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In this paper, I address the dispute between normativism and descriptivism by focusing on the arbitration problem. For this, I propose to take into account the discussion on the collapse problem that has taken place recently in the philosophy of logic. My proposal maintains, on the one hand, that human reasoning, as a social practice, is an essentially regulated activity and, on the other hand, that formal systems of reference in the psychology of reasoning are the result of various processes of reflective equilibrium. This makes it possible to defend the normative role of formal systems as a standard for human reasoning. Furthermore, I argue that the adequacy of a formal system is marked by the specific contexts of reasoning. Thus, I defend normative pluralism regarding formal systems of inference within the framework of empirical studies on human reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The writings of Jean-Marie Schaeffer stand out among those of other French philosophers because they not only emphasize the relevance of the evolutionary approach within philosophical reflection, generally completely discredited in intellectual circles linked to continental philosophy, but because they introduce it into aesthetic research, which is even less frequent among philosophers in general. In Schaeffer's research, this approach makes explicit the existence of a meeting point between, on the one hand, the philosophical critique of anthropocentrism and animal ethics, and, on the other hand, aesthetic analysis. As I argue in this paper, in light of Shaeffer's reflections some important implications of the theory of biological evolution in the problematization of the assumption of a human moral superiority within philosophical aesthetics become evident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the notion of being according to Maurice Nédoncelle. Firstly, I explain this French personalist philosopher's general concept of human interrelationship, after which I present a general idea of Nédoncelle's metaphysics. Then, I discuss his conception of being as a transcendental relation. I claim that Nédoncelle's conception of being is coherent with personalist claims about the nature of the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant's moral philosophy intends to be an articulated project between metaphysics of morals and practical anthropology. In the works in which he undertakes the task of grounding his metaphysics of morals, namely, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant insists that he borrows nothing from anthropology to support this grounding, whereas in his two other most important practical writings, the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant applies his metaphysics of morals to anthropology. By discussing Kant's idea that empirical happiness is an essential end for every human being, and that his metaphysics of morals is just incoherent without denying rationality and freedom to every sensible incentive, this paper problematizes the possibility of the articulated project of Kant's moral philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant contributions of the application of the analytical method in Wittgenstein's later work consists in the differentiation of the grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic structure of statements in the first and in the third person which express the feelings and experiences of human beings. His analysis aims to show the difference in meaning and understanding between statements of the form "I am depressed" and "Arthur is depressed". This paper is oriented to show the theoretical implications of Wittgenstein's study, which validates and legitimizes the specificities of psychiatry and psychology as sciences of different types from that of natural sciences, which are configured according to different language games and require interpretive observation and understanding of the significant expressions of the affective life of human beings, such as language, actions, and symbolic figures. With this analysis, Wittgenstein opens a communication channel between analytical philosophy and hermeneutics for the studies of human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With regard to the so-called "Anthropocene" era, in which human beings have become Earths' main telluric force, the humanities are clearly under siege. They must review in depth their conception of human being, usually defined as essentially different from Nature. Accordingly, two distinct ways of reaction are open: one retains the principles of the humanistic tradition, while the other one seeks to drift apart from that very same tradition, and to open up a new paradigm of thinking that might be called posthumanist. This paper broadly puts in contrast both approaches by asking which of them comes to grip with this event, and so lets us understand what does it mean to be human in this new era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental ethics is often seen as a branch of applied ethics whose task is to offer solutions to emerging ethical dilemmas in the context of ecology. In this paper, we challenge this assumption, showing how the object of environmental ethics raises questions that go beyond that of applied ethics. We explore how the environmental issues bring up the need to inquire into the ontological status of Nature and the place of human beings in it, raising more general and far-reaching questions that do not get entrapped in the mere application. In this regard, it appears that "dwelling", in its ontological sense, is at the bottom of these questions, creating a bridge between the ontological and the practical realm. Finally, we review classical environmental ethics' paradigms highlighting the elements that go beyond applied ethics. And so, taking into account the different environmental ethics paradigms, we have two options: reducing the scope of the discipline and exclude the models that exceed it, or reconsidering it as an environmental philosophy tout court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An attribution of mental agency is defined as the act of assigning the initiation or authorship of a first personal phenomenal thought to a specific agent. This type of attribution is fundamental for the production of the belief that human beings are rational agents not only in behavioral terms, but also, in a cognitive manner. The top-down approach --one of the dominant theories in current literature-- suggests that attributions of mental agency arise as retrospective rational explanations for the occurrence of phenomenal thoughts. Thus, the agency of a thought would not be contained in its most fundamental phenomenal structure, rather, it would be an imposed category. After introducing the most fundamental elements of the debate, this paper evaluates the topdown model in order to identify its argumentative strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, although this model possesses a number of merits, it cannot deal in a plausible way with some fundamental conceptual challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]