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This article treats the intellectual problem of revolution, agency, and the advent of liberal democracy from the standpoint of mid-nineteenth century France in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions. After a discussion of the theoretical and historiographical problem-in particular the relevance for this period in history of science studies-the article discusses the views of former Saint-Simonian and political economist, Michel Chevalier, eventually turning to the debate over the free market of goods and labor between the early French socialist Louis Blanc and Chevalier in Chevalier's new role of liberal free trade activist who trumpeted the ideology of the mass marketplace. Chevalier's engagement of the social question turned on a distinctively moral, ideological, and, ultimately, technocratic defense of the free market-this free market utopianism became both starker and more ideologically refined as a result of Chevalier's engagement with Blanc, especially in regard to worker-education. Both referred to the new mass marketplace of cheap, retail goods created by the rapid advance of mass transport, modern logistics, as le bon marché. French political economists went so far as to invoke a new way of life: la vie a bon marché (literally, 'life on the cheap'). This notion of work and life was opposed by Blanc on the grounds of fraternal social solidarity. Finally, and potently, the moral virtues of the free market were conceived by Chevalier as a direct answer to social revolution, a means for affording social stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the sociology of markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The initial premise is that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I define these coordination problems as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. I argue that these problems can only be resolved based on stable reciprocal expectations on the part of market actors, which have their basis in the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embedding of markets. The sociology of markets aims to investigate how market action is structured by these macrostructures and to examine their dynamic processes of change. While the focus of economic sociology has been primarily on the stability of markets and the reproduction of firms, the conceptualization developed here brings change and profit motives more forcefully into the analysis. It also differs from the focus of the new economic sociology on the supply side of markets, by emphasizing the role of demand for the order of markets, especially in the discussion of the problems of valuation and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States’ failed effort to impose an East Asian-style, export-led industrial development regime on the Dominican Republic in the aftermath of the 1965 “Dominican crisis” poses two related empirical puzzles. First, why did the Dominicans reject the widely praised and ultimately rather successful East Asian model? And, second, how did the Dominicans overrule their erstwhile North American overlords? I answer the first question by underscoring the incompatibility of export-led industrialization and the island nation’s prevailing system of patrimonial rule. I answer the second question by illuminating the patrimonial regime’s “asymmetrical” desire for independence. And I thereby suggest that the social and political underpinnings of successful export-led industrialization are decidedly more restrictive than the mainstream social science literature would have us believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, researchers seek to account for the paradox, involving the "industrialization" of the academy and the "collegialization" of industrial research. By exploring the nature and origins of this seeming contradiction, it is hoped to unearth important clues regarding the social positions that educated workers are likely to assume as capitalism comes to rely more heavily on scientific and technical expertise. Synthesizing findings from previous empirical work, one may conclude that a process of convergence is underway in which codes and practices of industry are infiltrating the academy, even as academic norms are increasingly governing the work practices of selected knowledge workers in high technology firms and industries. Researchers refer to the process as asymmetrical convergence because although codes and practices circulate in both directions, industry ultimately appears to have an upper hand in this process. Given the inchoate state of this convergence process and the institutional and organizational complexity it involves, the precise contours of any outcome are uncertain. The process is affecting and is likely to affect different varieties of institutions of higher education in different ways.

Peasant revolutions in the twentieth century played a major role in shaping the course of world history. Peasants, identified by Marx as a species facing extinction in the face of rapid industrialization, in fact became one of the primary forces of social change. This research reflects the trends in scholarship on revolutions. Through the comparative-historical method, it seeks to explain very different patterns of peasant revolutionary behavior in two revolutions in South China between 1926 and 1934. In the case of Hunan, peasants staged a radical revolution without significant outside mobilization. In the case of Jiangxi, peasants remained politically passive even under very intense mobilization from Mao Tse-tung's Red Army. Historically, many peasant communities were governed by powerful cooperative institutions. This research argues that agrarian revolutions can be caused by peasants attempts to restructure unfair and illegitimate community organizational phenomena.

Within three decades of emerging from World War II as the world's leading economic power the United States was in economic crisis. In the 1970s plants were being shut down and major portions of traditional industries such as steel and automobiles were lost to other nations. The first wave of deindustrialization had been blamed on United States corporations' concentrating their attention on financial manipulation rather than on improving production. In contrast to the nineteenth century, when the federal government explicitly created infrastructure for economic development purposes, twentieth-century economic infrastructure development was typically an indirect effect of social welfare and military policies. A central issue for state governments has been whether they should orient their efforts toward saving existing industries or developing new ones. However, state governments, in an era of economic decline, were forced to become more involved in industrial policy as the federal government withdrew. This trend, occurring as it did within the context of general economic stringency, increased competition among states for economic activity.

This article focuses on the emergence of a new comparative political economy. The political turmoil of the sixties was a world-wide phenomenon and the international character of the impact of the decade on intellectual life is perhaps clearer in the case of development theory. Intellectual currents originating in the third world challenged accepted approaches to development issues. These new streams of thought found a receptive audience in the developed world among younger scholars and students radicalized by the events of the sixties. The new comparative political economy has not aimed at charting progress along a presumed unilinear path of societal development but rather at uncovering, interpreting, and explaining distinctive patterns of development. Different countries exhibit different patterns of distribution and accumulation over the course of their development. Industrialization associated with strikingly disparate political regimes in different periods and regions. One of the hallmarks of the new comparative political economy is its focus on the way processes of historical change are shaped by the patterns of conflict and alliance among classes or fractions of classes.

National labor organizations first became established in most industrial nations just before the World War I. Contemporaries expected the differences among these early organizations to diminish as the logic of industrialism overcame the peculiarities of national history and the test of time revealed the most appropriate forms. Instead, labor institutions in each country followed a distinctive trajectory: at least half a dozen arrangements were institutionalized in the liberal, industrial democracies alone. Industrialization forced workers to reorganize, because it made traditional forms of mutualism inadequate In the pre-industrial context, the informal craft community was an adequate basis of solidarity, because the relative isolation of local markets and the absence of competing techniques made local craft solidarity effective. The artisans in each town could rely on a relatively stable pool of jobs, which constituted a form of collective property. By limiting the number of apprentices they could guarantee jobs for all qualified workers, and by using stints and work spreading they could sustain the members of their community during periods of economic contraction. Artisans' dependence on their local artisanal community's collective property reinforced the sentimental ties to the local craft provided by kinship and residence with rational, selective incentives.

This article uses data from a nineteenth-century industrial community in the U.S. to consider the conditions under which entrepreneurs introduce the technology of steam power. The steam engine seems the quintessential technology of industrialization. Not surprisingly, historians have traditionally assigned a central role to the steam engine in the industrialization of western society. If steam was the critical pivot of industrialization, then the geographical and chronological pattern of the adoption of steam power in manufacturing would have paralleled the spread of U.S. manufacturing activity. But beyond an overall contrast between North and South, this was not so. The multiplication and spread of manufacturing enterprises was first a New England phenomenon and then, by the mid-nineteenth century, became most concentrated in the Middle Atlantic states. The relationship between steam and the size of steam users was much the same in 1870 and 1880 as it had been earlier; value added per industry and firm was nearly substantially higher among steam users. As with cost savings, steam's locational flexibility was more critical to Western manufacturers than their Eastern counterparts.

The historical development of child welfare, like that of social welfare in general, has come to be explained in a variety of ways. The orthodoxy up until about the late 1960s explained the relation between children and the state in terms of an increased humanitarianism, a flowering of concern for unfortunate children and a gradual progression from the barbarism of pre and early industrialization to the humane and responsible practices of the modern welfare state. For child welfare the turning point was Anthony Platt's "The Child Savers," in which he "exposed" the reformers by examining in detail what they actually said about their own work. Benevolence and humanitarian concern did not appear to be their central sources of motivation. In fact they spoke mostly in political economic terms of producing better disciplined workers, preventing and combating delinquency and crime, cutting off the supply of paupers, producing industrious and self-reliant citizens, thus halting the drain on the state imposed by the poor, of danger to property, the dangerous classes and so on. The second edition of The Child Savers (1977) told a slightly different story, in the new introduction and conclusion at least and the differences with the first edition are instructive.

This article examines the grain procurements during the Great Leap Forward in China. A central issue in the relationship between Marxist-Leninist states and their peasantries is the extent to which resources are extracted from the countryside in support of the goal of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The extreme case of relentless extraction was Stalin's Soviet Union, where the state's relationship to the peasantry amounted to an instance of internal colonialism. The state's procurement program imposed compulsory grain delivery quotas on the collective farms, the unconditional fulfillment of which, regardless of objective conditions, became the first commandment for all rural officials. At times, extraction was carried to the point of inducing not only severe food shortages in the countryside, but also widespread famine, particularly in 1932-1933 and to a lesser extent in 1947. The enforcement of the procurement program necessitated the imposition of tight bureaucratic straightjacket on the countryside, not only in the form of collective farms but also of associated institution such as the Machine Tractor Stations. The Great Leap Forward, an unprecedentedly intense mobilization effort launched in 1958 to achieve a developmental breakthrough suggests that the prevailing image of Maoist China as differing fundamentally from Stalin's Russia must be reexamined. That the Great Leap Forward should have brought China closer to Stalinist practice is at first glance a paradox. The Leap was Mao Zedong's effort to chart an independent developmental and ideological road by breaking with the preceding years of emulation of the Soviet model.

The article discusses business and politics in the U.S. and Great Britain. The start of the 1980s was a period of extraordinary political transformation in the U.S. and Great Britain. In both countries, governments came to power committed to radical reductions in state social services and traditional safety nets. A central objective of the business mobilization of the late 1970s and early 1980s in both the U.S. and Great Britain was to restore company profits to levels of an earlier decade. In the name of reindustrialization and recapitalizing capitalism, government spending was targeted as the chief impediment to such prosperity. In the American case, government restraint on business decisions has also been named as a critical target. And in Britain, government failure to resist and control organized labor has been identified by business as a first priority as well. All point toward government reductions in social spending, the dismantling of programs that regulate business and the scaling down of programs that benefit labor. The formation of a classwide system of organization within the corporate community is rooted in the rise of institutional capitalism and this system is generically akin to that expected by instrumentalist analysis. But the class-wide organization has emerged alongside the far more atomized system based in managerial capitalism and expected by pluralist and structuralist analysis.

Two terms of the tripartite title 'class, democracy and modernity,' need no further qualifications, they are self-explanatory. But the third does. By modernity is meant the period in which capitalism, industrialization and democracy appear simultaneously, reacting to, reinforcing, complementing and checking each other. Democracy is used in a value-free manner, in other words, not counterposed to liberalism. It involves simply the following conceptual constituents: publicly recognized political pluralism, formally free citizenry and the trend towards an increasing political equality. It is stated simply, without historical analyses of any kind, the fact of the more or less simultaneous emergence and later symbiosis, of democracy, capitalist organization of socio-economic life and industrialization. This symbiosis is not either historically necessary or historically contingent. Both descriptions would mean setting diverse factors into the homogenizing framework of a philosophy of history which is deliberately intended to avoid.

This article presents a critique of the professionalization view, and examines several case studies pointing toward an interpretation that sees the social scientist at the turn of the century drawn by stick and carrot into a role definition of expertise in the service of power. It also outlines a notion of "role complementarity" as an alternative to professionalizations. The most important problem, and the one that argues decisively against professionalization theory, involves the theory's incomplete analysis of resource exchange and power. For the new social scientists, the provision of resources was the critical issue, as their method of discourse required nothing less than the industrialization of social science expertise. There are a number of extremely difficult problems raised by the use of professionalization theory. The explanation reflects the views of the triumphant social scientists, views endlessly reproduced and expanded by those trained by the victors. Professionalization theory is a congratulatory occupational self-justification becoming an ideology for all mental workers.

The article focuses on syncretism in the society. Premature socialism turns out to be an effective organization for industrialization in the period of imperialism. The opposition of imperialism to all industrialization except its own is the first source of the present contradiction between socialism and industrialization. Social syncretism includes another element: an immense power autonomously organized, which reproduces the incompatibility and the coexistence of the other two. The most general function of this structural syncretism is to assure the effectiveness of capitalist mechanisms at the level of the production and distribution and, at the same time, their total substitution by the decisions of the state at the level of appropriation and investments. Social syncretism is naturally also that of the power which it embodies. It defends the social structure against the economy, the economy against the social structure, and itself against both of these. It is at the same time the protector and the perturber of the social structure and of the economy.

The period roughly spanning the years 1900 to 1920 has been termed the "Progressive era" because of the extensive amount of thought and action directed at ill effects of massive urbanization, industrialization, and immigration. The argument advanced is that each historian projected back upon the Progressive era the dominant theoretical approaches and the salient societal features of his own period. In taking this line of approach, the author hopes to buttress the view that social and historical theory has developed not so much by processes wholly internal to the social sciences but rather in connection with the changing societal and historical circumstances in which theorists themselves work. In other words, this is a study in the sociology of knowledge; specifically, an examination of the social contexts of historical reinterpretation. The author deals with the subject, both by examining the empirical evidence which has been brought to bear upon theories of authors Hofstadter, Kolko, and Wiebe and by seeing how "incompatible" their conclusions really are.