Search

The Ch'ing Dynasty was a dynasty established by the Manchus. In the 267 years from the beginning of Manchu rule in China until the end of the dynasty there were altogether ten emperors. Hsüan-yeh, the K'ang-hsi emperor (the second ruler after the establishment of the Ch'ing Dynasty in China), who reigned for almost 62 years, was undoubtedly one of the most outstanding. When the Shun-chih emperor died, Hsüan-yeh was only eight years old. Yet this eight year old boy succeeded to the throne as the K'ang-hsi emperor. In terms of his position among the sons of the Shun-chih emperor, he did not have the status of being a son of the empress and in terms of age, he was not the oldest of the emperor's sons. So why did the Shun-chih emperor not choose another son instead of allowing Hsüan-yeh to inherit the throne? There were of course reasons for this. In answering this question this article cites books and documents, both official and private, Chinese and foreign, verifying their accuracy. Furthermore, in discussing this problem, this article vividly reveals certain customs of the Manchus of more than 300 years ago, the situation between the emperor and the princes, and the power structure of the Manchu regime so that we see the historical facts in a three-dimensional and not a one-dimensional way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that Nurhaci was able to achieve political stability and establish the Later Jin Dynasty at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and that the Qing Dynasty could suddenly rise as a political force in the North-East, was intimately connected with the outcome of the Battle of Sarhü. The Battle of Sarhü occurred in 1619, one year before the death of Emperor Shen Zong. Although at least 200,000 men took part on either side, and the Mongols and Koreans came to the aid of the Ming, the outcome of the battle was decided within five or six days: Nurhaci achieved total victory, and the Ming troops were routed. From that time on, the balance of power between the Jurchen (as the Manchus called themselves at that time) and the Ming changed. The Jurchens advanced gradually, entrenching themselves step by step, and the Ming troops were in an entirely defensive position, barely able to withstand the attack. Why could a small number of Jurchen troops, under Nurhaci, defeat the armies of the Ming Dynasty so easily? Was it because the bitterly cold weather of Liaodong was disadvantageous to the fighting style of the Ming troops? Was it because the Jurchen troops were more familiar with the mountainous terrain east of the Liao River? Was it because of the arrogance of the Ming generals and men, each acting as he saw fit, and the subsequent dispersion and lack of concentration of the Ming forces? Or was it that the commanders-in-chief of the Ming armies were mediocre, cowardly and incompetent, and that they brought upon themselves the shame of national defeat? If all of these factors were present, perhaps the Battle of Sarhü was only one of the contributing factors in the final defeat of the Ming troops. It is the view of the author of this article that the situation in Liaodong at the time of the Battle of Sarhü was such, that the defeat of the Ming troops was inevitable. Detailed arguments for this view are presented in the main text of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ch'ing dynasty was established by the Manchus, a national minority in China. There were many suspicious circumstances surrounding the accession of the third emperor of the dynasty, Shih-tsung (Emperor Yung-cheng), and this has been a topic of considerable controversy amongst scholars. Over the past ten years, the author of the present article has published several papers on Shih-tsung and the fourteenth son of Emperor K'ang-hsi the Fu-yuan Ta Chiang-chun Yin-chen, which have supported the view that when Shih-tsung succeeded Emperor K'ang-hsi, he usurped the throne from his younger brother. The present article approaches the problem from another angle. Did K'ang-hsi's fourteenth son receive an instruction from K'ang-hsi, prior to his death, to the effect that he should inherit the throne, and did he return to Peking with the understanding that he would become Emperor? Or was the reason he returned to Peking to take part in the funeral ceremonies for his father, after he had been informed by Shih-tsung of his death? This article investigates the question of the usurpation of Shih-tsung from this direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]