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As regards the debate on the European Constitution-Building processes, a key question is whether the European Constitution shall enjoy the supreme status in any domestic legal system of the Member States in the EU. The Convention and IGC between 2002 and 2004 seem to have established such a supreme status in the EU by installing Article 1-6 of the Constitution, which is integrally based upon the principle of supremacy established by the European Court of Justice since its famous Costa judgment in 1964. Nonetheless, no work in-tends to survey the relevant jurisprudence of all Member States in the EU with the intention of offering a politico-legal explanation of the development and limits of the principle of supremacy. Therefore, this shall be the objective of this paper, along with a desire to respond to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper. A general survey of the relevant jurisprudence of ECJ will be presented first, followed by an evaluation of reaction from the jurisdictions of all Member States with the exception of those that most recently joined to the EU. The limits of this principle in the European Constitution, which distinguishes it from the constitution of any modern state, shall be analyzed accordingly. In conclusion, this article presents a political-legal explanation of the development and limits of the principle of supremacy in order to determine whether the European Constitution can be deemed a constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In consideration of deeply rooted historical and cultural differences among the member states, and in order to sustain diversity of values, the European Court of Human Rights developed the doctrine of the national margin of appreciation. This doctrine states that in some special areas, particularly where there is no consensus among member states, the Court should give way to a member state's discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws. In doing so, it attempts to find a balance between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism. The margin of appreciation doctrine has grown in usage because it is seen to be a flexible tool with which to integrate competing interests within a system that divides power between international and national authorities. It is a natural evolution of the principle of subsidiarity, which means that in order to achieve democracy and efficacy, lower levels of government should rule. In our case, this is because national authorities, which are in direct and continuous contact with their people, and are therefore better able to know, assess and judge issues of national concern than more remote levels of governance. In our case, the European Court of Human Rights plays a role subsidiary to that of member states, standing aside and supervising; stepping in only in need. This paper probes the origin and development of the national margin of appreciation doctrine applied by the European Court of Human Rights, and assesses the costs and benefits of such an application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]