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Many developing countries have, in recent years, adopted structural transformation strategies and strengthened state economic activism. While prima facie reminiscent of the post-war era's developmentalist strategies, contemporary industrial policies have resurfaced in a different environment: they are often designed and implemented in (newly) democratic, rather than authoritarian, political regimes. This paper argues that when democratic developing countries seek to (re)deploy industrial policies, governments must navigate the specific demands arising in an institutional setting in which political power is constrained and contestable. Therefore, the focus of the classical industrial policy literature on instrumental-rational, top-down, technocratic -policy-making, with centralised state–business relations, needs to adapt to this environment. This paper discusses how challenges to secure fiscal space, reach parliamentary consensus, and address diverse societal demands in a formal democratic institutional setting influence industrial policies in developing countries. We exemplify this using Indonesia as a case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key but neglected dimension of developmental industrial policy is the formation of a mutually beneficial relationship among developing country governments, domestic capital and multinational corporations, or what Peter Evans has termed 'dependent development'. Such relationships were a prominent feature of the growth trajectories of Latin American and East Asian industrialisers in the 1960s and 1970s. This article argues, however, that dependent development is a historically specific phenomenon; it is much harder to achieve for developing countries attempting industrial development after the 1990s, when multinationals have significantly more power and autonomy in relation to the state in developing countries, as a result of domestic liberalisation and changes in the international regimes of trade and investment. These power imbalances have persisted in the last two decades. The article examines the institutional relationships among states, multinationals and domestic firms after neoliberal economic reform and globalisation, and demonstrates the substantive constraints of multinationals in executing externally oriented industrial policies in a most likely case, that of India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the implications and consequences of the rise of BRICS for the developing world and for global governance. In doing so, it examines BRICS’ increasing importance among developing countries and their growing significance in the world economy, situated in historical perspective, and considers the factors underlying the evolution of the group as an economic and political formation. This is followed by an analysis of the possible economic impact of future growth in BRICS on other developing countries, which could be complementary or competitive, positive or negative. In conclusion it discusses the potential influence of BRICS, extending beyond economics to politics, in the wider global context, with reference to international institutions and cooperation among developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Until the mid-1980s post-World War II development thinking shared three basic paradigms, ie essentialising the Third World and its inhabitants as homogeneous entities, an unconditional belief in progress and in the makeability of society, and the importance of the (nation)state in realising that progress. Development theories (from modernisation to dependencia) as well as the international development aid industry all shared these paradigms. From the mid-1980s onwards these three paradigms increasingly lost their hegemonic status and are currently, on the threshold of the twenty-first century, being replaced by a loose set of partly descriptive, partly heuristic notions like civil society, social capital, diversity and risk. This article is an attempt to analyse the most important reasons for the loss of the central paradigms in development thinking. It tries to assess the importance for development studies of several postmodern, post-development and globalisation-inspired notions and insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores why the modernization theory of economically-driven political development applies to Asia-Pacific developing countries. Late democratization followed late industrialization in the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan because the demobilization of labor and the dependency of business that accompanied successful export-driven industrialization delayed pressures for an earlier transition. The cases of several Asia-Pacific countries show that developmental dictators were better able to contain docile unions and business groups. Much as modernization theory predicts, the rise of civil society in South Korea and Taiwan was drawn in large part from the growing middle class created by relatively high levels of economic development. But the cases of Malaysia and Singapore suggest an emerging middle class is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic transition. While middle class-backed proto-democracy movements were repressed and only pseudo-parliamentarism practiced, a justification for tight state control in terms of Asian values was offered even after considerable economic advances had been achieved. This both strengthened rulers' will to rule undemocratically and weakened the opposition's ability to challenge them in these two countries. These successful developmental dictatorships may also encourage other late industrializers elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific to resist pressures for democratization.

This article attempts to assess the influence of the two main development strategies, import-substitution industrialization and export-led growth, in the economic growth of developing countries. The article will not focus on the concrete experiences of a few countries, but will present a general, quantitative analysis on the basis of data concerning 84 developing countries and three periods: 1965-74, 1975-84 and 1985-92. To do this, a causal model will be sketched that links development strategies and structural characteristics of developing countries to economic growth. The causal model will be estimated by applying path analysis, starting from the assumption that the relations are stable over time and, hence, that the causal model is identical for all three periods under study. Then, the causal model linking development strategies to the economic performance of Third World countries will be specified.

This article argues fundamentally that existing research on developing world multinationalism has not been successful in abandoning its academic straitjacket which results in misleading stereotypes and biased interpretations. There is a pressing need not only for more attention devoted to this contradictory phenomenon of Third World multinationalism but also for critical reflections on the state-of-the-art research in academia. This article purports to fill this gap in the existing literature. Two methodological notes are useful here. First, the term Third World multinationals has gained such a wide currency in the literature that almost every empirical study adopts it uncritically. Second, this article excludes those studies of foreign direct investment per se.

The article presents an analysis of the factors behind the underdevelopment of the Philippines and offers an alternative development program. According to the author, the government's post-World War II import-substitution program aimed at attempting to shift to an export-oriented economy proved to be unsustainable as reflected on the devaluation of the peso and dismantling of the import-control system. He believes that the causes of the country's development problems include the feudal socio-economic structure and the colonial economic framework that relates its economic relations with other countries. The author suggests that a private sector is a necessary factor of the mixed, transition economy.

Information about several papers discussed during the Second Summit of Third World Scholars and Statemen is presented. It discusses problems that have been caused by a lack of industrialization on a global scale which cannot be solved regionally. It stresses the lack of North-South dialogue and the increasingly uncooperative line taken by industrialized countries. It cites the cellular development within the existing economic system argued by Tengku Razaleigh.

The author reflects the move of Third World toward the need for disarmament, the advances in technology and the task of preserving the environment. Accordingly, peace is breaking and war as an instrument of diplomacy or domination is becoming obsolete and these factors will affect the relationships between the superpowers and the rest of the world. The author added that Third World nations feared that industrialized world will restrain the process of industrialization in developing countries.