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BackgroundIn June 2018, San Francisco voters upheld the first comprehensive prohibition on sales of flavoured tobacco products (all products including menthol, everywhere in the city with no exceptions).MethodsThis paper used data collected by the San Francisco Department of Public Health as part of its implementation and enforcement of San Francisco's city-wide ban on the sale of flavoured tobacco products. Every licensed tobacco retailer was visited and inspected. The San Francisco Department of Public Health and volunteers conducted an educational campaign from September 2018 to December 2018, including emailing all licensed tobacco retailers about the law, mailing a fact sheet poster, conducting four listening sessions and visiting permitted tobacco retailers to educate them about the law and solicit questions.ResultsCompliance inspections started in December 2018, which found that compliance was 17%. Compliance increased in January 2019 and averaged 80% between January 2019 and December 2019. After the phase-in period, all retailers were visited as part of routine inspections. This effort resulted in 80% compliance.ConclusionIncluding retailer education prior to enforcement can result in compliance with a comprehensive ban on the sale of menthol and other flavoured tobacco products.

BackgroundNepal was a monarchy, then a dictatorship, then a democracy. This paper reviews how tobacco control progressed in Nepal in the context of these changes in government from 1950 through 2006.MethodsWe triangulated tobacco industry documents, newspaper articles and key informant interviews.ResultsUntil 1983, the tobacco industry was mostly state owned. Transnational tobacco companies entered the Nepalese market through ventures with Surya Tobacco Company Private Limited (with Imperial Tobacco Company and British American Tobacco) in 1983 and Seti Cigarette Factory Limited (with Philip Morris International [PMI]) in 1985. Seminars and conferences on tobacco, celebrations of World No Tobacco Day (WNTD) and efforts by WHO helped promote tobacco control in Nepal beginning in the 1970s. Tobacco advocates in Nepal pushed the government to issue executive orders banning smoking in public places in 1992 and tobacco advertising in electronic media in 1998, and to introduce a tobacco health tax in 1993. The tobacco industry lobbied against these measures and succeeded in keeping the tobacco tax low by challenging it in court. Tobacco advocates sued the government in 2003 and 2005, resulting in a June 2006 Supreme Court decision upholding the smoking and advertising bans and requiring the government to enact a comprehensive tobacco control law.ConclusionsPolitical instability, conflict, weak governance and the dictatorship significantly affect tobacco control activities in low-income and middle-income countries. Nepal shows that tobacco control advocates can take advantage of global events, such as WNTD, and use domestic litigation to maintain support from civil societies and to advocate for stronger tobacco control policies.

BackgroundThe tobacco industry (TI) uses several strategies to attract new consumers, including using additives in tobacco products, which makes tobacco especially attractive to youth. Based on scientific evidence and the principles of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA, for the name in Portuguese), published the Collegiate Board Resolution (RDC, for the name in Portuguese) 14/2012 in 2012, prohibiting the addition of substances that enhance the flavour and taste of tobacco products in order to make them more attractive. In response, the TI used various strategies to prevent RDC 14/2012 from entering into force. At the time, the Brazilian additive ban was the most comprehensive in the world as it included a ban on menthol.ObjectivesThis paper analyses the arguments and strategies used by the TI to prevent the implementation of the additives ban.MethodsReview of published articles, reports, legislation and legislative activity, internal TI documents, media stories and other documents to describe TI's reaction to the ban.ResultsThe results show that the TI used some well-known strategies to delay or cancel the entering into force of the resolution. For example, the TI attempted political interference, used litigation and commissioned studies with findings that questioned the resolution's rationale. The TI strategies used in Brazil are similar to those used at the global level to oppose other tobacco control measures.ConclusionsTI successfully delayed the most comprehensive additive ban in the world using its usual tactics, despite the fact that none of the arguments presented by the TI had an acceptable scientific basis or evidence.

BackgroundElectronic cigarettes (ECs) are nicotine delivery devices that produce aerosol without combustion of tobacco; therefore, they do not produce sidestream smoke. Nevertheless, many users exhale large clouds of aerosol that can result in passive exposure of non-users. Analogous to thirdhand cigarette smoke, the exhaled aerosol also settles on indoor surfaces where it can produce a residue. We refer to this residue as EC exhaled aerosol residue (ECEAR). Our objective was to determine if exhaled EC aerosol transferred from a vape shop in a multiple-tenant retail building, where it was produced, to a nearby business (field site) where it could deposit as ECEAR.MethodsWe examined the build-up of ECEAR in commonly used materials (cotton towel and paper towels) placed inside the field site across from the vape shop. Materials were subjected to short-term (days) and long-term (months) exposures. Nicotine, other alkaloids and tobacco-specific nitrosamines (TSNAs) were identified and quantified in controls and field site samples using analytical chemical techniques.ResultsNicotine and other alkaloids were detected after 1 day of exposure in the field site, and these chemicals generally increased as exposure times increased. TSNAs, which have been linked to carcinogenesis, were also detected in short-term and long-term exposed samples from the field site.ConclusionsIn a multiple-tenant retail building, chemicals in EC aerosol travelled from a vape shop into an adjacent business where they deposited forming ECEAR. Regulatory agencies and tenants occupying such buildings should be aware of this potential environmental hazard.

IntroductionCalifornia's law raising the minimum tobacco sales age to 21 went into effect on 9 June 2016. This law, known as 'Tobacco 21' or 'T21', also expanded the definition of tobacco to include electronic smoking devices. This paper describes the T21 evaluation plan and initial evaluation results.MethodsAn evaluation plan and logic model were created to evaluate T21. A tobacco retailer poll was conducted 7 months after the law went into effect to assess awareness, support and implementation; an online survey of California adults was fielded to provide data on tobacco use and attitudinal changes before and after T21 implementation; and tobacco purchase surveys were conducted to assess the retailer violation rate (RVR). Multivariate models estimated the odds of RVR and odds of being aware, agreeing with and observing advertisements related to T21.ResultsSeven months after the T21 effective date, 98.6% of retailers were aware of the law and 60.6% supported the law. Furthermore, 66.2% of retailers agreed that people who start smoking before 21 would become addicted to tobacco products. The RVR using youth decoys under age 18 statistically decreased from 10.3% before T21 to 5.7% after T21 (P=0.002). Furthermore, the RVR using young adult decoys ages 18-19 was 14.2% (95% CI 9.3% to 19.1%) for traditional tobacco and 13.1% (95% CI 10.2% to 16.1%) for electronic smoking devices.ConclusionsSurvey findings suggest that the high awareness and support for the law may have contributed to reducing illegal tobacco sales to youth under 18 and achieving widespread retailer conformity with the new law disallowing sales to young adults under 21.

BackgroundThis paper describes the methods and conceptual framework for Wave 1 of the Population Assessment of Tobacco and Health (PATH) Study data collection. The National Institutes of Health, through the National Institute on Drug Abuse, is partnering with the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Center for Tobacco Products to conduct the PATH Study under a contract with Westat.MethodsThe PATH Study is a nationally representative, longitudinal cohort study of 45 971 adults and youth in the USA, aged 12 years and older. Wave 1 was conducted from 12 September 2013 to 15 December 2014 using Audio Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing to collect information on tobacco-use patterns, risk perceptions and attitudes towards current and newly emerging tobacco products, tobacco initiation, cessation, relapse behaviours and health outcomes. The PATH Study's design allows for the longitudinal assessment of patterns of use of a spectrum of tobacco products, including initiation, cessation, relapse and transitions between products, as well as factors associated with use patterns. Additionally, the PATH Study collects biospecimens from consenting adults aged 18 years and older and measures biomarkers of exposure and potential harm related to tobacco use.ConclusionsThe cumulative, population-based data generated over time by the PATH Study will contribute to the evidence base to inform FDA's regulatory mission under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and efforts to reduce the Nation's burden of tobacco-related death and disease.

Tobacco 'endgame' discourse has emerged in recognition of the nature of the global public health emergency created by tobacco use and tobacco promotion. This discourse is a promising development, but translating it into action requires developing some consensus, at least by countries or regions. It also requires negotiating some of the recurring tensions within the tobacco control movement, contributing to risks for the movement as visionaries clash with pragmatists. This paper outlines one combination of approaches that might hold promise for the US situation. Every significant achievement in tobacco control was preceded by many influential people saying it couldn't be done, wouldn't work, or would create new problems. The risks of not envisioning an endpoint for the tobacco epidemic are far greater than the risks of attempting any endgame solutions and failing.