10 results on '"Keith E. Stanovich"'
Search Results
2. Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test
- Author
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Richard F. West, Keith E. Stanovich, and Maggie E. Toplak
- Subjects
Vertical thinking ,Philosophy ,Cognitive Reflection Test ,Information processing ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Dual process theory ,Cognition ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Variance (accounting) ,Psychology ,Divergent thinking ,Cognitive psychology ,Test (assessment) - Abstract
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. It is a prime measure of the miserly information processing posited by most dual process theories. The original three-item test may be becoming known to potential participants, however. We examined a four-item version that could serve as a substitute for the original. Our data show that it displays a .58 correlation with the original version and that it has very similar relationships with cognitive ability, various thinking dispositions, and with several other rational thinking tasks. Combining the two versions into a seven-item test resulted in a measure of miserly processing with substantial reliability (.72). The seven-item version was a strong independent predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks after the variance accounted for by cognitive ability and thinking dispositi...
- Published
- 2013
3. Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice
- Author
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Keith E. Stanovich
- Subjects
Philosophy ,Decision theory ,ComputingMethodologies_SYMBOLICANDALGEBRAICMANIPULATION ,Cognitive complexity ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Cognitive architecture ,Axiom ,Ecological rationality ,Organism ,Mathematics ,Epistemology - Abstract
Several formal analyses in decision theory have shown that if people's preferences follow certain logical patterns (the so-called axioms of rational choice) then they are behaving as if they are maximising utility. However, numerous studies in the decision-making literature have indicated that humans often violate the axioms of rational choice. Additionally, studies of nonhuman animals indicate that they are largely rational in an axiomatic sense. It is important to understand why the finding that humans are less rational than other animals is not paradoxical. This paper discusses three reasons why the principles of rational choice are actually easier to follow when the cognitive architecture of the organism is simpler: contextual complexity, symbolic complexity, and the strong evaluator struggle.
- Published
- 2013
4. On the failure of cognitive ability to predict myside and one-sided thinking biases
- Author
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Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West
- Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Cognition ,Cognitive bias ,Predictive factor ,Philosophy ,Critical thinking ,Confirmation bias ,One sided ,Argument ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Psychology ,Social psychology ,media_common - Abstract
Two critical thinking skills—the tendency to avoid myside bias and to avoid one-sided thinking—were examined in three different experiments involving over 1200 participants and across two different paradigms. Robust indications of myside bias were observed in all three experiments. Participants gave higher evaluations to arguments that supported their opinions than those that refuted their prior positions. Likewise, substantial one-side bias was observed—participants were more likely to prefer a one-sided to a balanced argument. There was substantial variation in both types of bias, but we failed to find that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less myside bias or less one-side bias. Although cognitive ability failed to associate with the magnitude of the myside bias, the strength and content of the prior opinion did predict the degree of myside bias shown. Our results indicate that cognitive ability—as defined by traditional psychometric indicators—turns out to be surprisingly independent ...
- Published
- 2008
5. Higher-order preferences and the Master Rationality Motive
- Author
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Keith E. Stanovich
- Subjects
Philosophy ,Consistency (negotiation) ,Order (exchange) ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Cognition ,Rationality ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Disposition ,Psychology ,Superordinate goals ,Ecological rationality ,Preference ,Epistemology - Abstract
The cognitive critique of the goals and desires that are input into the implicit calculations that result in instrumental rationality is one aspect of what has been termed broad rationality (Elster, 1983). This cognitive critique involves, among other things, the search for rational integration (Nozick, 1993)—that is, consistency between first-order and second-order preferences. Forming a second-order preference involves metarepresentational abilities made possible by mental decoupling operations. However, these decoupling abilities are separable from the motive that initiates the cognitive critique itself. I argue that Velleman (1992) has identified that motive (“the desire to act in accordance with reasons”), and that it might be operationalisable as a thinking disposition at a very superordinate cognitive level. This thinking disposition, the Master Rationality Motive, is likely to be of particular importance in explaining individual differences in the tendency to seek rational integration. Preliminary...
- Published
- 2008
6. Natural myside bias is independent of cognitive ability
- Author
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Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West
- Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject ,Perspective (graphical) ,Individual difference ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Cognition ,Proposition ,Cognitive bias ,Developmental psychology ,Philosophy ,Variable (computer science) ,Confirmation bias ,Natural (music) ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Psychology ,Social psychology ,media_common - Abstract
Natural myside bias is the tendency to evaluate propositions from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants conditions) to avoid doing so. We defined the participant's perspective as their previously existing status on four variables: their sex, whether they smoked, their alcohol consumption, and the strength of their religious beliefs. Participants then evaluated a contentious but ultimately factual proposition relevant to each of these demographic factors. Myside bias is defined between-participants as the mean difference in the evaluation of the proposition between groups with differing prior status on the variable. Whether an individual difference variable (such as cognitive ability) is related to the magnitude of the myside bias is indicated by whether the individual difference variable interacts with the between-participants status variable. In two experiments involving a total of over 1400 university students (n = 1484) and eight different comparis...
- Published
- 2007
7. Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects
- Author
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Richard F. West and Keith E. Stanovich
- Subjects
Fallacy ,Philosophy ,Empirical research ,Framing (social sciences) ,Construals ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Cognition ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Conjunction fallacy ,Psychology ,Social psychology ,Framing effect ,Axiom - Abstract
Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky’s (1974) understanding/acceptance principle—that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence.
- Published
- 1998
8. Cognitive Ability and Variation in Selection Task Performance
- Author
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Richard F. West and Keith E. Stanovich
- Subjects
business.industry ,Deontic logic ,Contrast (statistics) ,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology ,Cognition ,Bivariate analysis ,Task (project management) ,Philosophy ,Task analysis ,Psychology (miscellaneous) ,Artificial intelligence ,business ,Psychology ,Selection (genetic algorithm) ,Cognitive psychology ,Cognitive style - Abstract
Individual differences in performance on a variety of selection tasks were examined in three studies employing over 800 participants. Nondeontic tasks were solved disproportionately by individuals of higher cognitive ability. In contrast, responses on two deontic tasks that have shown robust performance facilitation—the Drinking-age Problem and the Sears Problem—were unrelated to cognitive ability. Performance on deontic and nondeontic tasks was consistently associated. Individuals in the correct/correct cell of the bivariate performance matrix were over-represented. That is, individuals giving the modal response on a nondeontic task (P and Q) were significantly less likely to give the modal response on a deontic task (P and not-Q) than were individuals who made the non-modal P and not-Q selection on nondeontic problems. The implications of the results are discussed within the heuristic-analytic framework of Evans (1996; Evans & Over, 1996) and the optimal data selection model of Oaksford and Chater (1994).
- Published
- 1998
9. Individual Differences in Framing and Conjunction Effects.
- Author
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West, Keith E. Stanovich Richard F.
- Subjects
- *
FRAMES (Combinatorial analysis) , *CONJUNCTIONS (Grammar) , *COGNITION - Abstract
Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1998
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. Cognitive Ability and Variation in Selection Task Performance.
- Author
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West, Keith E. Stanovich Richard F.
- Subjects
- *
COGNITION , *TASK analysis - Abstract
Individual differences in performance on a variety of selection tasks were examined in three studies employing over 800 participants. Nondeontic tasks were solved disproportionately by individuals of higher cognitive ability. In contrast, responses on two deontic tasks that have shown robust performance facilitationthe Drinking-age Problem and the Sears Problem-were unrelated to cognitive ability. Performance on deontic and nondeontic tasks was consistently associated. Individuals in the correct/correct cell of the bivariate performance matrix were over-represented. That is, individuals giving the modal response on a nondeontic task (P and Q) were significantly less likely to give the modal response on a deontic task (P and not-Q) than were individuals who made the non-modal P and not-Q selection on nondeontic problems. The implications of the results are discussed within the heuristic-analytic framework of Evans (1996; Evans & Over, 1996) and the optimal data selection model of Oaksford and Chater (1994). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1998
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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