Search

A recent paper by Dehaene, Izard, Pica and Spelke examined geometric concepts among the Munduruku, an Amazonian group without many linguistic terms for spatial relations, and without maps or formal schooling. Their profile of strengths and weaknesses provides new insights into the nature of the human mind and the importance of culture and language to the development of thought. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Humans and animals use mental representations of the spatial structure of the world to navigate. The classical view is that these representations take the form of Euclidean cognitive maps, but alternative theories suggest that they are cognitive graphs consisting of locations connected by paths. We review evidence suggesting that both map-like and graph-like representations exist in the mind/brain that rely on partially overlapping neural systems. Maps and graphs can operate simultaneously or separately, and they may be applied to both spatial and nonspatial knowledge. By providing structural frameworks for complex information, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may provide fundamental organizing schemata that allow us to navigate in physical, social, and conceptual spaces. Spatial navigation has been suggested to rely either on Euclidean cognitive maps or on graph-like representations of routes between locations. Instead of being competing hypotheses, cognitive maps and cognitive graphs may coexist in the same individuals, with their availability and use depending on environmental characteristics and navigational demands. Cognitive maps and cognitive graphs are instantiated by partially distinct but partially overlapping neural systems in the hippocampal formation, frontal lobes, and scene-selective cortical regions. Both representational systems can likely support abstract thought; Euclidean maps are suited for representing content varying along continuous dimensions, whereas cognitive graphs are suited for representing state transitions and discrete associations between items. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental representation and transformation of spatial information is often examined with mental rotation (MR) tasks, which require deciding whether a rotated image is the same as or the mirror version of an upright image. Recent research with infants shows early discrimination of objects from mirror-image versions. However, even at the age of 4 years, many children perform at near chance level on more standard measures. Similar age discrepancies can be observed in other domains, including perspective taking, theory of mind, and intuitive physics. These paradoxical results raise the questions of how performance relates to competence and how to conceptualize developmental change. There may be a common underlying mechanism: the development of the ability to imagine things and mentally transform them in a prospective fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During early ontogeny, the rapid and cumulative acquisition of world knowledge contrasts with slower improvements in the ability to lay down detailed and long-lasting episodic memories. This emphasis on generalization at the expense of specificity persists well into middle childhood and possibly into adolescence. During this period, recognizing regularities, forming stable representations of recurring episodes, predicting the structure of future events, and building up semantic knowledge may be prioritized over remembering specific episodes. We highlight recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence suggesting that maturational differences among subfields within the hippocampus contribute to the developmental lead–lag relation between generalization and specificity, and lay out future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]