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In response to the recent spate of financial crises in East Asia (1997-98), the IMF has established a core set of international standards to regulate market behaviour in the global South. These standards are embodied in 11 modules that comprise the IMF's Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Both content and form of the ROSCs warrant further consideration. That said, the main objective of this paper is to explain how and why one particular ROSC, namely corporate governance, has become standardised. And, more importantly, to address the question of whose interests are served. In doing so the essay suggests that, despite the claim that the international standard of corporate governance embodies 'universal principles', the definition advanced in the ROSes intentionally draws on the Anglo-American variant. This imposed standardisation of corporate governance serves two overlapping goals. First, it seeks to stabilise the international financial system by ensuring that emerging markets adhere to the principles of a neoliberal open market economy. Second, by placing a greater emphasis on 'shareholder value' than other types of corporate governance, it protects the interests of institutional investors based in market-centric systems such as that of the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-US agreement regarding China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 1999 came as a surprise to many observers. How and why did the Chinese reach the agreement in view of the impasses in the negotiation that occurred earlier in the year? These impasses included the collapse of the WTO talks during Zhu's visit to the USA in April, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May, and the deadlock between the Chinese and US negotiators in November. Drawing on published sources as well as experts' insights, this paper examines the Chinese leadership's decision-making process and its reasons for concluding the agreement. It suggests that the exclusive decision-making circle of top Chinese leaders circumvented the opposition to the agreement and facilitated the negotiations. These leaders, especially Jiang and Zhu, favoured an agreement because they believed WTO membership could improve China's international relations, trade conditions, the outcomes of reform at home, and China's leverage over Taiwan. The closed decision making on the WTO also left the Chinese leaders with a challenging task: educating officials and the population about the WTO rules and possible impacts while ensuring that they abide by the rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the agendas of the U.S. policies towards Latin America. Although the first policy objective, which is the promotion of neoliberal market reforms, is viewed as an economic issue and the second policy objective, which is the fight against the illegal drugs trade, is viewed as a law enforcement issue, both involve reshaping the relationship between states and markets. The compatibility of these two very different models of state-market relations is questionable, since legal and illegal markets are often inextricably intertwined. Thus, even as the U.S. seeks to expand the role of market forces and the private sector, the awkward reality in many Latin American countries is that the drug export industry is a leading market force and an integral component of the private sector.