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Scholars often argue that Charles Sanders Peirce was responsible for Josiah Royce's semiotic turn in The Problem of Christianity of 1913. Thus scholars tend to assume that a Roycean approach to semiotics was a later development and derives almost entirely from Peirce's semiotics. Far from a later development, Royce probably read Peirce much earlier. Indeed, even before Royce had read Peirce, the kernel of a Rocyean approach to semiotics is found in the dissertation of 1878. Thus the present essay will prove that a Roycean approach to semiotics did not have a basis in Peirce's semiotics, whether early or later, but rather grew out of Royce's earliest writings. The first part will reconstruct the early pragmatism in the dissertation of 1878 and find that the kernal of a Roycean approach to semiotics was the idea of a mediating third. The second part will show how the disseration's pragmatism develops into a phenomenology of time that contains Royce's earliest semiosic insights. The third part will explain how the early pragmatism and phenomenology come together in the argument on the possibility of error from Royce's The Religious Aspect of Philosophy of 1885. The possibility of error is Royce's original argument for absolute idealism, so the essay will conclude that a Roycean approach to semiotics entails a semiotics of the absolute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ibri's book is not meant to be an introduction to Peirce nor in any explicit sense a systematic confrontation of Peirce's philosophical project with alternative approaches to its central themes. By Ivo Assad Ibri Semiotics and Pragmatism: Theoretical Interfaces Springer, 2022, xxvii + 341 pp., incl. index In the chapter on "The Heuristic Power of Agapism in Peirce's Philosophy" in his recent book, I Semiotics and Pragmatism: Theoretical Interfaces i , Ivo Ibri points out that access to Peirce's work requires something on the part of the reader that is "not readily available in everyone's spirit: a sense of poetry, an aesthetic sensitivity that will, ultimately, become the sharpest and strongest tool to penetrate the deepest meaning of his philosophy" (116). As to Peirce's categories, Ibri writes: "Understanding them distinctly, within two philosophical realms, namely, the phenomenological and ontological planes, provide a master key to consider the entire system of doctrines that shapes Peirce's philosophy" (268). [Extracted from the article]

This article builds on Bellucci's and Murphey's accounts of Peirce's early logic of signs by making a pair of contributions to the literature on Peirce's reduction of illation to the sign relation. First, I reinvestigate the connection between the structure of inference and the representative relation, relying here on Peirce's early accounts of sign inference from 1865 and 1866. Second, with the development of Peirce's theory of inquiry in mind, I elucidate the implications of Peirce's early view of sign inference. These contributions deepen our understanding of Fisch's claim that the Illustrations series "is thought out within the framework of the doctrine of signs." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The volume shows Peirce occasionally going back and forth, making Bellucci's chronological approach to Peirce's work even more important. Bellucci's volume spans almost two decades of Peirce's life - a period during which Peirce had retreated to Milford, Pennsylvania, spending most of his time with his pen on paper. Edited by Francesco Bellucci Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings on Semiotics 1894-1912 Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020; no index. [Extracted from the article]

This article deals with one of the most pressing issues of Peirce’s late attempt at a classification of signs, namely, the order in which the ten trichotomies should be arrayed with the intention of deriving sixty-six signs. The first part of the article tracks the proposals made by Peirce and other scholars about the order of the ten trichotomies. They have proposed several different ways to array the ten trichotomies, but there is still no consensus about the correct order, and besides Peirce, no one has tried to derive types of signs from those orders. In the second part, we discuss other criteria for arraying the trichotomies, such as comparing groups of trichotomies in order to see which trichotomy is prior and which is posterior, and classifying logical inferences according to the types of signs derived from those trichotomies. The result is a linear order of trichotomies according to the principle of determination. With that order, we undertake the task of deriving some kinds of signs (although not the sixty-six possible ones) through the principle of degeneracy in order to establish that there are no contradictions or incongruencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a non-standard perspective on Peirce’s notion of the Immediate Object, according to which this notion embodies the quantificational aspect of proposition-like signs. This viewpoint is supported by collecting evidence through the chronological analysis of the 1904–1909 manuscripts, in which the dichotomy of the Dynamic and Immediate object is developed. Moreover, it is shown how, after 1907, Peirce’s semiotics is enriched by a new pragmatical sensitivity that brings forth a whole new framework and, consequently, a further evolution of the concept of the Immediate Object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze an apparent paradox that exists in the concept of the assertiveness of terms, an idea put forth by Peirce in the manuscript R 787, c. 1896. The scrutiny of this case sheds new light on Peirce's speculative grammar, especially on his account of subject and predicate. After briefly reviewing the current relevance of Peirce's thought for speech act theories, this paper investigates the role of rudimentary assertions in Peirce's thought, which lies at the crossroads of semiotics, logic and linguistics. In order to reach this goal, this paper (i) considers the place of assertions in Peirce's thought; (ii) analyzes the general conditions for assertion, especially its syntactical structure; (iii) redefines Peirce's original concepts of subject, predicate and copula, which differ from traditional logic and Indo-European grammars; and (iv) explores the structure of reasoning tacitly assumed in our linguistic habits, such that even a term might be understood as assertoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What would happen to Peirce's study of signs if we did not focus to such a great extent on such phenomena as a sunflower turning toward the sun, or a person knocking on a door, or the formation of a fossil, or even a string of sentences woven into a text such as a literary essay or scientific memoir, but rather preoccupied ourselves with such complex and open-ended phenomena as the history of a science (say, the science of biology)? Would this make any difference for how we (for example) conceive the object of semiosis? Moreover, do not the paradigmatic instances of the experimental sciences in which Peirce was most interested display their vitality as much as anywhere in the continual refashioning (at least, rethinking) of their most basic concepts? These are the questions with which the author of this essay concerns himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most specialists agree that Peirce upholds his abstract definitions of reality and truth simultaneously and consistently with his pragmatic clarifications of those concepts. But some might assume that his pragmatic clarifications (the third grade of clearness) restrict the extensions of abstract definitions (the second grade of clearness), such that anything real must both be independent of what anyone thinks about it, per the abstract definition, and be an object of the would-be "final opinion", per the pragmatic clarification. I call this reading Interpretive Dependence of the second grade of clearness on the third grade. In contrast, on Interpretive Independence , which I defend here, a concept can have a different extension on the second grade than it has on the third grade, such that it could be true, in a purely abstract sense, that there are realities that can never be known (metaphysical realism). "True" here must also be interpreted only according to an abstract definition, namely, one which Peirce endorses in 1906 and which, I argue, is a deflationary definition. Interpretive Independence not only allows Peirce to explain the intuitive appeal of metaphysical realism, while at the same time rejecting it, it also allows him to explain how there can be truths about fictional objects and truths in pure mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Peirce's concept of analogy. I begin by arguing that he understands it along two main lines: (1) as a natural cognitive operation that discerns the resemblance of structural relations, pivotally signified by the diagram sign-class, and (2) as a "mixed" form of argument employing abduction, deduction, and induction. After exploring these two aspects, along with their interpenetration, I compare Peirce's account of analogous reasoning with the highly influential view of the late-Medieval scholastic Thomas Cajetan. I argue that Peirce presents a superior approach because his diagrammatic logic renders a view that is methodologically open to further inquiry, explains that openness in terms of inference through sampling, and capaciously accepts a variety of potential determinations for any one analogy due to the objective vagueness of signs. Cajetan's appeal to the irreducible proportionality of analogous thinking, on the other hand, excludes further explanation of analogy's workings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce's sign type of "Dicent Indexical Legisigns" has received relatively little scholarly attention, and it is sometimes confused with the "Dicent Symbol" category. This stems from an inconsistency between Peirce's general explanation and his exemplifications of the category. Taking the lead from the latter, this paper argues that while the role of "Dicent Symbols" is descriptive, the task of "Dicent Indexical Legisigns" is not to describe but rather to establish identity of reference by connecting some proper name to an object or to another identifying sign of that object. Thus, it appears as an overlooked sign type playing an important role both in everyday agreement upon reference and in scientific negotiations over identity, terminology, existence, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay considers the inferential operation of abduction from the theoretical framework of biosemiotics and emphasizes the evolutionary dimension of Peircean semiotics. Main axioms and hypotheses constitutive of the contemporary biosemiotics consensus are discussed. Peirce's classification of sciences is examined in order to better position abduction with regard to Peircean semiotics' general epistemology. Jakob von Uexküll's concept of Umwelt is used as a basis for a desubjectivized theory of signs and semiosis in which cognition, of which abduction is a mode, is regarded as a general principle occurring throughout nature. Taking into account recent works by Fredrick Stjernfelt on the logical syntax of natural propositions, or Dicisigns, Peirce's evolutionary model is put to the trial of contemporary research in epigenetics. The thesis unifying all the elements of this framework together, and motivating the essay as a whole, is that abduction is a common regulatory operation occurring at different levels in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles S. Peirce reviewed the first two volumes of George Santayana's The Life of Reason for the June 8, 1905 edition of The Nation. Santayana's publisher, Charles Scribner's Sons, advertised the five-volume series of The Life of Reason as having a place in the line of American Pragmatism. Peirce's review penetrated basic tenets of The Life of Reason and discounted Santayana's Pragmatist credentials. His concise Nation review followed upon a handwritten manuscript (R 1494) in which he addressed Santayana's Pragmatism in critical perspective on the philosophic life of the times. These two Peircean texts, the extant portions of which are presented here in full, came in the aftermath of his Cambridge and Lowell Lectures that expanded his earlier Pragmatism to Pragmaticism in tandem with innovative speculations on the normative sciences and a grammatology of semiotics. Santayana attended the third Cambridge Lecture; years later he commented on Peirce's "unacademic personality" while waffling on Peirce's possible influence on his doctrine of symbols. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Josiah Royce (1855–1916) have both developed a metaphyical semiotics at the center of their versions of philosophical pragmatism. Thereby, they also tried to reconsider the question of a "personal God", but not in the line of classical theism. This article compares Peirce´s and Royce´s model of a personal divine under several aspects: their dealing with questions of cosmology, of social philosophy, and especially in their dealing with the problem of evil. Whereas Peirce is arguing for kind of "aesthetic theism", Royce mostly comes close to an ethical model of theism in which the "universal community of mankind" is both, saved and reconciled in the "community of interpretation". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article attempts a semiotic analysis of the "humble argument," the most inward one of a nest of three arguments presented by Peirce in his 1908 essay "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." The analysis is based on the system of ten trichotomies Peirce developed in 1905 but never explained. The article (1) tries to establish which element of an argument acts as the sign, which element acts as the object, and which element acts as the interpretant, (2) sets out to identify structural differences between seme-abducents, pheme-abducents , and delome-abducents , and (3) draws conclusions concerning the humble argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, scholars have come to recognize certain affinities between Peirce’s Speculative Rhetoric and the rhetorical tradition. Yet, they have not offered a comprehensive account of how they are related. In the first section of this essay, I show that Peirce is linked to the rhetorical tradition partly because he gives new expression to two major insights of the tradition, namely (i) that discourses are bridges between an orator and an audience and (ii) that the efficacy of a discourse depends not only on the orator’s intention, but also on the audience’s prior knowledge. In the second section, I suggest that certain key distinctions developed by Peirce—most notably his distinction between icon, index and symbol, and between the various classes of interpretants—can account for the concerns of the rhetorical tradition, while at the same time explaining the efficacy of signs in contexts, like scientific inquiry, that have remained largely overlooked by this very tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows how Peirce's semeiotics can be applied to explain the representation of non-existent or unreal objects, whether in misrepresentation or in thought and discourse about fictional objects. Such representation would seem to require a relation between a sign and an unreal object, and the puzzle is how a real object (the sign) can bear a relation to an unreal object. Peirce can solve this puzzle without denying that representation generally is relational. However, he can deny that the representation of an unreal object involves a real relation to that object. The key lies with his distinction between the immediate object and the dynamical object of a sign, as an unreal object is always only an immediate object. With a functional substitution model of signs (suggested by Peirce's writings, and defended here) we can understand an unreal immediate object in terms of an interpreter responding to a sign as if it were related to a real object. The remainder of this Peircean solution rests upon a realist interpretation of dynamical objects, as well as upon his abstract definition of truth as the correspondence of a sign to its object, which helps to explain how some propositions about unreal objects can be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Sanders Peirce famously distinguishes between three types of sign, depending on how the sign refers to its object. An 'icon' refers by resemblance. An 'index' refers by a physical connection. And a 'symbol' refers by habit or convention. In this paper I argue that emotional expressions-e.g. cries of sadness, laughs of amusement, and scowls of anger-refer to emotions in none of these ways. Instead, they refer to their objects by manifesting them, or by enabling the perception of them. Thus, a cry signifies sadness because an observer who hears a cry can hear sadness, a laugh signifies joy because an observer who hears a laugh can hear joy, and a scowl signifies anger because an observer who sees a scowl can see anger. Although this analysis of emotional expression challenges a common understanding of Peirce's theory of signs, I demonstrate that it is ultimately consistent with Peirce's views on signification, emotion, and perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I connect Peirce's early logico-semiotic investigations (1865-1867) to the doctrine of sign-inference presented by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics.In section III I argue that An. Pr.II.27 showed Peirce the possibility of a syllogistic reconstruction of non-syllogistic inferences, and taught him (i) to consider the premises of an argument as affording a σημεῖον or sign of the conclusion, and (ii) to consider the three syllogistic figures as three different signs based on three different semiotic principles. As a preliminary to my argument, in section II I discuss some of Peirce's later remarks on semiotic terminology that collectively throw some light on the historical models of Peirce's semiotic enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We offer a formulation of first-order logic that is diagrammatic in nature, retains a basic part of C. S. Peirce's own graphics, renders quantification both graphical and easily readable, and seems a natural approach to what lies at or near the foundations of his science of Semeiotic. The approach is in agreement with Peirce's propositional graphics (Alpha EG), but different in its treatment of quantifiers. Our syntax is formulated with the "atoms" of the usual predicate calculus given a fine structure in terms of a bonding operation on monadic, dyadic, and triadic building blocks. A suitable semantics is introduced, based on relative product and culminating with a proof of a precise formulation of the famous Peircean Non-Reduction Thesis (NRT). (In particular, in Theorem B', we document precisely the quantificational aspect of NRT: quantification is a multivalent operation, with full expressivity occurring only for valencies ≥ 3.)The principles NRT and RCT (Relational Completeness Thesis) are implicit in predicate logic, whatever form it might take; but their explicit presentation has generally been either neglected (classical predicate calculus) or attended by technical complexities (Peirce's Beta EG, Burch's PAL). Here, the proofs are both explicit and relatively simple. Other contexts in which our "molecular" treatment of relations may be advantageous will be indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I conclude from the examination of an example of semiosis that even though Peirce himself typically talks of two types of causation being involved, usually referred to as 'efficient' and 'final,' he could have-and for completeness should have-spoken of three types, the third corresponding to the classical conception of 'formal' causation. (A Peircean modification of the classical four-cause scheme requires abandonment of the notion of the fourth or 'material' cause as that was understood by Aristotle. This fourth factor has no functional counterpart in Peirce's philosophy because its function in the explanation of natural processes was bound up with the cyclical character of Aristotle's conception of such processes, which has no appropriately close parallel in Peirce's philosophy at the level of the generic conception of a sign.) The following is not textual exegesis and no textual basis is cited for it since it is based rather on my overall understanding of semiosis, as I have acquired that from studying Peirce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The late Joseph Ransdell's advocacy for a 'unitary interpretation' of the work of C.S. Peirce found expression in a 1989 paper where he declared Peirce's 1867 essay 'On a New List of Categories' to be 'the basic text for that part of his philosophy which he called 'phenomenology'.' Several of Peirce's later writings comment retrospectively on the process of inquiry which produced that 1867 paper and eventually developed into the science which he named 'phenomenology' in 1902. Some of these later texts are arguably as 'basic' to an understanding of Peircean phenomenology as the 1867 essay itself. An examination of these retrospective texts, together with some of Peirce's late writings on phaneroscopy, will support Ransdell's claim that Peirce rightly considered his own life's work to be 'fundamentally self-consistent throughout,' but will also clarify and modify Ransdell's assertions about Peirce's 1867 essay, his phenomenology, and their roles in his philosophical system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role theatre played in the life of Charles Peirce and his second wife, Juliette, from 1884-1888. Peirce became acquainted with playwright and director Steele Mackaye, who trained Juliette in the acting techniques associated with 'aesthetic expression,' a movement derived from the work of François Delsarte. I first trace the Peirces' interactions with Mackaye during this period. The paper then demonstrates affinities between Peirce's semeiotic account of cognition as mediated through feeling and sensation and the architecture of Delsarte's system of actor training. The latter employs Delsarte's semeiotique as an analytical tool for conveying the dramatic character's inner life. A function of mind, semeiotique intertwines with the functions of life and soul to complete the actor's task. The affinities between these two accounts of semeiotic emerge from the paper's analysis of Peirce's 1888 essay on aesthetic expression, 'Trichotomic,' and related passages from A Guess at the Riddle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses philosopher Charles S. Peirce's theory of representation, noting its triadic nature. It is said that his use of the terms representation and sign was similar to that of philosopher John Locke, while the notion of thirdness is said to play a critical role in Peirce's semiotic theory. Also addressed are the term representamen, which refers to that which represents an object to an interpreter, philosopher Charles Morris's notion of a representamen as a sign vehicle, and the relation of interpretation to representation or mediation.

The article discusses the views of philosopher Donald Davidson on the topic of meaning and metaphor, comparing them to those of philosopher Charles Peirce. An argument is presented that Davidson's arguments depend on a distinction between conveying and causing meaning, and that this distinction is collapsed by Peirce’s theory of signs. The causal processes which are involved in any kind of meaning are discussed in terms of Peirce's semiotic reasoning, and additional reasons for rejecting Davidson's argument about the cognitive significance of metaphors are adduced.

The article discusses American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and his theory of the symbol. How Peirce's theory of the symbol relates to the concept of habit is examined. The author states that Peirce added an evolutionary perspective to the theory of the symbol that had gone unnoticed by other philosophers. Peirce's belief that the symbol is the unique characteristic of human nature is explored. The article also discusses Peirce's definition of the symbol against the background of the history of semiotics.

The article presents the author's opinions on the philosopher Charles S.Peirce's statement that the universe is injected with signs and possibly composed of signs, which has confused the semioticians who study sign processes. The author discusses using Peirce's belief that absolute reality can't be found to overcome the semioticians' confusion and the metaphysicians' bewilderment of Peirce's theory of matter being "effete mind." It is suggested by the author that in synechism, which is the tendency to regard everything as continuous, if the mind is conceived of as semiosis, then semiotics supplies concepts to link semiosis and the continuity between mind and matter.

The article focuses on the nineteenth-century philosophical theories regarding universal concepts held by American philosopher and mathematician Charles S. Peirce. The author focuses on Peirce's semiotic writings from 1860 to 1891 regarding the use of proper names in the logic of relatives. The article also discusses logical formalism, sytax, semantics, the requirements of proof theory, predicates of quantificational logic, Peirce's paper titled "Logic of Relatives," English philosopher and mathematician George Boole, and German philosopher and mathematician Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege.

The article discusses the semiotic consideration of Charles Sanders Peirce on proper names. The author relates that Peirce's theory of proper names implies the concerns on social practice of name changing, issue of identity and temporary insanity. The author adds that Pierece referred proper nouns to the categorization of rhematic indexical legisigns. Further, the author stresses that Pierce belives that it requires a sign that fit the continuity which a person demostrates according to the regular patterns of behavior to which proper names point. In addition, the author provides preliminary ways in which Peirce's theory can be applied to the practical concerns and explains how semiosis consideration complements Peirce's ontology of persons.

The article discusses the relationship of Charles S. Peirce's semiotics with the existing philosophy of language established by contemporary philosophers including David Lewis, Helmut Pape, and Risto Hilpinen. The author explores Peirce's accounts of signs and provides information on how the signs play essential role in answering the two puzzles of reference, which are The Problem of Cognitive Significance and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Furthermore, the author discusses how Peirce's accounts of signs differ with the philosophy of language by other philosophers.

The article discusses the possibility on the integration of the sciences with humanities by considering the theory of indexicality developed by Charles S. Peirce. The author explores Peirce's theory of indices which focuses on indexical signs and the significant role it plays in understanding theoretical concepts. It provides a comparison on Carlo Ginzburg's view concerning indices and traces with that of Peirce's theory of indexical signs. In addition, a discussion on the functions of different indices and traces as well as their semiotical connectivity are also discussed. Furthermore, the empirical generality of Pierce's indexical signs and its applications in the field of sciences is mentioned.

The article explores Charles S. Peirce's early view of the relation between cognition and being by examining his essays from 1868 to 1869. Published in the "Journal of Speculative Philosophy," these essays explain Peirce's objections to the strong classical version of foundationalism as well as his criticism of Descartes' method and epistemological individualism. It is the author's opinion that Peirce's essays present an isomorphic relation between cognition and being that is consistent with weak semiotic foundationalism. The author proposes a form of realism through a transcendental approach.

The article examines claim of philosopher Charles Peirce on the semiotics of death and analyzes the relationship of human beings and the dead through indexical signs. Three distinct but constitutive structural elements are involved in Peirce's account of the phenomenon of signification. These are the sign representamen, the real object and the interpretant. According to Peirce, the event of experience itself is referred to as secondness. He says that shock is related to the change of mood characteristics of secondness. Peirce's classification of the sign based on how it stands for its object is employed in the transition from the replacement of firstness by secondness.

The article examines the philosophy of thinker Charles Peirce on aesthetics and its role as a normative science. Normative sciences, according to Peirce, seek to examine the conditions of possibility for what ought to be with regards to feeling, conduct and thought. In particular, the formation of ideals and of the supreme ideal, the summum bonum, is studied through the science of aesthetics. Peirce claims that the ideal must be admirable in itself and must be conceived from the point of view of Firstness, as a quality of feeling or a habit of feeling.

The article discusses how philosophers Max H. Fisch, James J. Liszka, Lucia Santella, Anne Friedman and Mats Bergman brought focus on why Charles S. Peirce took speculative rhetoric to be the highest and most living branch of logic. The author studied how these scholars assessed the unfinished trajectory of Peirce's realization of the importance of speculative rhetoric. He argues for a more pragmaticist and rhetorical approach in the shift from the formalist and taxonomic emphasis of many commentators.

The article discusses the argument that pragmatists must be aware about the concept of power and its consequences. It reflects the beliefs of Michel Foucalt and Charles Peirce. Peirce being a pragmatism's initiator believes in semiotics whereas Focault believes that language and signs is not the great model of language but more on action. Both beliefs can be merged by regarding philosophy not just as a form of knowledge but it can also become a way of guiding actions.

The article discusses if and in what sense semiosis can be regarded as an emergent process in semiotic systems. It discusses the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. It first summarizes a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. A model for explaining emergence based on S. N. Salthe's hierarchical structuralism is then discussed.

Discusses the transcendental semiotics and the unity of apperception and the deduction of the categories of sign. Definition of transcendental logic; Interrelation of judgment with the condition of consistency; Stages of the account of apperception.

Discusses the character of abduction through the distinction of areas of logic or semeiotic by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Excerpts from Peirce's writings concerning abduction and semeiotic; Definition of abduction; Difference between deduction, induction and abduction or hypothesis.

Argues that the problem of induction is always already caught up in a transcendental performative self-contradiction because he or she is, in the very act of articulating anything meaningful, committed to the idea that the future must, in fact, resemble the past. Interpretation of the Riddle of Induction of Nelson Goodman; Information on the theory of the Grue Paradox on confirmation; Synthesis of Kantian transcendental epistemology and the theory of semiotics by Charles S. Peirce.

Explores philosopher Charles Peirce's 1903 systematic division of signs. Logic employed in his 1903 derivation of the classes of signs; Overview of the classes of signs; Ways to accomplish the division of triadic relations into ten classes.

Argues that the limitations of the logism paradigm have emerged, which results to the shift of philosophy towards rhetorical themes. Claim of philosopher Charles Peirce in his semiotics; Speculation on his notion of rhetoric; Division of semiotics or the theory of signs.

Discusses the diagram concept for semiotics and epistemology by Charles S. Peirce. Illustration of the diagram as an icon of rationally related objects; Operational criterion and the extension of the icon category; Discussion on the diagram as the interpretant of a symbol;

Argues that the triad ground/immediate object/meaning offers a clearer resonance with the texts of Charles S. Peirce and opens more surely on the great theme of community. Texts wherein immediate object, ground and meaning seem to be synonymous; Examination of the three texts that Eco uses to support his equivalence between ground, meaning and interpretant; Abductions which lead to the assertion that the triad can be viewed as the basis for a communal semiotic.

Discusses the role of communicative sign in semiotics. Difficulties that cast doubts upon the possibilities of developing a thoroughgoing communicative conception of semiotics; Characterization of mediation in terms of semiotic connection; Processes involved in the inclusive process of semiosis.

Considers Peircean semiotics in the study of iconicity in language. Discussion on iconicity and the Linguistic Theory; Information on the foundations of the theory of iconicity in the semiotics of philosopher Charles Peirce; Details on endophoric iconicity in texts and the essence of poetry.

Deals with the reflections of philosopher Charles Peirce on musical signs and subjectivity. Presentation of intuition as an independent faculty; Discussion on problems concerning the application of semiotic thought to music; Information on the article 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,' by Charles Peirce.

Focuses on the ontology of logic conceptualized by philosopher Charles S. Peirce as displayed in the first of his eleven Harvard Lectures. Examination of his psychological and unpsychological definitions of logic; Discussion on the realization of logical form; Discussion of semiotics that support the realization of logical form.

Examines the relationship between the ideas of metaphysics and cosmology of Charles S. Peirce with his semiotics. Explanation on the metaphysical idea of final causality; Relevance of his metaphysical and cosmological philosophy; Analysis of his viewpoint on the physical laws of nature.