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Intermixing central, directional arrow targets with the peripheral targets typically used in the Posnerian spatial cueing paradigm offers a useful diagnostic for ascertaining the relative contribut...

It has become widely accepted that the direction of another individual’s eye gaze induces rapid, automatic, attentional orienting, due to it being such a vital cue as to where in our environment we should attend. This automatic orienting has also been associated with the directional-arrow cues used in studies of spatial attention. Here, we present evidence that the response-time cueing effects reported for spatially non-predictive gaze and arrow cues are not the result of rapid, automatic shifts of attention. For both cue types, response-time effects were observed only for long-duration cue and target stimuli that overlapped temporally, were largest when the cues were presented simultaneously with the response-relevant target, and were driven by a slowing of responses for invalidly cued targets rather than speeding for validly cued ones. These results argue against automatic attention-orienting accounts and support a novel spatial-incongruency explanation for a whole class of rapid behavioral cueing effects.

The control of human attention is typically conceptualized either in terms of exogenous automatic processes that are driven by external sensory stimulation or endogenous strategic processes that are driven by internal expectancies about events in the environment. However, this classic dichotomy has struggled to explain a wealth of new data demonstrating that behaviourally and biologically relevant visual stimuli, like arrow and eye direction, elicit shifts of spatial attention that on the one hand, appear exogenous, and on the other hand, endogenous. To address this issue, we used a double-cueing task that combined arrows with classic cues known to invoke either exogenous or endogenous orienting. Our data suggest that behaviourally relevant directional cues, like arrows, engage a new form of cortically mediated orienting—automated symbolic orienting—that operates independent of, and in parallel with, the two classic forms of exogenous and endogenous spatial attention.

Gaze and arrow studies of spatial orienting have shown that eyes and arrows produce nearly identical effects on shifts of spatial attention. This has led some researchers to suggest that the human attention system considers eyes and arrows as equivalent social stimuli. However, this view does not fit with the general intuition that eyes are unique social stimuli nor does it agree with a large body of work indicating that humans possess a neural system that is preferentially biased to process information regarding human gaze. To shed light on this discrepancy we entertained the idea that the model cueing task may fail to measure some of the ways that eyes are special. Thus rather than measuring the orienting of attention to a location cued by eyes and arrows, we measured the selection of eyes and arrows embedded in complex real-world scenes. The results were unequivocal: People prefer to look at other people and their eyes; they rarely attend to arrows. This outcome was not predicted by visual saliency but...

Predictive arrow cues, as used in the classic “Posner paradigm”, that were long thought to engage and isolate voluntary attention, may in fact trigger a strong interaction between voluntary and involuntary attention (Ristic & Kingstone, 2006). This interaction produces an orienting effect that exceeds both the effects of involuntary and voluntary attention alone, and the additive combination of involuntary and voluntary orienting. The present study shows that nonpredictive peripheral cues—understood to engage and isolate involuntary attention—if made predictive, result in enhanced orienting effects similar to predictive arrows. The important contribution of these data is that they suggest an “interaction principle”: If attention cues can elicit reliable involuntary orienting, then when they are made spatially predictive, the resulting attention effect will be greater than the sum of involuntary and voluntary orienting alone.

Voluntary and relatively involuntary subsystems of attention often compete. On one hand, people can intentionally “tune” attention for features that then receive visual priority; on the other hand, more reflexive attentional shifts can “short-circuit” top-down control in the face of urgent, behaviourally relevant stimuli. Thus, it is questionable whether voluntary attentional tuning (i.e., attentional set) can affect one's ability to respond to unexpected, urgent information in the real world. We show that the consequences of such tuning extend to a realistic, safety-relevant scenario. Participants drove in a first-person driving simulation where they searched at every intersection for either a yellow or blue arrow indicating which way to turn. At a critical intersection, a yellow or blue motorcycle—either matching or not matching drivers’ attentional set—suddenly veered into drivers’ paths and stopped in their way. Collision rates with the motorcycle were substantially greater when the motorcycle did not...