce the stock price crash risk of innovative companies in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to analyse the monitoring adeptness of the financial system in China, particularly in controlling earnings management activities. First, this study identifies the reasons and motivations of managers for involvement in earnings management activities. Second, this study determines whether China's financial system has developed sufficiently to be capable of establishing a strong monitoring mechanism over firms. The study compares how an equity‐based financial structure develops an efficient monitoring system with that of a bank‐based one. A panel dataset of 2997 listed Chinese firms spanning the years 1998–2015 shows that the agency issue is the main reason that firms engage in earnings management activities. Management of financially constrained firms is found to be more prudent than management of other firms because they avoid masking firm performance. The study concludes that Chinese firms are restrained from indulging in managing earnings practices owing to the overwhelming development of the financial system. Moreover, firms in capital market‐based financial structures are more inclined to avoid earnings management compared with those in bank‐based structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, a mandatory dual audit system for domestic A-share firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong stock market (i.e. AH companies) was abolished in 2010. Since then, AH companies have been allowed to choose to have a dual audit or a single audit. We find that the mandatory dual audit regime before the deregulation is associated with a lower cost of equity than voluntary dual audit after the deregulation. Furthermore, the lower cost of equity under the mandatory dual audit regime is greater in companies exposed to stronger financial constraints and with higher agency costs, and is not attenuated by alternative voluntary audits. Our results are not affected by accounting standards convergence and audit quality, and are robust to various model specifications. Our results suggest that the role of mandatory dual audit in mitigating agency costs and information asymmetry is not replaceable by voluntary dual audit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of independent directors' reputations on executive pay‐performance sensitivity. Using hand‐collected data from listed Chinese companies from 2012 to 2017, we find a positive association between independent directors' reputations and pay‐performance sensitivity that is more pronounced in companies with less concentrated ownership. Further, the results show that reputable directors have a stronger influence on pay‐performance sensitivity when they sit on a remuneration committee, are in state‐owned enterprises, and are in companies with higher agency costs. Our results highlight the monitoring role of reputable independent directors in setting effective executive compensation contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019, this paper studies the impact of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on corporate financialization. We find that the implementation of ESOPs has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate financialization, and a series of robustness checks indicate that the conclusion is valid. The mechanism tests show that ESOPs decrease corporate financialization by reducing management agency costs and improving internal control. Heterogeneity analyses indicate that ESOPs in firms with higher financing constraints, a lower external audit quality, and higher proportions of executive shareholdings and self-funded employee equity have a much stronger decreasing effect on corporate financialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Photovoltaic industry promotes the transformation of China's energy structure to green and low-carbon, which is of great significance to achieve the goal of "Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality." At present, the industry is mainly faced with problems such as the drastic reduction of government subsidies and the difficulty of financing. From the perspective of independent auditing, our paper takes 54 A-share listed photovoltaic companies in China from 2011 to 2020 as the research object to study the impact of audit quality on financing efficiency, and the role of agency costs in the relationship between audit quality and financing efficiency.The results show that audit quality is positively related to financing efficiency. For every 1% increase in audit quality, the financing efficiency will increase by 13%. In addition, agency cost plays an intermediary role between audit quality and financing efficiency. For every 1% increase in audit quality, agency cost can be reduced by 34% and financing efficiency can be increased by 25%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Using unique trade credit insurance data from China, we examine whether trade insurance claims are associated with audit efforts and audit quality. Design/methodology/approach: The paper is based on a sample of Chinese firms to study insurance claims of trade credit insurance that affects abnormal audit fees. Findings: In this study, we find that firms with high insurance claims pay higher abnormal audit fees. Further, our findings indicate that firms with high insurance claims have a short audit report lag and tend to select local audit firms. Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the association between trade credit insurance claims and audit efforts. In addition, we contribute to the literature on the agency cost of abnormal audit fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By exploring a unique setting wherein all Chinese listed firms were mandated to specify dividend provisions, we find such dividend regulation generates costs to firms. In particular, low agency cost firms tend to strengthen their dividend provisions. Firms strengthening dividend provisions raise more equity than other firms, at least in a subsample with high dependence on equity. These firms incur higher costs than other firms when issuing equity. All these findings highlight the regulatory cost imposed by dividend regulation. In addition, investors downward revise their valuation of earnings if a firm misses its dividend provision, maintaining the observed separating equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how trade liberalisation affects the extent of corporate decentralisation using the World Bank enterprise survey in China. In particular, we examine the autonomy of production, investment and employment decision and the incentive compensation of CEOs of subsidiary firms after China's entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO). We show that subsidiary firm CEOs receive more decision autonomy and higher powered incentives when facing increased foreign competition in output market. In contrast, subsidiary CEOs receive less decision autonomy and flat incentive compensation when foreign competition in subsidiaries' input market intensifies. When examining subsidiary CEOs' autonomy in different decisions, we find that CEOs' investment autonomy is more responsive to foreign competition than employment and production autonomy. We explain this difference through the agency cost angle by showing that firms whose CEOs with greater investment autonomy tend to spend more on managerial perks. Taken together, this paper sheds new light on how trade liberalisation reshapes firms' decentralisation decisions in a multi‐tasking principal‐agent setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Chinese A-share listed industrial firms between 2009 and 2016, we find that greater religious influence is negatively associated with firm cost stickiness. This negative association is more significant for firms displaying higher agency costs, lower risk aversion, and a higher probability of corruption. Our findings highlight the importance of informal institutions such as religion on corporate behaviours such as cost stickiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether firms' political connection affects their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements and how the effects vary with different political ties, namely symbolic and material connections. These ties reflect different degrees of political embeddedness, interest alignment, network size, and monitoring with the government, and therefore impart divergent effects on managerial incentives for CSR practices. Our analysis indicates that CSR in firms with symbolic connection is much more associated with agency cost than CSR in firms with material connection. We also find that large firms with symbolic connection exhibit lower CSR performance than those with material connection, probably because the former group tends to substitute the prestige of their political capital for the goodwill associated with CSR engagement. These results show that accounting for the effects of different types of political connection on managerial incentives contributes some clarity to the debate about the compatibility of CSR with primary corporate mandates. • We examine whether a firm's political connection affects its CSR engagements • CSR engagement in firms with symbolic connection is associated with agency cost • CSR engagement in firms with material connection is associated with good governance • Large firms with symbolic connections exhibit lower CSR performance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Urban redevelopment is a crucial prescription in response to the problems associated with limited land, urban decay, and fading buildings, especially for China's megacities. Given that state-dominated urban redevelopment is slow and limited, the Chinese government has proposed a pioneering market-oriented approach to drive urban redevelopment in Shenzhen. This study seeks to examine the impacts of market-oriented institutional arrangements on land redevelopment approval duration (LRAD) in China from the perspective of public and private interests. Various institutional arrangements are observed under the institutional change of urban redevelopment in Shenzhen, and they are differed by the nature of the applicants, including the original property owners (old factory owner (OFO)), their representatives (e.g., village committees (VC) and the government agency involved in redevelopment (URB)), and developers (DP , second-hand property owner). A number of hypotheses are developed, and empirical tests are conducted to verify or dismiss our hypotheses with the data in Shenzhen. The empirical findings indicate that (1) The LRAD is the shortest when the applicant is the OFO and the longest if the applicant is the local government officials such as URB. (2) Compared with the URB , the LRAD is shorter if the VC is the applicant. (3) The LRAD is longer for the projects with a larger redevelopment scale and the projects with more dedicated public facilities. The findings shed new insights into the design and practical effects of market-oriented institutional arrangements on the progress performance of urban redevelopment, which can give the local government a timely reminder that they should examine and approve urban redevelopment schemes in a soundly planned and socially sustainable fashion. • Under bottom up urban redevelopment, property owners are endowed with land redevelopment right and allowed to apply for redevelopment directly. • Institutional arrangements are differed by the nature of the applicant who owns different sets of property/land rights. • Land redevelopment approval duration (LRAD) is the shortest when the applicant is the sole private property owners. • LRAD is the longest if the applicant is the local government officials. • Compared with the local government, LRAD is shorter if village committee (VC) is the applicant due to lower agency cost. • LRAD is longer for the projects with a larger-scale redevelopment site and the projects with more developer obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]