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This study investigates the green development of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP) by exploring the synergistic reduction of water pollution and carbon emissions. Firstly, a differential game model is constructed to reduce pollution and carbon in the water supply chain. Secondly, the emission reduction strategies of water source and receiving areas under centralized and decentralized decision models are compared and analyzed and a cost-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, numerical analysis is used to compare and analyze the important parameters to draw conclusions. The results show that: (1) Collaboration between water source and receiving areas influences emission reduction efforts, with the highest achieved under the centralized model. (2) The cost-sharing contract improves efforts and addresses ‘free-riding’ in the decentralized model. (3) The SNWDP can achieve a win-win situation in terms of both environmental and economic benefits by promoting the synergy of pollution reduction and carbon reduction. HIGHLIGHTS Established a model for synergistic management of low carbon and water pollution control in water supply chain.; Investigated the benefits of low carbon and water pollution control in the water supply chain under various decision models.; Designed a cost-sharing contract to improve synergies in the water supply chain.; Carbon and pollution reduction can improve the economic and environmental benefits of the SNWDP.;

This study first defined the concept of the water–energy–food nexus system risk (WEF-R). Then, the WEF-R evaluation index system was established from three aspects: stability, coordination, and sustainability subsystems. Finally, the set pair analysis-variable fuzzy set model was used to evaluate the risk levels of subsystems, and the risk matrix was applied to assess provincial WEF-R levels in China from 2009 to 2018. The results showed that the stability subsystem had the greatest influence on provincial WEF-R, followed by the sustainability subsystem. The provinces with a higher risk of the stability subsystem and lower risk of the sustainability subsystem were mainly centralized in southeast coastal and central regions, which were consistent with the provinces with better socio-economic development. The provinces with lower risk of the stability subsystem and higher risk of the sustainability subsystem were mainly concentrated in northwest regions, which correspond with the provinces with better natural resources endowment but lower socio-economic development. As for the temporal evolution of risk levels, the risk levels of the coordination and sustainability subsystems showed downward trends during the study period, while the risk level of the stability subsystem displayed a small fluctuation, and the provincial WEF-R level in China presented a decreasing trend. HIGHLIGHTS The water–energy–food nexus system risk (WEF-R) was defined as internal, nexus, and external risks.; The WEF-R evaluation index system was established from three aspects: stability, coordination, and sustainability subsystems.; Set pair analysis-variable fuzzy set model and risk matrix were applied to assess the risk levels of subsystems and the water–energy–food nexus system.; Provincial WEF-R in China presented a decreasing trend.;

This study establishes a market sharing mechanism for watershed ecological compensation between an upstream and downstream government based on the game-theoretical approach. It is found that, in this transboundary market sharing mechanism, the upstream government is encouraged to make more effort to protect the watershed ecosystem. As a result, a market-sharing compensation mechanism can bring Pareto improvements to all stakeholders. Furthermore, the influences of several key factors on the performance of the market sharing mechanism are investigated, which provides theoretical guidance for establishing and implementing such a mechanism in practice. HIGHLIGHTS Resolves compensation and allocation problems between upstream and downstream.; Makes full use of the ecological benefits from the watershed.; Proposes a market sharing ecological mechanism based on a cooperation game.; Analyzes the influencing factors of the market sharing mechanism.; It is conditional on the market sharing mechanism being beneficial.;