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Even after the First World War, the British and German armies remained strongly influenced by Clausewitz, for whom personality rather than mass was the best means to reduce friction. This article explores how this was reflected in their military doctrine between the two world wars. The German regulations showed a clear alignment with Clausewitz's thinking. The British tended to focus on the characteristics Clausewitz had argued were necessary for the troops, rather than for their commanders. The campaigns of 1939/40 caused the Germans to place even greater emphasis on boldness, while the British focused on steadiness and caution.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the introduction of new weaponry dramatically changed the balance between moral factors and technology on the battlefield. Yet, this shift was widely met by a renewed emphasis on the importance of the human element. This article explores the development of thinking on this issue in the British Army during the period from 1856 to 1899. This reveals three phases, representing the struggle between the conservative Duke of Cambridge and the modernizing Lord Wolseley, with their view explored through the writings of key theorists and in the official manuals. This reveals that the Duke remained focused on a mechanical model, centred on the teachings of Jomini, where the troops were simply tools in the hands of their commanders, whereas Wolseley emphasized the need to protect the ‘moral strength’ of the troops and saw undermining that of the enemy as the key to victory, yet always recognizing that bravery and resilience could never overcome modern weaponry.

Rommel’s approach to command and his relationship with the German army’s doctrine remain subjects of lively debate. Analysis of his career prior to 1940 shows he was a highly respected figure at the centre of the army’s officer training system. Consideration of his approach during the crossing of the Meuse in May 1940 demonstrates consistency with his actions at Caporetto in 1917. Far from proving his unorthodoxy, however, comparison of this approach with the army’s official manuals suggests Rommel acted fully in accordance with doctrine. This highlights a tension within that doctrine between independence of action and wilfulness.

Drawing on theories of problems in warfare being ‘tame’ or ‘wicked’, this article explores continuity and changes in British and German doctrine through examination of wording, emphasis, and approach in field service manuals. This reveals significant continuities in German doctrine, especially the emphasis on initiative, but growing focus on rapid decision-making, coupled with forward command, to achieve surprise. British doctrine also displayed continuity, focused on controlling the battle and reluctance to allow subordinates to exercise initiative. A shift in British doctrine, from one similar to the German model towards a more restrictive approach, is identified between 1905 and 1909.