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The Arctic is rapidly warming posing a significant threat to underlying permafrost. Permafrost degradation has already resulted in extensive damage to the Arctic's built infrastructure, putting communities and industries at risk. Projected climate warming will further reduce the capacity of permafrost to support infrastructure, thereby requiring a rethinking of construction and development of permafrost regions in the future. This paper focuses on three Arctic regions with a substantial presence of population and infrastructure on permafrost: USA (Alaska), Canada, and Russia. The three regions' permafrost construction practices are examined in order to identify best practices and major gaps. We identify a lack of standardized, codified construction guidelines; an absence of permafrost-geotechnical monitoring in communities; barriers to integrating climate scenarios into future planning; limited data sharing; and low numbers of permafrost professionals as major constraints limiting the region's resilience in the face of climate change. Refining building practices and standards, implementing operational permafrost monitoring systems, developing downscaled climate projections, and integrating local knowledge will minimize the impacts of permafrost degradation under rapidly warming climatic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, Russia has considerably ramped up its military presence in the Arctic. This is something that attracted much attention from Western countries, especially against the backdrop of deteriorated relations and general mistrust following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Current developments are to some extent familiar, as they echo the militarisation of the Arctic during the Cold War and the attendant US-Soviet tensions. Although comparisons with the Soviet Union's Arctic military posture lie close at hand, we need to analyse Russia's current military build-up in the Arctic with fresh eyes. Two of the most indicative developments were studied. Firstly, the formation of a single Arctic military command, with its implications for a reassessment of the Arctic strategic direction; secondly, the physical expansion of its Arctic military footprint, which includes both the construction of modern facilities and the increased activity of its armed forces there. In both these developments, the Northern Fleet is taking on a leading role, but the overall military posture relies on other military and civilian actors as well, and is closely related to security concerns of the developing latitudinal axis of the Northern Sea Route, rather than the Cold War longitudinal axis of a massive nuclear weapons exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global human influence on the climate is growing at an alarming pace. This trend appears doomed to continue. Polar regions are feeling the effects first. This means that if the impacts of climate change serve to motivate effective policies, polar regions could be a good place to look for climate policy innovation. It is within this context that this article considers Arctic climate policy in Russia and Canada. The basic question posed is whether the unique and immediate threat climate change presents in the Arctic is reflected in progressive laws and policies with respect to four key areas: mitigation, adaptation, impacts and vulnerability, and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security interests of Arctic states are increasingly described as intertwined. The Arctic is seen either as a region where great power rivalries or resource wars are likely, or as a part of the world defined by cooperative traits and shared security interests. These depictions often implicitly lean on notions of a security region and regionalism, albeit without utilizing such frameworks to unpack security interactions in the Arctic. An increasing number of Arctic-focused scholars refer to the Arctic as a region in terms of security interests, but is this really the case if we make use of the different ways a security region has been outlined as an analytical tool? Leaning on different levels of analysis, this article questions several assumptions underpinning recent work on military security in the Arctic, advancing our understanding of security dynamics in the north and adding to our knowledge of security regions as a concept within international studies. It is argued that descriptions of the Arctic as a new security region are based on mixing and equating two distinct features of the region: the changing climate and related increases in economic ventures; and Russia's military build-up and regional hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fundamentally new integrated approach to the state activity on the adaptation to changing environmental conditions, namely, the territorial planning of land use is proposed by the example of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation being the most vulnerable region to climate change. Adaptation measures for natural ecosystems are scientifically grounded for the Arctic region: the prevention of permafrost surface cover disturbances, the minimization of other types of anthropogenic impact and pollution, the maintenance and increase in surface albedo in winter. The examples of development of a dual indicator system are given: for monitoring the implementation of measures and adaptation efficiency (the quantitative markers of climate-caused damage). The analysis of all indicators in the adaptation efficiency monitoring system, as well as the projections of indicators for 5–10 years ahead help to make reasoned management decisions to correct the applied adaptation measures. The practical application of the results includes the use of the developed approaches in the sectoral and regional plans and at the second stage of the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arctic is undergoing a rapid transition toward a seasonal ice regime, with widespread implications for the polar ecosystem, human activities, as well as the global climate. Here we focus on how the changing ice cover impacts transborder exchange of sea ice between the exclusive economic zones of the Arctic states. We use the Sea Ice Tracking Utility, which follows ice floes from formation to melt, in conjunction with output diagnostics from two ensembles of the Community Earth System Model that follow different future emissions scenarios. The Community Earth System Model projects that by midcentury, transnational ice exchange will more than triple, with the largest increase in the amount of transnational ice originating from Russia and the Central Arctic. However, long‐distance ice transport pathways are predicted to diminish in favor of ice exchanged between neighboring countries. By the end of the 21st century, we see a large difference between the two future emissions scenarios considered: Consistent nearly ice‐free summers under the high emissions scenario act to reduce the total fraction of transnational ice exchange compared to midcentury, whereas the low emissions scenario continues to see an increase in the proportion of transnational ice. Under both scenarios, transit times are predicted to decrease to less than 2 yr by 2100, compared to a maximum of 6 yr under present‐day conditions and 2.5 yr by midcentury. These significant changes in ice exchange and transit time raise important concerns regarding risks associated with ice‐rafted contaminants. Plain Language Summary: The Arctic is undergoing a rapid transition toward a thinner, less extensive, more mobile sea ice cover. This affects the amount of sea ice exchanged between the exclusive economic zones of Arctic states. Here we use an Earth System Model, the Community Earth System Model, to track sea ice from where it forms to where it ultimately melts. By midcentury, the area of sea ice exchanged between the different regions of the Arctic is predicted to more than triple compared to the end of the twentieth century, with the Central Arctic joining Russia as a major ice "exporter." At the same time, the exchange of sea ice over long distances is predicted to diminish in favor of ice exchanged between neighboring Arctic states. By midcentury, the average time required for ice to travel from one region to another is more than halved; by 2100, nearly all transports take less than a year, with little multiyear ice left in the Arctic. Sea ice provides a transport mechanism for a variety of material, including algae, dust, and a range of pollutants. The acceleration, and then disappearance, of sea ice has important implications for managing contamination in Arctic waters. Key Points: The CESM projects a large increase in transnational ice exchanged in the Arctic by midcentury with transit times reduced to under 2 yrBy midcentury the amount of transnational ice originating from Russia doubles and the Central Arctic emerges as the second dominant sourceLong‐distance ice transport pathways diminish by 2100 in favor of regions directly downstream, especially under the high emissions scenario [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]