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Is logic out of this world? This elusive question reveals a tension in our thinking about the basis of logic: both worldly and unworldly answers get something right and yet they conflict. My aim is to clarify the question and explore a conciliatory answer. I focus on a characterization of unworldliness in terms of ground. This allows for a distinction between proximal and distal unworldliness. That in turn reconfigures our approach to the question. It may now be taken as asking for the proximal or the distal basis of logic. This helps alleviate the tension because the answer for the one need not conflict with a different answer for the other. I explore a case study culminating in an illustration of how a logical truth may indeed be proximally worldly but distally unworldly. I conclude by considering some potential extensions.

L'A. developpe une explication de la notion de croyance empirique qui s'appuie sur le concept de possibilite serieuse propre a la philosophie d'I. Levi. Examinant le phenomene d'ambivalence epistemique dans le contexte pratique de la deliberation, l'A. etudie les relations entre la croyance et l'assertion, l'infaillibilisme et le corrigibilisme, qui permettent de definir les conditions necessaires de la croyance

Introduction I: Meaning and Truth Theory II: Reply to Foster III: Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism IV: What is a Theory of Meaning? II V. Two Theories of Meaning VI: Truth Definitions and Actual Languages VII: On Understanding the Structure of One's Language VIII: Semantic Structure and Logical Form IX: Language-Mastery and the Sorites Paradox X. Existence and Tense XI: States of Affairs XII: The De Re Must: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims An Appendix to David Wiggins's Note XIII: Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?