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This article proceeds to analyze the Atlante freddo trilogy, focusing particularly on the interplay between fictional creation and the author’s cognizance of crime chronicles explored in his non-fictional works. From this vantage point, Bernardi’s novels emerge as an experimental terrain wherein he probes conceivable narratives, employing the narrative as a pretext to delineate the locales and dynamics of contemporary society. The trilogy by Bernardi directs attention to a spectrum of concerns, encompassing the marginalization of the foreigner, the erosion of the media’s informative function, and the interrelation between minor and major criminal activities. Ultimately, a comparative analysis between Bernardi and Carlotto is introduced, primarily examining ideological and thematic alignments.

Članak donosi neobjavljene i u to vrijeme neke objavljene dokumente o Stepincu iz Meštrovićeva arhiva na Sveučilištu Notre Dame u Indiani, SAD, na kojem je Meštrović predavao od 1955. godine do svoje smrti 1962. godine. Uz ostale, donosi se Meštrovićevo pismo kardinalu Spellmanu iz 1954. godine označeno oznakom „povjerljivo“, pismo Alojzija Stepinca Meštroviću od 3. listopada 1956. godine, Meštrovićeva čestitka Stepincu u povodu njegova 60. rođendana, prepiska sa č. s. Reginom Mary C. S. J. nakon Meštrovićeva posjeta Stepincu 1959. godine. U članku su dokumenti dijelom transkribirani i prikazani su, tj. obrađeni najvažniji sadržaji. Dokumenti su nastali u razdoblju od 1949. do 1960. godine. Dokumentacija pokazuje da je Ivan Meštrović iznimno poštovao Stepinca te ga je smatrao nevinim u odnosu na sva nedjela koja su mu se u montiranom sudskom procesu i u javnosti stavljala na teret.

Članak donosi neobjavljene i u to vrijeme neke objavljene dokumente o Stepincu iz Meštrovićeva arhiva na Sveučilištu Notre Dame u Indiani, SAD, na kojem je Meštrović predavao od 1955. godine do svoje smrti 1962. godine. Uz ostale, donosi se Meštrovićevo pismo kardinalu Spellmanu iz 1954. godine označeno oznakom „povjerljivo“, pismo Alojzija Stepinca Meštroviću od 3. listopada 1956. godine, Meštrovićeva čestitka Stepincu u povodu njegova 60. rođendana, prepiska sa č. s. Reginom Mary C. S. J. nakon Meštrovićeva posjeta Stepincu 1959. godine. U članku su dokumenti dijelom transkribirani i prikazani su, tj. obrađeni najvažniji sadržaji. Dokumenti su nastali u razdoblju od 1949. do 1960. godine. Dokumentacija pokazuje da je Ivan Meštrović iznimno poštovao Stepinca te ga je smatrao nevinim u odnosu na sva nedjela koja su mu se u montiranom sudskom procesu i u javnosti stavljala na teret.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 69-86 | European Forum Insight of 02 May 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Frontex under scrutiny: allegations, investigations, and the rule of law dilemma. - III. From Aleppo to the CJEU: WS et al. challenge Frontex in Court. - IV. The findings of the Court: no direct causal link. - V. Legal remedies and litigation avenues before the CJEU. - VI. In light of precedent: evolving perspectives on causation and joint liability. - VII. Consequences of WS for Frontex Accountability. - vii.1. Rapid reactions and resounding criticism. - vii.2. Unaddressed aspects: what the Court didn't say. - vii.3. Frontex Liability under the Competence Model. - VIII. Broader Consequences of WS for EU Law. - viii.1. The ecosystem of integrated administration. - viii.2. Is there space in EU law for joint liability?. - IX. Conclusion: shaping the EU joint liability landscape? | (Abstract) The Insight delves into the CJEU judgment of WS et al. v Frontex, the first action for damages against the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, for human rights violations at the EU's external borders. Despite the prevalence of systemic violations and heightened attention to the agency's accountability, the Court, applying a stringent causality threshold, dismissed the claim, sidestepping crucial questions of positive obligations and responsibility attribution. The analysis critiques the judgment's shortcomings in causality assessment, emphasising its broader repercussions for EU law, particularly concerning liability frameworks and accountability dynamics within the new multi-actor reality of EU integrated administration. The Insight underscores the pressing need to reevaluate the existing competence model of determining liability in EU law to address its limitations and introduces the classification of these limitations as the binary of causality and the binary of jurisdiction. The CJEU’s reluctance to establish an effective framework for joint liability not only perpetuates contested accountability gaps but also risks establishing precarious areas devoid of accountability, thereby compromising the foundational principles of the Rule of Law in the European Union. The Insight concludes with a call to address these shortcomings, emphasising that rectification is not merely a matter of procedural refinement but a crucial step towards ensuring robust accountability mechanisms in EU law.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 53-68 | European Forum Insight of 2 May 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Le contexte des interventions devant la CIJ. – II. Les modalités d’intervention devant la CIJ. – II.2. L’intervention en interprétation de l’art. 62 du Statut de la CIJ. – II.2. L’intervention en interprétation de l’art. 63 du Statut de la CIJ. – III. Les principaux arguments des interventions. – III.1. La question centrale de la compétence de la Cour: art. IX de la Convention. – III.2. L’interprétation des arts I et VIII de la Convention. – III.3. L’interprétation des arts II et III de la Convention. – IV. Impact procédural des interventions multiples devant la CIJ. – IV.1. Le double objectif des déclarations d’intervention des États membres de l’Union européenne. – IV.2. Une crainte de retard rapidement rassurée. – IV.3. L’ordonnance du 5 juin 2023. – V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) In the context of the litigation relating to the Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v Russian Federation) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Member States of the European Union (EU) have in turn filed a declaration of intervention on the basis of art. 63 of the Statute of the ICJ. Scarcely deployed in practice, this procedure allows third parties’ States to the proceedings to declare the interpretation they adopt on the convention in dispute to which they are parties. In the present case, the States, on the one hand, interpret the convention in such a way as to ensure the jurisdiction of the Court and, on the other hand, that the use of armed force without the authorization of the Security Council is not a means of prevention or repression, even in the case of a potential genocide. In doing so, the intervening States openly show their support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the massive use of the declaration of intervention also tends to look like a instrumentalization of the law, directed towards Russia.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 39-52 | European Forum Insight of 15 April 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. The complexity of the geopolitical matter. - i.1. EU gas policy before 2022. - i.2. The Russian retaliation after the invasion. - II. The measures adopted in response (and their opposers). - ii.1. The first steps: saving gas. - ii.2. Gently steering the market. - ii.3. Joint purchases of gas. - ii.4. Enforcing solidarity. - III. The most debated aspect: what limits to market intervention? - iii.1. Regulation 2022/2578: another round of the price cap debate. - iii.2. A balancing solution? - IV. The effectivity of the measures: the impact assessments and the comments. - iv.1. After the emergency: the situation after one year. - iv.2. The energy community (was) now: was the EU prepared? - iv.3. The legal issues. - iv.4. The return of geopolitics and the future of an open(?) strategic autonomy. | (Abstract) This Insight offers an overview of the EU's evolving energy policy in the face of the energy crisis which followed the Russian illegal invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the critical interplay between legal measures, market dynamics, and geopolitical strategy. In the first section, the Insight will examine the history of the EU policy on gas and its inherent risks, presenting the supply shock which occurred after the invasion February 2022. In the second section, the Insight details the legislative measures adopted under RepowerEU in the field of gas, describing the various approaches such as reducing consumption, ensuring storage, and fostering interstate solidarity, highlighting how the political debates between member states have contributed to shape the Regulations on the matter. In the third section, the Insight also explores the complex dynamics of market interventions, particularly the debated Market Correction Mechanism (MCM) and its implications for EU energy markets. In the final section, the Insight examines the impact of these measures, noting the mixed outcomes highlighted in the EU commissioned reports and presenting the criticism of other stakeholders, highlighting the legal challenges in implementing coordinated energy policies among Member States with diverse interests. Moreover, reflecting on the post-crisis landscape, the Insight advocates for a transition from emergency measures to strategic foresight in energy policy. It argues for the EU's need to balance national autonomy with collective energy security, suggesting a shift towards more integrated energy policies also in light of preserving the EU’s strategic autonomy in response to emerging geopolitical challenges.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 21-38 | European Forum Insight of 15 April 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Context. - III. The draft regulation in detail. - III.1 Category 1 NGT plants. - III.2 Category 2 NGT plants. - III.3. Provisions for delegated and implementing acts as well as guidance material. - IV. Assessment of different scientific aspects in the regulation. - IV.1. Scientific reasoning of equivalence criteria as given in Annex I. - IV.2. Scientific reasoning of risk assessment criteria as given in Annex II. - V. Assessment of different legal aspects in the draft regulation. - V.1. Deliberate releases of cat 1 plants and committee procedure. - V.2 Precautionary principle. - V.3. Cartagena protocol. - v.4. Amendment of Annex I via delegated act. - VI. Ongoing discussion | (Abstract) This Insight explains in detail, yet easily understandable, the contents of the European Commission’s draft regulation on plants obtained by certain new genomic techniques and their food and feed. It critically comments on the underlying scientific considerations and discusses potential legal issues – the precautionary principle being one of them, though arguably not the most important one. Finally, the Insight summarizes the ongoing discussions and developments regarding the draft regulation. The Authors also hint at potential amendments, which might resolve some of the remaining problems.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1679-1695 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. The normative positioning of the Union: a new space for the collective exercise of sovereignty. – II.1. Human rights and criminal law, a source of inspiration and legitimacy. – II.2. Normative interpretation and hybridization within the Council practice. – III. “Supplementing” criminal repression? A new space to overcome the limits of jurisdiction. – III.1. Foreign policy v. criminal repression: the nature and purpose of the measures involved. – III.2. Overcoming the limits of jurisdiction and extending the reach of the measures. | (Abstract) The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime was adopted by the European Union in December 2020, following in the footsteps of its allies and some of its own Member States. Initiated across the Atlantic in response to the murder of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, these thematic international sanctions can now target anyone associated with the most serious human rights violations. Presented as key levers in the international fight against impunity, these instruments lie at the confluence of foreign policy and criminal justice. The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime is therefore a privileged observation point for studying the evolution of practice in areas that are traditionally closely associated with State sovereignty. More specifically, the analysis, carried out within the framework of both EU external action law and public international law, shows how the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime enables the Union and its Member States to grasp some international situations which would fall outside their single competences and jurisdictions. This in turn illustrates a form of enhanced, collective and long-armed sovereignty, exercised on the international stage by the EU and its members in the service of their values and strategic interests.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1575-1597 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. New formulas in the regime of mutual recognition in the EIO. – III. The question of defining investigative measures and having recourse to a different one. – III.1. The applicability of the corrective mechanism in other cooperation systems. – IV. An increased extent of direct communication between the issuing and the executing authorities. – IV.1. Regulating greater communication between issuing and executing authorities as a form of institutionalised distrust. – V. The fundamental rights-based refusal ground and the question of its applicability. – V.1. Making the fundamental rights-based refusal ground the norm instead of it being the exception. – VI. Conclusion. | (Abstract) This Article concerns the European Investigation Order (EIO) and its relations to the principle of mutual recognition. The principle has been the engine of judicial cooperation in criminal matters between Member States of the European Union since the adoption of the Tampere conclusions in 1999. Member States rely on the principle in creating cooperation systems, thereby facilitating interaction among their criminal justice systems. Since Member States refrain from extensive criminal law harmonisation, the principle is of utmost importance. As such, a common regulatory technique was developed through which the principle is given effect in every cooperation system created so far. Although this regulatory technique was mostly followed in the directive establishing the EIO, it also introduced several novelties in the regime, notably the option to have recourse to another investigative measure, the possibility for a greater extent of communication, and the fundamental rights-based refusal ground. This Article argues that these rules make the EIO directive more protective of fundamental rights and show a new trend in the cooperation systems based on the principle of mutual recognition. In addition, while reviewing the applicability of these rules in other cooperation systems, it provides a proposal on how to apply them to enhance mutual trust between Member States through legislation.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1697-1740 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. Aid and assistance provided to Ukraine since February 2022. – II.1. The European Union and its Member States. – II.2. The United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada. – II.3. Russia’s response. – II.4. Reactions from other states. – II.5. Conclusion. – III. Jus ad bellum, neutrality law, and jus in bello: the need for legal coherence. – III.1. Collective self-defence. – III.2. Different shades of neutrality? – III.3. Party status. – IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) To assist Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression, the EU invoked the European Peace Facility to “finance the provision of […] military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force for defensive purposes”. It marks the first time that the EU is funding the provision of lethal equipment to a third state. In October 2022, the EU announced the creation of EUMAM Ukraine to train Ukrainian Armed Forces to use the weapons EU Member States have provided. Since February 2022, the EU’s military aid and assistance has only increased. EU Member States are also providing military aid and assistance bilaterally, including training Ukrainian soldiers. In so doing, they are aligning their assistance with “like-minded” partners and NATO Member States, particularly the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Canada. This Article will assess the supply of military aid and equipment to Ukraine as well as the training of UAF through the lens of international law. One wonders whether the EU’s military aid and assistance amounts to collective self-defence, even if none of the supporting actors have invoked art. 51 UN Charter. The argument could be made that the EU and its Member States are breaching neutrality law in supplying lethal aid to Ukraine, albeit it has been argued that neutrality law is no longer relevant in the post charter era. The question also arises whether these actors have become parties to the conflict, even if supporting states and the EU frequently assert that they are not co-belligerents.