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Outdated legislations refer to those failing to meet the needs of economic and social development, losing contact with reality, or going against the mainstream values in our society. They are commonly seen in the field of economic law. Due to complex economic relations, economic law does not always meet our realistic needs, leading to an inefficient interaction with economic and non-economic systems in our society. Outdated laws fall in to several types according to different causes for their obsolescence. As to out dated legislations in the field of economic law, we can identify and correct them through introducing legal assessment, democratic legislation, accountability system and judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Land policy has a prominent position in the macro-control, but often encounters the plight of the local government default during the implementing. This article explains the main reason and behavior of the local government default, and analysis the principal-agent relationships and utility functions of the central and local governments in land policy transmission process by information economics. Then through the introduction of the transfer variable of the default compensation, Holmstrom and Milgrom simplified model has been partially improved, the optimization model is established based on the land macro control preferences of central government and the demands of the legitimate interests of local governments, and the linear accountability system for local government in land macro-control is drawn. The results show that: the local government to expand the impact of default will increase its default risk costs, and enhance the investigation and penalty of the central government for the local government default so as to promote the local government to soften its default behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]