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Abstract: In a context of rising protectionist rhetoric, this paper looks at the potential impact of trade wars initiated by a change in US trade policies. We use a static multicountry, multisector general equilibrium model to evaluate six modalities of three potential trade wars—for a total of 18 scenarios—between the USA and China, between the USA and Mexico, and a combination of the two previous conflicts. In each case, we evaluate various forms of trade retaliation by the US partner(s): the same level of import duty as the one imposed by the USA, an import duty that minimises welfare loss, a duty that minimises terms‐of‐trade deterioration, a duty that generates the same amount of collected revenue, and finally a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that there is no scenario in which the US government augments its domestic welfare or GDP. There may be sectoral gains in value added in the USA, but they are small and to the detriment of other sectors. While losses for China are relatively small, potential losses for the Mexican economy are significant. There are also free riders of these trade wars. Finally, the way in which trade retaliations are designed matters greatly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides evidence on the incidence of tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries by investigating the relationship between per capita incomes of US trading partners and tariff rates. It constitutes the first attempt to assess the incidence of tariffs imposed by the US on countries that span the entire range of per capita incomes. Average tariff rates are lower for the poorest and richest countries and higher for countries in the middle of the income distribution. This finding is not consistent with the widely held view that tariffs used by industrial nations bear more heavily on products of export interest to poorer developing countries than on imports from industrial nations. It is consistent with the tariff escalation pattern reported in earlier studies if advanced countries account for most products at the high end of the fabrication scale. Results show that poorest countries will find it difficult to escape tariffs by attaining higher levels of economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade openness, popularly measured as ( X + M)/ GDP in the hundreds of studies published to date, consistently considers the world's biggest trading countries such as the USA, the UK, Japan and Germany to be closed economies, irrespective of the data set used. This study suggests a composite trade share measure that more completely reflects reality by combining two important dimensions of trade openness: trade share and the relative importance of a country's trade level to total world trade. Robustness tests support the new proposed measure in lieu of the conventional measure of openness and suggest that the latter may not only be incomplete but may also overstate the impact of trade on such things as income and the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States maintains a broad spectrum of economic sanctions against China ranging from export controls to prohibitions on certain imports. Our study finds that, although from a macroeconomic perspective, US sanctions have had no significant adverse effect on China's overall economic growth and trade between the two countries, they do have a negative impact on producers and consumers in both countries. US economic sanctions have hindered technology transfer to China and US investment in China. US restrictions on imports from China have caused deadweight losses for the US due to higher domestic production costs for import substitutes and a reduction in consumption. US export controls have hindered US exports to China and contributed to large US trade deficits with China. The export controls have also caused losses of high-paid jobs in the United States and benefited competitors from other countries. In addition, US economic sanctions against China have had significant third-party effects. China's diversification of imports to sources other than the United States may have a long-term effect on US exports to China even after US economic sanctions against China are lifted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post-Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post-Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non-member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]