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The parliamentary oversight of the European Central Bank (ECB) is frequently criticised for its lack of focus in both monetary policy and banking supervision. While Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can publicly question ECB decisions in these fields, they often use committee hearings for other purposes, such as expressing political positions on issues that may or may not be related to ECB activities. This article aims to conceptualise such variation by expanding the seminal distinction between 'police patrols' and 'fire alarms' to include two novel categories – 'planning bureaus' and 'ambulance chasers'. To illustrate the applicability of our typology, the article provides the first systematic comparison of the Monetary and the Banking Dialogues (2014–2021), combining a qualitative content analysis of 1,504 parliamentary questions with insights from interviews with MEPs. The findings highlight the pervasiveness of fire alarms and ambulance chasing in the parliamentary practice of overseeing the ECB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Swedish decision-makers opted out of the European banking union (EBU) despite the large cross-border presence of Swedish banks in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The three Baltic states, on the other hand, have already joined the eurozone and are part of the EBU. This article identifies three important domestic considerations that have shaped Sweden’s position. Firstly, Swedish decision-makers were concerned that member states outside the eurozone would not fully participate in EBU decision-making. Secondly, they were reluctant to pay for the recapitalisation or resolution of distressed non-Swedish banks in other EU countries. Thirdly, Sweden preferred to retain regulatory autonomy in crisis management. The article relates Sweden’s position to the overall cautious approach of other non-eurozone members such as the UK and Denmark. Nevertheless, it highlights the enhanced role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in banking supervision not only for eurozone insiders such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania but also for member states outside the Eurozone such as Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]