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This article discusses deregulation of the airlines industry and the Wright Amendment. The author traces the origins of the Wright Amendment and the impact it has had on airline carriers. He reviews proposed legislation to repeal the Wright Amendment and analyzes the apparent strengths and weaknesses. He suggests ways to address consumer interests both nationally and regionally. He discusses the opposition to the legislation and their interpretation of the compromises and violations of the anti-trust laws.

The article takes a look at some of the inherent problems in comparing the differing approaches to airline deregulation across the Atlantic. Liberalization has happened in a progressive way and without major upsets. This contrasts with the situation that the US experienced at the time of deregulation of the aviation market. The European Community (EU)has been able to find the correct balance between competition and control mechanism. U.S. domestic aviation was heavily regulated from the late 1920s, initially as part of a policy to foster air mail services but subsequently on grounds of promoting safety and, from 1938, to seek economic efficiency. The U.S. liberalized market is mainly domestic, whereas that within the EU is predominantly international. The size of the European market is also reflected in the size of the EU's airlines. The U.S. reformed its domestic air transport market in a specific way but also in the context of a set of geographical, institutional, and economic conditions that were somewhat different from those pertaining in the EU.

The article examines the administrative consequences of the filed rate doctrine (FRD) and identifies directions for policy concerning its future role as it applies to motor freight common carriers in the U.S. Problems associated with FRD became a phenomena in the wake of the implementation of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The Interstate Commerce Commission responded to the enactment by relaxing regulations governing motor freight common carriers' tariffs. In addition, the agency removed the filing requirements for motor freight contracts. These changes intensified competition, spurred fierce rate discounting, driving many carriers into bankruptcy. The resulting disparities in transportation charges proved economically harmful to high rate paying shippers against other shippers who paid lower rates.

This article focuses on brokerage and the potential for electronic marketing of produce transportation in the United States. Brokers are the key factors in the produce transportation/distribution system. Between 1935 and the late 1970s there were fewer than 100 active Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) licensed brokers, versus nearly 6,000 by 1988. It is common, though inaccurate, to refer to the past decade's interstate motor carriage regulatory reforms as "deregulation." Rather, there was a loosening (not elimination) of regulations. That step (i.e., total deregulation) remains an option for public debate. Brokers of produce trucking are the only significant example of brokering in the absence of economic regulation. Indeed, as produce trucking never has been regulated, it may be considered an example of conditions after long-run adjustments to deregulation. It seems appropriate, therefore, to reexamine produce truck brokering. In this article, the overall importance and specific practices of produce truck brokers will be examined and compared to earlier results.

The article focuses on various aspects related to deregulation and information costs in the transportation industry of the U.S. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 significantly deregulated the interstate for-hire motor carrier industry in the U.S. The paper investigates the question of the role of information costs on shippers as the result of deregulation. While significant numbers of new entrants have appeared in the truckload segment of the market, the less-than-truckload (LTL) market has also experienced significant new entrants in the sense of the pre-deregulation LTL carriers expanding the geographic scope of their markets. However, information costs to the shipper have been increased as a result of deregulation. Under regulation, rates were proposed by rate bureaus in a cartel-like setting and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. While independent actions were allowed by the Reed Bulwinkle Act, they were the exception. After deregulation, rates could differ dramatically in the same marketplace as carriers utilized information asymmetries and the monopoly powers, which they conferred.

The results of deregulation in the LTL sector have been the opposite of what was predicted by the deregulators. Instead of more competition, this paper documents the increasing concentration of both revenues and profits. Instead of more competitors, there are fewer firms in this segment of the industry now than prior to deregulation and open entry. Bankruptcies and voluntary departures (often because of impending doom) have thinned the ranks of competitors and there has been essentially no new entry. The new competition has been expansion by the larger carriers. This has often placed the smaller in-cumbants under extreme pressure. While the truckload industry may very well function according to the theory of pure competition, the same is not true of the LTL business. There are significant financial barriers to entry. Operating economics of size appear to give the larger carriers a possible cost advantage. In any case, the nature of the LTL marketplace and the fact that there is a trend towards shippers using fewer carriers gives the giant carriers that can offer nationwide service a natural advantage called "marketing economies." Such a marketing advantage for the giants would place smaller carriers at a disadvantage even in the absence of any size economies on the cost side. The dismal distribution of profit that has been documented in this paper is not encouraging for the smaller and medium-sized firms. Mergers, wage concessions, and geographic expansion are one possible road to survival. Perhaps the opposite approach, pulling back to a more potentially profitable and less exposed niche, is another strategy. However, with excess capacity in the industry and excessive rate discounting continuing unabated, no strategy will quarantee survival. It is still a guess as to when the LTL industry will reach solvent stability. Only one thing is certain. When that stability does finally arrive, the industry will bear no resemblance to what was predicted by the deregulators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior to the mid-1970s, the major modes of intercity transportation, with the exception of the automobile, were subject to federal economic regulation. Railroads were regulated by the provisions embodied in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its subsequent amendments. A common concern that accompanied regulatory reform for all these modes was fear that residents in small communities would no longer receive adequate service or, in some cases, any service at all as carriers redeployed their equipment to focus on more lucrative higher-density markets. Substantial attention has been paid in the literature to the effects of regulatory reform on intercity air passenger service, but little attention has been given to the effects of regulatory reform on intercity bus passenger service. This paper reports the results of a study of the intercity bus industry's experience with regulatory reform. A cornerstone of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 was the easing of entry and exit requirements in the motor bus industry, including easing restrictions on abandoning routes or service to points on a route.

The article focuses on the postderegulation pricing behavior of Class I and Class II regular route common carriers of general commodities and determines the ways this behavior constituted change. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 allowed carriers substantial new pricing freedoms and reduced constraints upon market entry. This act was the culmination of intensive debate over the outcome of far-reaching policy changes. A survey was taken of presidents of Class I and II regulars route common carriers and questions were developed in true-false, multiple-choice, and open-ended formats. The final step of the research was data analysis. The majority of the carrier group reported that their contract activity was greater than or equal to that prior to deregulation. The group is making greater use of special tariffs or special items aimed at the shippers. Discounting was examined in terms of the use of specific named discounts and in terms of price cutting. Price cutting, in turn, was examined in terms of deviation from bureau tariffs and relationship of revenues to costs.

Deregulation caught many motor carrier managers unprepared for the demands of strategy-making or for gathering the information on which strategy depends. Under regulation, strategic management processes and the information that drives them meant little in the industry, since firms that did not plan fared as well as those that did. Deregulation caught many motor carrier managers unprepared for the demands of strategy-making or for gathering the information on which strategy depends. Under regulation, strategic management processes and the information that drives them meant little in the industry, since firms that did not plan fared as well as those that did. While these restrictions meant that the results may not describe the industry, they improved the study in a prescriptive sense. They also made it possible to examine formal procedures which might be invisible in a sample that was composed exclusively of small firms. Since the size of the firms seemed likely to influence the formal strategic information system, a range of sizes was sought in the sample.

The article focuses on activities performed internally by motor carriers as a service to their customers, the projects for which transportation or logistics consultants or software vendors have been used in the previous years, under a deregulated environment. Deregulation has removed the blanket of protection and many motor carriers are fighting for survival in an increasingly competitive marketplace. This change is due to many factors which include deregulation of private and contract motor barriers and elimination of barriers to entry which has allowed 8000 new motor carriers to enter the market since 1980. Deregulation, leaner staff organizations, the emphasis on efficiency, and the need for product differentiation have helped make management consulting one of the fastest-growing sectors of the U.S. economy. Given the growing use of consultants, it is likely that motor carrier management could benefit from knowledge of the types of projects for which consultants have been used. Strategy development has been useful which includes both market attitudes or customer perceptions and corporate goals, objectives and strategies.