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How does industrial policy currently interact with Regional Economic Communities in Africa? This article examines the tension between Regional Economic Communities and state-level industrial policy in Africa through two main problems: (1) how state industrial policies undermine Regional Economic Communities through a crisis of implementation and (2) how Regional Economic Communities undermine industrial policies through crisis of coordination. In discussing these issues, using indicative examples from the regions, especially the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC), the article brings together industrial policy and regional economic integration in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances the argument that moves towards regional integration need to be understood as 'regional governance projects' undertaken by domestic actors and coalitions. Regional political projects--such as open regionalism--have roots in domestic structures, and it is this which defines the broad configuration of the regional political economy. On the basis of this framework the paper suggests, first, that the strategy of open regionalism was contingent on a particular configuration of power and interests in the domestic and external economy (embedded mercantilism). Second, this system of embedded mercantilism depended on a set of domestic coalitions between tradeable and non-tradeable sectors of the economy. The non-tradeable sector in Southeast Asia was entrenched within a particular system of political patronage. Third, the Asian crisis and other structural changes in the international economy have made these domestic coalitions less sustainable, thereby creating opportunities for new forms of regional governance projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the impact of democratic transitions in Southeast Asia on regional co-operation, and the relationship between this process and the development of a non-official regionalism. Until now, regionalism in Southeast Asia has been essentially elite-centred and politically illiberal. The emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded upon the common desire of its members, which had by then retreated significantly from their postcolonial experiments in liberal democracy, to ensure regime survival. This orientation was further institutionalised by asean's doctrine of non-interference, which helped to shield its members from outside pressures towards democratisation. But with democratisation in the Philippines, Thailand and more recently Indonesia, the asean model of elite-centric regional socialisation has been challenged. The civil society in the region demands greater openness in Southeast Asian regionalism. The article proposes a conceptual framework for analysing the relationship between democratisation and regionalism, with the key argument being that the displacement of traditional patterns of regional elite socialisation has been offset by potential gains such as advances in regional conflict management, transparency and rule-based interactions. But the realisation of a more 'participatory regionalism' in Southeast Asia faces a number of barriers, including obstacles to further democratisation, the continued salience of the non-interference doctrine and the diminished space for civil society in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has conventionally been explained as a project of open regionalism adopted by the asean member governments to attract foreign direct investment to the region through the 'carrot' of the single regional market. Yet, when the same governments incorporated an investment liberalisation component programme within the AFTA project in 1998, they opted to accord full national treatment and market access privileges to foreign (non-asean) investors at least 10 years later than to domestic or asean national investors. Although member governments removed this particular discriminatory clause in September 2001, the fact that a distinction between foreign and domestic investors was adopted and maintained for a three-year period is puzzling given AFTA's acknowledged role as a magnet for foreign investment. Although AFTA is clearly a response to the pressures of globalisation, the available theoretical models of the relationship between globalisation and regionalism are unable to account for this empirical anomaly because they do not make a distinction between foreign-owned and domestic-owned capital. This paper advances the notion of 'developmental regionalism' as a way to incorporate domestic-owned capital in analysing the globalisation-regionalism relationship, which allows for a more robust explanation of the empirical puzzle outlined above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the original framework of 'open regionalism' underpinning the Mercosur is petering out, and consequently the regional governance project in the Southern Cone is undergoing a process of redefinition. The article seeks to understand the nature of this redefinition, and contends that this task requires a re-orientation of some of the prevalent ways in which the study of regionalism is approached. Specifically, it highlights the limitations of an understanding of regionalism merely as a reflection of domestic processes, and instead argues for a greater attention to processes of regionalisation and their complex relationship with both regionalism and domestic political economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The splintering of the Mercosur following the Brazilian devaluation in early 1999 has given way to an important re-crafting of the regional vision and a significant expansion of the scope of the regional project. This article contends that these trends can best be understood as coalescing into a new (and nascent) form of regionalist governance in the Southern Cone, in which the Mercosur is reconfigured as a vehicle for a new set of developmentalist and strategic objectives. This emerging form of regionalist governance is both causative and indicative of a new political economy both of the subregion and of the wider region of the Americas, and reflective of the crystallisation of a new political economy of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aceh is known as not only a rich but also a rebellious region. It experienced one of the longest wars against the Dutch colonial government. The seeds of conflict with the Indonesian government were sown early on during the independence period in the 1940s and 1950s. During the Suharto period (1966-98) Aceh developed from being a poor province to being the fastest growing provincial economy in Indonesia. However, the Acehnese believe that they did not gain much from this economic growth. This fuelled anti-Jakarta feeling among the Acehnese and also increased the popularity of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in Aceh. The military solution that the Suharto government imposed in the late 1980s worsened the human rights conditions in Aceh. As both the Habibie and Abudurrahman Wahid governments have failed to end the conflict, many Acehnese have been calling for a referendum to decide the future of the province: whether to remain part of Indonesia or to be an independent state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the way state-society relations and the advent of a historically specific Eastern Asian region were forged in the context of a succession of forms of world order: the colonial, era, the Pacific War, the Cold War and the post-Vietnam War world of globalization of production, finance, cultural practice and ideas. It will do so by first considering the various ways rational models of political economy have been theorized. The article will then propose a historicist political economy that is both comparative and transnational at the same time, locating specific country contexts in relation to region-formation and the nature of world order. This method, it will be argued, must embrace an explicitly political understanding of regional political economy. By political, it is meant to be more than merely the institutional context within which public policy is formulated, or the impact of inter-state rivalry on industrialization. The political also needs to be considered in terms of a configuration of power that has sub-national, national, macro-regional and global dimensions, and, at least in part, is linked to the structure of production. Once a theoretical framework is delineated, the key processes of region-formation will be discussed via the use of a brief comparative study of the Taiwanese and Thai cases. Often seen as adopting similar models of political economy because of the predominance of small-scale firms, the comparison will attempt to highlight how the social and institutional composition of the respective countries as well as the timing and manner of their linkage to regional and global structures have combined to produce divergent social formations, with different political economies that belie the notion that there is some sort of region-wide model.