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Prior to the enactment of the Financial Sector Regulation Act (FSR Act), the regulation of cooperation and collaboration between the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and other financial role players was not done for the purpose of protecting financial stability or promoting market integrity. The SARB, the Financial Services Board (FSB) and the Bank Supervision Department (BSD) were required by the Banks Act to harmonise supervisory actions and to share relevant information for operational purposes. The lack of adequate cooperation and collaboration arrangements to promote, protect, enhance and maintain financial stability and market integrity gave rise to regulatory gaps and overlapping functions in the financial sector. The provisions for cooperation and collaboration contained in the Banks Act, the Financial Markets Act and the Financial Services Board Act, and the establishment of the Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF) were not adequate to foster effective cooperation and collaboration between the SARB, the BSD, the FSB and other financial role players.

Although Zimbabwe has established several institutions to combat money laundering and related crimes, there is a perception that inadequate measures are taken to apprehend offenders responsible for financial crimes. Institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) have done little to prove that the government of Zimbabwe is resolute in combatting money laundering. On the contrary, it increasingly appears that these institutions are poorly equipped and lack the necessary capacity to enforce and uphold anti-money laundering (AML) measures in Zimbabwe. Further, there appears to be a selective application of the law, with one set of rules for individuals or institutions that are perceived as political adversaries of the incumbent establishment and a different set of rules for the political elite. Consequently, the selective application of the law projects Zimbabwe as a jurisdiction that is somehow tolerant to money laundering, corruption and related financial crimes, thereby lowering and tarnishing the standing of the country in the global economic community of nations. This paper provides a regulatory analysis of the AML role-players in Zimbabwe in order to assess their functions in combatting financial crimes. It also analyses whether these role-players are effective and substantively executing their responsibilities therein. The authors argue that while Zimbabwe is well able to effectively combat money laundering through the even application of the law to all persons regardless of their political or economic standing, it is imperative that its AML institutions operate without fear, favour or prejudice. This is crucial in combatting money laundering and instilling confidence in the general public's perception of AML institutions in Zimbabwe.

Abstract In response to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, South Africa, like most other countries, embarked on a journey of financial regulatory reform. This transformation has seen the country shift away from a silo approach, where various sectoral regulators supervise different financial institutions, towards the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. The term “Twin Peaks” refers to the separation of regulatory functions between two independent regulators. For instance, one regulatory agency is responsible for the supervision of the safety and soundness of financial institutions, and the other is focussed on the regulation of business conduct. The Twin Peaks model is designed to provide the benefits and efficiencies of an integrated approach while simultaneously addressing inherent conflicts between the objectives of the safety and soundness of the financial system and consumer protection. The Financial Sector Regulation Act provides for the Twin Peaks model in South Africa. This Act positions South Africa as one of the first developing countries to adopt the model. On the other hand, Australia is the pioneer of the model since it implemented it in 1998. Its implementation in Australia, much as in South Africa, involved the separation of regulators for prudential soundness on the one hand and market conduct and consumer protection on the other. In this article, the authors provide a comparative analysis of the design and implementation of the Twin Peaks model in Australia and South Africa. They argue that while there are minor differences between the design and implementation of this model in Australia and South Africa, the model was customised and implemented to align with the specific needs of each country

Abstract The Zimbabwean banking sector has experienced several tumultuous challenges since 2000. This is owing chiefly to the political and economic challenges the country has experienced. Poorly conceived and ill-timed policies have also wreaked havoc in the Zimbabwean banking sector. Financial consumers have sometimes lost their savings to hyper-inflation or overnight policy changes in Zimbabwe. The change in currencies is a good example of how financial consumers have seen their deposits and savings at banks and other related financial institutions eroded to nothing. In 2018, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) issued a directive for all banks to convert all deposits made prior to October 2018 from the United States (US) dollar denomination to the Zimbabwean dollar (bond notes and coins). This was done on an exchange rate of one US dollar as to one Zimbabwean dollar, yet in reality, the local currency had been devalued. The RBZ directive left individuals and corporates reeling from exchange losses. The directive was akin to a heist and many people lost trust and confidence in the Zimbabwean banking sector. While many financial consumers suffered in silence, some decided to take their banks to court, demanding a reimbursement of their deposits in the currency in which they deposited or alternatively, the equivalent of the original deposit using the correct exchange rate. This article examines the role of the courts in upholding the rights of financial consumers in the Zimbabwean banking sector in the light of the Penelope case. It also discusses how the Zimbabwean courts could assist in preserving the sanctity of the bank-client relationship among banks and financial customers. In addition, the article explores the role of the courts in challenging unjust laws that affect financial consumers' investments in banks. The strengths and weaknesses of the Zimbabwean banking regulatory framework are further discussed to assess if it is robust enough to protect financial consumers. The article recommends that the courts should objectively set aside unjust laws in the interest of justice to enable banks and other financial institutions to honour their contractual obligations. Policymakers should not adopt poor policies that infringe upon financial consumers' rights. Keywords: Banking, consumer protection, financial consumer, deposits, exchange rate, courts, contractual obligations.

Abstract Money laundering and financial crimes pose a significant threat to the integrity and stability of South Africa’s financial system. This paper explores the application of artificial intelligence (AI) to detect and prevent money laundering in South African banking institutions. Through the implementation of big data technologies and data processing analytics, AI can enhance the detection and prevention of money laundering activities in South Africa’s banking sector. AI can be harnessed to improve the detection of suspicious activities, enhance accuracy of financial intelligence and adapt to evolving money laundering techniques. The paper also examines the benefits and challenges of implementing AI as an anti-money laundering (AML) measure in the South African banking sector. These include the need for quality data, integration with existing systems, regulatory compliance and ethical considerations. The paper further highlights the potential of AI in transaction monitoring, customer due diligence, outcomes-based risk assessment, and improved detection of suspicious transactions by analysing how AI can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of AML measures. The importance of coordination between banking institutions, regulatory authorities and law enforcement bodies is also highlighted as an important component of leveraging AI to combat money laundering and related financial crimes in South Africa’s banking sector.

The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and other financial role players such as the Prudential Authority (PA), the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), the National Credit Regulator (NCR), the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), the Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF), the Financial Sector Council of Regulators (FSCR) and the Financial Sector Inter-Ministerial Council (FSIC) play a significant role in the protection and promotion of financial stability and market integrity in South Africa. The SARB has the primary financial stability mandate, whilst the FSCA was established to primarily promote market integrity and enhance market efficiency through protecting and promoting the fair treatment of financial customers and promoting financial literacy programs. As technology advances and new players enter the market, traditional financial institutions are faced with increased competition and the need to adapt and innovate to stay relevant. In this regard, regulatory frameworks and the functions of regulatory bodies should be constantly reviewed to conform to financial technology (fintech) developments and safeguard consumer interests. This article examines the roles and functions of the aforementioned financial role players as regulated by the Financial Sector Regulation Act (FSR Act) and other relevant financial sector laws. This is done to evaluate the effectiveness of their roles and functions to protect and promote financial stability and market integrity in line with fintech and Artificial Intelligence (AI) developments. The paper also evaluates the importance of cooperation and collaboration between the financial role players to fulfil their roles and functions.

The damage caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic to the fragile Nigerian economy is incalculable. The Nigerian economy was further weakened by the corruption of government officials involving the palliative measures put in place to provide financial relief to companies and individuals affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the Nigerian economy relies mostly on crude oil revenue, its focus on tax is less emphasised and tax evasion is pervasive. Consequently, the Nigerian tax on gross domestic product (GDP) is only about 6 per cent. This article examines the adequacy of the legal and/or statutory measures aimed at curbing tax evasion in Nigeria. The post-COVID-19 revenue shortfall has made the Nigerian federal and state governments raise the existing taxes, introduce new taxes, and adopt more aggressive tax collection methods. Consequently, taxpayers now use tax exemptions and incentives as devices for tax evasion. Moreover, there is rampant non-remittance of tax proceeds by government ministries, departments, and agencies to the tax authorities. Thus, despite the introduction of various laws, policies, and directives to curb tax evasion, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, tax evasion challenges still persist. Accordingly, it is submitted that good governance, integrity, and transparency in handling public funds are required to reduce and combat tax evasion in Nigeria.

Editorial: Special Edition on Rethinking Global Economies, Financial Markets, Corporate Practices & Business Activities Post-COVID-19 Pandemic

The increased usage of digital financial products and financial services such as mobile money brought various challenges and opportunities in Zimbabwe during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. This has also increased the responsibilities of the regulatory authorities in the Zimbabwean financial sector. The financial regulators were inadequately prepared for the regulatory demands of financial technology (fintech) products in Zimbabwe. For instance, they struggled to cope with the increased responsibilities of overseeing mobile money operators and have adequate resources to efficiently monitor and manage such operators to ensure compliance with the relevant laws. Most Zimbabwean financial regulators did not have sufficient resources to employ persons with the relevant skills and expertise to fulfil their responsibilities. Despite this, the widespread use of mobile money has considerably improved the financial inclusion of the poor and previously unbanked persons, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe. Consequently, various policy implications and mobile money regulatory approaches that were considered by policymakers during and after the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe in a bid to provide adequate supervision of mobile money operators and related digital financial services to curb the financial exclusion of the poor and unbanked persons are investigated. It is against this background that this article discusses the challenges, policy implications, and flaws affecting the adoption of viable mobile money regulatory approaches to promote financial inclusion of the poor in Zimbabwe after the COVID-19 pandemic.

This special edition consists of a selection of contemporary and well thought out academic contributions that were developed into full journal articles by presenters who delivered their key findings at the 2nd Annual Colloquium on Corporate and Financial Markets Law at the Faculty of Law, North-West University, on 29-30 October 2020. These contributions were developed into articles, subjected to a rigorous double-blind peer review process to determine their quality, and subsequently accepted for publication in the Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal.

Widespread corruption in the Nigerian public service is having a far-reaching detrimental effect on the economy. Public officers and other policy makers that formulate socio-economic policies are the main perpetrators of corruption in Nigeria. This article focusses on the viability of lifestyle audits for public officials as a strategy for combating such corruption, the proceeds of which are usually laundered and warehoused either offshore or in Nigeria with the assistance of professionals such as bankers and lawyers. If such warehoused wealth is discovered it is usually forfeited to the treasury of the government of Nigeria, after the trial of the offenders. This article interrogates the adequacy of the relevant legislation and the efficacy of the statutory bodies responsible for lifestyle audits in Nigeria, such as the Code of Conduct Bureau, which is discussed, as are the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, 2010, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004, and the income tax reporting framework administered by the Federal Inland Revenue Service. It appears that the provisions relating to lifestyle audits under the Nigerian statutes are not robust enough to curb corruption and tax evasion. In addition, the enforcement of such lifestyle audits is hindered by the immunity granted to certain Nigerian public officers and jurisdictional conflicts in prosecuting corruption cases.

The advent of mobile money innovations has given people in rural areas, informal settlements and other poor communities an opportunity to participate in Zimbabwe's mainstream financial economy. However, the technology-driven money services have presented some challenges to the traditional banking sector in general and the regulation of financial services in particular. Firstly, most mobile money services are products of telecommunication corporations, which are not banks. Telecommunication companies use their network reach to provide mobile money services via mobile devices at a cheaper cost than banks across the country in Zimbabwe. As such, banks face unprecedented competition from telecommunications companies that are venturing into financial services. It also appears that prudential regulation of banks cannot keep up with the fast pace at which technological innovations are developing and this has created a disjuncture between the regulation and the use of technological innovations to promote financial inclusion in Zimbabwe. The Banking Act [Chapter 24:20] 9 of 1999, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15] 5 of 1999 and the National Payment Systems Act [Chapter 24:23] 21 of 2001 have a limited scope in terms of the regulation of mobile money services in Zimbabwe. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development launched the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) 2016-2020 to provide impetus to the financial inclusion of the poor, unbanked and low-income earners in Zimbabwe. However, the NFIS appears to push more for bank-led financial inclusion than it does for innovation-driven initiatives such as mobile money services. This article highlights the positive influence of mobile money services in improving financial inclusion for the poor, unbanked and low-income earners in Zimbabwe. The article also seeks to point out gaps and flaws in the financial services regulatory framework that may limit the potential of mobile money services to reach more people so that they actively participate in the Zimbabwean economy. It is submitted that the Zimbabwean mobile money services regulations and the financial regulatory framework should be carefully amended in line with the recent innovations in mobile money to adequately regulate the use of mobile money services and innovative technology to address the financial exclusion of the poor, unbanked and low-income earners in Zimbabwe.

The most indispensable means of change in contemporary business society is technology because it offers convenience to both businesses and their clients. Almost every business has been influenced by technology. Traditional corporate governance systems have been affected as technology has ceased to be a mere business enabler but is now a source of a company's future potential opportunities. The infusion of corporate governance and technology has been quite slow in South Africa. This may either be attributed to the fact that it is costly to do so, at least in the short term, or that company directors in South Africa do not yet trust technological measures with corporate decision-making input. Consequently, the impact of decision support technology on corporate entities and their governance has received less academic interest in South Africa than in developed countries. This article seeks to discuss the integration and reliance on technology to enhance corporate governance principles in developing countries like South Africa. The article also discusses the practical challenges and the benefits to be anticipated by directors in South Africa when they integrate technology in decision making to enhance their independence and accountability.

The promotion of financial inclusion is important for the combating of financial exclusion in many countries, including South Africa. Nonetheless, most low-income earners living in rural areas and informal settlements are still struggling to gain access to basic financial products and financial services in South Africa. This status quo has been caused by a number of factors such as the absence of an adequate financial inclusion policy, the geographical remoteness of financial institutions to most low-income earners, rigid identity documentary requirements, a lack of access to reliable and affordable Internet connection by low-income earners living in informal settlements and rural areas, a lack of financial illiteracy, the high costs of financial services, unemployment and poverty, over-indebtedness, and cultural and psychological hindrances to low-income earners in South Africa. Consequently, these factors have somewhat limited the access to financial services offered by financial institutions to low-income earners living in rural areas and informal settlements. In many countries, including South Africa, the financial sector is relying on innovative technology, especially in banking institutions, to aid in the offering of financial services to their customers. It is against this background that this article discusses selected legal and related challenges affecting the regulation and use of innovative technology to promote financial inclusion for low-income earners in South Africa. The article further discusses possible measures that could be adopted by the government, financial institutions and other relevant regulatory bodies to promote the use of innovative technology to combat the financial exclusion of low-income earners in South Africa.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and fifth generation network technology (5G) are now being utilised by some companies and financial institutions such as banks to enhance their competitiveness and expand their businesses. The general types of AI include functional AI, interactive AI, text AI, visual AI and analytic AI. The key components of AI include machine learning, fast Internet connectivity, deep learning, neural networks and advanced data analysis. These components may be complemented by the adoption and use of standard 5G cellular networks. 5G utilises broadband Internet access and Internet connection, and is now employed by some banking institutions, especially in developed countries. It is not clear whether South African banking institutions have adopted 5G for their Internet connectivity and operations. AI and 5G may be used to detect and combat cybercrimes in banking institutions. On the other hand, AI and 5G may also be abused by cybercriminals to commit financial crimes such as money laundering and insider trading. In this regard it is submitted that South African policy makers should carefully revise the Cybersecurity Bill B6-2017 (Cybercrimes Bill) to embrace the use of AI and 5G to detect and combat cybercrimes in South African banks. Accordingly, this article examines the adequacy of the Cybercrimes Bill. It also explores the regulation and use of 5G and AI to detect, prevent and combat cybercrimes in banks and other financial institutions in South Africa.

Technology has positively contributed to the creation of financial markets and the facilitation of payments globally. The effective use of robust technology could enhance the consistent enforcement of financial market laws by curbing financial crimes in any country. This in turn would enhance the integrity of financial markets and promote the viability of financial markets. In relation to this, it appears that Zimbabwe has struggled to comply with international measures to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) since it has poor financial market laws which are inconsistently enforced due inter alia to its poor money laundering detection mechanisms and inadequate resources. For instance, Zimbabwe has to date failed to make satisfactory progress to adopt and enforce adequate risk mitigation measures against money laundering practices in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. This is evidenced by the increased incidence of money laundering in Zimbabwean financial markets. Furthermore, the inconsistent enforcement of financial market laws has resulted in poor liquidity and the recent suspension of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). The viability and integrity of the Zimbabwean financial market has thus been compromised. This article discusses the integration and use of robust technology in the Zimbabwean financial market to curb financial crimes such as money laundering and bank fraud. The adequacy of financial market laws and/or regulations will also be discussed vis-à-vis their consistent enforcement by relevant bodies such as the Financial Intelligence Inspectorate Evaluation Unit (FIU) in Zimbabwe. This is done to evaluate the use of technology to curb money laundering and promote a viable economy and financial market in Zimbabwe. It is submitted that the relevant authorities should promote the effective use of technological inventions like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to curb money laundering, bank fraud and other related financial crimes in Zimbabwe.

Several challenges involving torture-related human rights violations have been reported in Zimbabwe from the late 1970s to date. Notably, these torture-related human rights violations were problematic during the liberation war era in Zimbabwe. Regrettably, such violations are allegedly still prevalent, especially prior to and/or during general political elections in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, this article investigates torture as a human rights violation in Zimbabwe, inter alia by focusing on the role of selected law enforcement agencies in the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. The article also discusses the legal position on torture and the perpetration of torture against ordinary people prior to as well as after independence in Zimbabwe. This is done to investigate the adequacy of the legal framework in Zimbabwe with regard to the combatting of torture. In relation to this, selected regional and international legal frameworks against torture are briefly discussed in order to determine possible measures that could be utilised in Zimbabwe. The authors submit that although the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 20) Act, 2013 (Zimbabwe Constitution, 2013) prohibits torture, more may still need to be done to enhance the combatting of torture in Zimbabwe. For instance, apart from the prohibition contained in the Zimbabwe Constitution, 2013, there is no legislation that expressly outlaws torture in Zimbabwe. Moreover, Zimbabwe has not ratified the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (UN Convention against Torture) to date. Lastly, concluding remarks and possible recommendations that could be employed to discourage torture-related human rights abuses in Zimbabwe are provided.

Various violations of the human rights of ordinary people and human rights defenders have been reported in Zimbabwe since the late 1980s. It is widely acknowledged that such violations have been perpetrated mostly by the government through its different organs for political and other related reasons. Human rights violations were also easily committed against ordinary people and human rights defenders because there was no Constitution that adequately protected such people's fundamental human rights (including their civil and political rights and their socio-economic rights) in Zimbabwe. Given this background, the article discusses the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe, in the light of the Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Act 20 of 2013 (Zimbabwe Constitution 2013). This is done in order to investigate whether the promotion, protection, enforcement and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe has now improved. To this end, the functions of selected national human rights institutions and other related role-players, namely civil society, the judiciary, the law enforcement organs and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, are briefly discussed first. Secondly, the functions of selected regional and international institutions, namely the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and the United Nations are discussed in relation to the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. Thereafter, concluding remarks and possible recommendations that could be utilised to combat human rights violations and enhance the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe are provided.

Notably, in Australia, market abuse practices like market manipulation and other market misconduct practices are expressly prohibited under the Corporations Act as amended by the Financial Services Reform Act. In the light of this, and for the purposes of this article, a brief historical analysis of the market manipulation prohibition will be presented first. Secondly, the available penalties and remedies for market manipulation are discussed. Thereafter, possible recommendations and significant Australian anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that may be utilised in South Africa are briefly stated. Lastly, concluding remarks are provided.

In an early attempt to combat market abuse in the South African financial markets, legislation such as the Companies Act, the Financial Markets Control Act and the Stock Exchanges Control Act were enacted. However, these Acts failed to effectively curb market abuse activities that were allegedly rife in the financial markets. Consequently, the Insider Trading Act was enacted and came into effect on 17 January 1999. While the introduction of the Insider Trading Act brought some confidence in the financial markets, market abuse activities were still not extinguished. The provisions of the Insider Trading Act were to some extent inadequate and ineffectively implemented. Eventually, the Securities Services Act was enacted to repeal all the flawed provisions of the Insider Trading Act. Notwithstanding these efforts on the part of the legislature, more may still need to be done to increase the number of convictions and settlements in cases involving market abuse in South Africa. It is against this background that a historical overview analysis of the regulation of market abuse is carried out in this article to expose the flaws that were previously embedded in the South African market abuse laws prior to 2004. This is done to raise awareness of the situation on the part of the relevant stakeholders, as they consider whether such flaws were adequately resolved or subsequently re-introduced under the Securities Services Act and the Financial Markets Act. To this end, the article firstly discusses the historical development and regulation of market manipulation prior to 2004. Secondly, the regulation and enforcement of insider trading legislation prior to 2004 are examined. Moreover, where possible, certain flaws of the previous market abuse laws that were re-incorporated into the current South African market abuse legislation are isolated and recommendations are made in that regard.