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The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind''s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant''s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain''s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter''s association with consciousness and self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The nature of the self has been one of the central problems in philosophy and most recently in neuroscience. Here, we suggest that animals and humans share a ‘core self’ represented in homologous underlying neural networks. We argue that the core self might be constituted by an integrative neuronal mechanism that enables self-related processing (SRP). Because mammalian organisms are capable of relating bodily states, intrinsic brain states (e.g. basic attentional, emotional and motivational systems) and environmental stimuli to various life-supporting goal-orientations, SRP appears to be a core ability preserved across numerous species. Recent data suggest that SRP is operating via a central integrative neural system made up of subcortical–cortical midline structures (SCMSs), that are homologous across mammalian species. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

For a long time philosophers and psychologists have been intrigued by the question of the self. More recently, this has become a topic of discussion in neuroscience. In this article, we suggest that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline structures (CMS) is a fundamental component in generating a model of the self. Drawing from neuroimaging studies, we distinguish between representation, monitoring, evaluation and integration of self-referential stimuli. All of these subfunctions are related to distinct regions within the CMS. This relationship between self-referential processing and CMS might provide novel insight into the neural correlates underlying the constitution of the self. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We are continuously bombarded by external inputs of various timescales from the environment. How does the brain process this multitude of timescales? Recent resting state studies show a hierarchy of intrinsic neural timescales (INT) with a shorter duration in unimodal regions (e.g., visual cortex and auditory cortex) and a longer duration in transmodal regions (e.g., default mode network). This unimodal–transmodal hierarchy is present across acquisition modalities [electroencephalogram (EEG)/magnetoencephalogram (MEG) and fMRI] and can be found in different species and during a variety of different task states. Together, this suggests that the hierarchy of INT is central to the temporal integration (combining successive stimuli) and segregation (separating successive stimuli) of external inputs from the environment, leading to temporal segmentation and prediction in perception and cognition. The brain exhibits a hierarchy of intrinsic neural timescales with transmodal regions showing longer timescales compared with unimodal regions. This hierarchy of intrinsic neural timescales is present in human and non-human primates as well as on cellular and regional-systemic levels. The hierarchy of intrinsic neural timescales is carried over from resting state to task states including task-unspecific and task-specific effects. Intrinsic neural timescales mediate behavior, cognition, and mental features like sense of self and consciousness, including their alterations in neurologic and psychiatric disorders. Intrinsic neural timescales shape input processing through temporal segmentation of the input. The generation of empirical priors, as in predictive coding, may be strongly shaped by the intrinsic neural timescales allowing for temporal self-evidencing as 'deep temporal model'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]