Search

Copyright of Automotive Digest is the property of Automotive Digest Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of South China University of Technology (Natural Science Edition) is the property of South China University of Technology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the context of the rapid advancement of the digital economy and its deep integration with the real economy, enterprise digital transformation emerges as a pivotal force driving sustainable innovation. Nonetheless, this transformation encounters significant challenges, notably the "transformation dilemma of digital" and the "innovation paradox of digital", impeding both digital transformation and innovation within enterprises. Existing literature has overlooked the influence of market environments on enterprise digital transformation while predominantly focusing on its enabling effects rather than considering its potential burdens. This paper addresses these gaps by constructing a theoretical framework that elucidates the interplay among market power, digital transformation, and innovation.It demonstrates the phenomenon of reduced innovation caused by excessive digital transformation in the market power. Through empirical analysis using data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing companies spanning from 2007 to 2021, the study examines the nonlinear indirect effect of enterprise digital transformation on the relationship between market power and innovation output. Results indicate that while market power facilitates digital transformation, excessive transformation can hinder innovation output, with an optimal inflection point for innovation empowerment. We show that digital transformation indirectly impacts the influence of market power on innovation output. Specifically, companies with greater market power can achieve digital transformation more efficiently and rapidly. However, excessive digital transformation can impose burdens and impede innovation output within enterprises. Further analysis demonstrates that government interventions adjust the nonlinear relationship between digital transformation and innovation empowerment to varying extents through industrial support and property rights mechanisms. Contributions of this research include expanding the endogenous growth model to incorporate the digital decision index, thereby demonstrating the nonlinear relationship between digital transformation and innovation performance within market structures. Moreover, it offers the first empirical evidence of the impact of enterprise market power on digital transformation decisions and tests the innovation paradox with a substantial sample size. Furthermore, the study highlights the guiding role of government functions, providing insights for policy formulation to address barriers to digital transformation and foster innovation. Overall, this paper provides a theoretical basis for the scientific understanding of the relationship between market structure, digital transformation, and innovation performance. Its findings enrich the literature on industrial organization and digital transformation, offering practical implications for improving market structures and facilitating the deployment of innovation strategies in industrial digital transformation. It provides valuable guidance for policymakers to navigate enterprise digitalization challenges and alleviate digital and innovation insufficiencies resulting from intense competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to deal with the situation of power marketing service under the new situation and improve the service of power grid in the internet era, a virtual robot model of "Internet+ Marketing service" was designed by the dung beetle optimizer (DBO) algorithm. Firstly, interaction analysis and relationship framework design were carried out for possible human-machine interaction scenarios in the power grid marketing department. Then, a virtual robot autonomous learning model was established based on deep Q network (DQN), and the DBO algorithm was introduced to efficiently optimize the model hyperparameters. The optimized model learning was completed through training. Finally, actual power marketing data was input into the model for experimental testing. The actual application of the virtual robot model was comprehensively tested in a specific testing environment.The test results show that the normal operation rate of the model and system in functional experiments, non functional experiments, and safety experiments reach 100%, which can achieve human-machine interaction function and the strategic goal of accurate response to customer needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tourism Tribune / Lvyou Xuekan is the property of Tourism Institute of Beijing Union University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Angle Health Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The construction of market power regulation is one of the critical elements of the current market construction and supervision system construction in China. Firstly， this paper summarizes the detection methods， mitigation measures， and evaluation indicators of overseas electricity market power and compares and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of structural processes and behavior-influence methods. Then， the problems and challenges faced by China are summarized from the perspective of power supply distribution， power supply mix， network frame power flow， and bidding strategy. The paper analyzes the problems and challenges faced by China’s market power control construction. Furthermore， it points out that China’s market power regulation on the power generation side should take power plants as the primary control object. A regulation system that combines events before and after with emphasis on the behavior-influence method is established. Finally， from the market design and construction perspective， measures to mitigate market power are proposed， and an evaluation index system for market power is given to provide a reference for the construction of market power regulation in China.

Copyright of China Rural Water & Hydropower is the property of China Rural Water & Hydropower Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Angle Health Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Angle Health Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tourism Tribune / Lvyou Xuekan is the property of Tourism Institute of Beijing Union University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Computer Engineering & Applications is the property of Beijing Journal of Computer Engineering & Applications Journal Co Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zhejiang Electric Power is the property of Zhejiang Electric Power Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology / Shehui is the property of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Based on the game models under different market structures, the impacts of different competition modes on upstream manufacturers ' innovation investment decision-making in horizontal and vertical dimensions were discussed. The results showed that the horizontal market competition intensity has a negative effect on upstream manufacturers ' innovation investment willingness, while the vertical market power has a positive effect on upstream manufacturers' innovation investment willingness. However, compared with the benchmark situation without competition pressure, both horizontal and vertical competition will reduce manufacturers ' motivation to invest in research and development innovation, and the double competition pressure from the horizontal and vertical dimensions will aggravate this inhibition. Finally, through numerical analysis, the correctness of the obtained results is verified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vertical product quality differentiation model consisting of monopolistic manufacturers and downstream oligarchic competitors was constructed. Based on this model, the changes in quality-innovating incentives and market equilibrium results were investigated before and after the downstream large-scale enterprises with high-quality products had market power.Research showed that when downstream enterprises at different quality levels all have no market power, the quality promotion of any party will stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of its competitors. When a downstream large-scale enterprise has market power and negotiates with an upstream manufacturer, the wholesale prices and the retail prices of the two downstream enterprises will decline with the increase of market power. At the same time, the wholesale prices, retail prices and market sales of the two downstream companies all depend on buyers’ market power while the sales and profitability of small-scale enterprises remain unchanged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwan Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of NTU Management Review is the property of NTU Management Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2005 to 2013, the paper investigates the relationship between market power and the trade credit of a company. The paper shows that market power has a positive effect on the trade credit, the company who has relative stronger market power will obtain more trade credit, and the market power is especially important to the company who is in a competitive market and facing financial constraint. The future research talks about the financial crisis, and finds that companies facing financial constraint tend to obtain more trade credit by their market power after the 2008 financial crisis, and the phenomenon doesn't exist in the companies who don't face financial constraint. The paper verifies the market competition hypothesis and enriches the research category of the hypothesis. In summary, the conclusion of the paper will give us a chance to understand the effect mechanism of trade credit, and has some policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pricing game of the manufacturer and retailer when both channel competition and brand competition exist in the supply chain is studied. Based on different market power structures, the manufacturer Stackelberg game model and retailer Stackelberg game model are established. The equilibrium solutions of the models are given. Finally, the validity of those models is verified through a numerical example, and the effects of price sensitivities on the demands of every channel and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are analyzed. As a result, the managerial implications is obtained that it is beneficial for the increase of supply chain members' profit to establish brand loyalty of their products, but it is not beneficial for the increase of manufacturer's profit to establish channel loyalty, and the leader of the Stackelberg game has the advantage of gaining more profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market power can reflect on the influence capacity of an industrial plant in all respects of its product marketing. It is generally agreed that excessive market power will cause monopoly and hence distort the configuration of market resources and downgrade social welfare. Yet a proper market power will help to some extent promote positive competition and production stability. The present case study is based on the data concerning the cement products of all provinces in China from 2005 to 2010. It is found that there is no significant market power in the North and Northeast as well as in the South-west and Northwest areas, and an extreme weak one in the South and East-Middle areas, which may be an unstable situation. The Open-door Policy has brought about rapid increase in China's cement industry, which, however, has also generated a series of structural problems. They may be implicit in high-speed economy growth, but will drastically affect its healthy development once the economy advancement speed slows down and the market demand for cement decreases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The microscopic study of market structure is always one of the important research directions, the relevant studies of the degree and the influence of the market power, domestically, however, might be with much importance due to the significant characteristic of concentrated supply of housing by the developers. This paper estimates the price elasticity of demand for 1029 commercial housing project and, of which, the Lerner Index for 494 elastic ones using the micro-level data set from Beijing. Based on the estimated result, the spatial distribution of the degree of monopoly of the housing market in Beijing is derived, and the impact of market power on the housing trading premium is empirically tested. It is revealed that every one percent marginal increase of the market power will result in 0.83% increase of the premium, which is excellent robust over different segmentations of sub-market. Besides, an analysis perspective, based on the concept of elasticity, is provided helping to explain the phenomenon of unwillingness to sell in recent market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great number of countries' electricity industries have been deregulated since 1990s, and more and more countries are going to do that. Electricity industry is one of the most complex systems in the world because of its special physical characteristics. The electricity industry has been vertically integrated in the past 100 years, that is, generation, transmission and distribution are all controlled by regulated public utilities. With the development of new electricity technology, especially the invention of CCGT, deregulation of electricity industry becomes feasible. After deregulation, generation and transmission are separated. The generators are required to bid in the wholesale electricity market for their production while the transmission networks are still controlled by regulated independent system operator because of its network effect. After the deregulation, the electricity price continues to stay unexpectedly high because of generators' market power. In fact, the generators' market power has become one of the most important problems in the deregulated electricity industries. As is known to all, the final result of the generators' market power is high price, which is not necessarily the result of market power. Sometimes the high price is probably due to high demand and low supply, that is the scarcity rents. The generators' market power should be suppressed while scarcity rent is necessary to the generators, by which the generators can recover their large scale fixed costs, though the scarcity rent should be protected. How to differentiate the market power from scarcity rent has become a challenging but meaningful work. Though it is hard work to monitor the generators' market power because of the complexity of electricity system, there are still plenty of achievements in this field. In this paper, we review the literature on the monitoring of generators' market power in wholesale electricity market by monitoring. In traditional industrial economics, market concentration index is the most commonly used method to measure market power, but not appropriate to be applied to electricity market because of its special characteristics. As we know, electricity demand and supply are highly inelastic and insensitive to the price, so the generators share high market power during the peak period even if its market share is very small. Some economists try to perfect the concentration index to reflect the characters of electricity market, which are pivotal supplier indicator and residual supply index, but these indices are still static and not ideal. More complex methods are simulation models, including competitive benchmark analysis, Cournot simulation and supply function equilibrium simulation. Simulation models try to reflect the main characters of the electricity market and simulate the generators' market behaviors in special conditions. The results of the simulation model is more accurate but complex. Besides the behavior indices, other three methods are also considered, including residual demand analysis, new empirical industrial organization and withhold analysis. These methods try to reflect the characters of electricity market and thus complex too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]