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I N order to depict adequately the significance of political and economic interaction in tropical Africa, it is necessary to sketch the background of recent changes in that area lying south of the Sahara and north of Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Here are some 30 states ranging in size from over 2-5 million sq.km. in the Sudan to less than oo I million sq.km. in the Gambia; in population from almost 80 million in Nigeria to about 400,000 in the Gambia; in density from over 120 per sq.km. in Burundi to less than one per sq.km. in Mauritania; in income per capita from over $400 in Gabon to less than $50 in Burundi, Somalia, and Upper Volta; and in G.N.P. from over $4'5 billion in Nigeria to less than $30 million in Gambia. Despite such wide differences, the process of political transition experienced in tropical Africa has followed a pattern which provides a basis for some degree of generalisation. Specifically, there has been a shift from a tribal political structure, through a period of colonial rule, eventually to an independent status. The argument presented in this article is based largely upon inequality, and the perception of inequality, as influenced by changes in political power, economic discontinuity, and spatial organisation. Traditional political structure in tropical Africa was based on dominance sometimes benevolent by a king or chief, supported by a group of associates who were mainly members of his immediate family and/or his kinship group. The territorial extent of political power was dependent largely upon the ruler's ability to command allegiance and respect, and upon the strength and loyalty of his military forces. Economic activity consisted mainly of subsistence agriculture or nomadic herding with minimal organised exchange. Traditional societies owed any surplus production to their ruler, in 'exchange' for which they obtained protection and security. Wealth was thus largely

TheAugust 1983 overthrow of Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo by Captain Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), the New Year's Eve abrupt termination in Nigeria of Black Africa's largest multi-party democracy, and the decision by the Guinean army in April 1984 to remove their party leaders after the death of President Sékou Touré, illustrate two of the most salient realities of contemporary African politics: (1) militarycoups d'étatare the principal form of régime change, and (2) they can happen under any type of political system–a functioning democracy, a personalistic civilian dictatorship, or an already existing military junta.1

Thetheme of this article is the decline of customary law in Upper Volta where, like most countries in Africa, customary courts operate side by side with the modern, ex-colonial legal system.1My study ofLe Tribunal de Premier Instancein Bobodioulasso suggests that customary courts may not in fact apply customary law. An examination of the criteria and the process by which decisions are reached here may help us to gain an insight into the function the Court serves for the community.

In the 1958 referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle asked the French West African territories whether they wanted continued association with France in the Community; if they voted ‘No’, this meant immediate independence, which was chosen by Guinea alone.There was widespread sentiment, in those territories which voted ‘Yes’, in favour of some type of federation for the former A.O.F. (L'Afrique occidentale française). Long an advocate of this idea, Leopold Senghor of Senegal presented a constitution for a West African federation to the other A.O.F. leaders in October 1958. Senegal, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Soudan all empowered their governments to enter into the proposed federation; Niger, Mauretania, and Ivory Coast said nothing. The four territories which responded to the call for unity sent delegations to meetings of federalists, in Bamako in December 1958, and then in Dakar, at which time a constituent assembly met and drafted a constitution. The work was finished and approved without discussion in three days.

IN the early g96os pan-Africanism was thought by many scholars and leaders of government to be the force which would bring political harmony coupled with rapid economic development. During the last decade a number of regional and sub-regional organisations were developed as first steps towards greater African unity. In Englishspeaking Africa the East African Community formed by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda exemplified, with all its frustrations and aspirations, this type of grouping. In French-speaking Africa the limited success of the Union douaniere et economique de l'Afrique central, its successor the Union des etats d'Afrique centrale, and the Union douaniere de l'Afrique occidentale has raised serious questions of whether these organisations, at this point in history, can attain their goals of regional economic integration and development. Because of the problems in establishing and maintaining a viable organisation of this type for all of West Africa, the francophone states have formed two major sub-regional groupings: the Conseil de l'entente, whose members are Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta, and the Organisation des etats riverains du Senegal, whose members are Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The purpose of this article is to discuss the history, nature, and experience of the subregional organisation in western-most Africa, the O.E.R.S.

Direct military intervention, aimed at unseating civilian governments and replacing them with ruling councils drawn largely from the army, is a relatively recent phenomenon in Africa. With the exception of the Sudan, where officers led by General Ibrahim Abboud seized control in November 1958, no supplanting of civilian authority by a military junta occurred until 19 June 1965 (Algeria). Then, in rapid succession, the Governments of Congo-Kinshasa (25 November 1965), Dahomey (22 December 1965), Central African Republic (1 January 1966), Upper Volta (4 January 1966), Nigeria (15 July 1966), Ghana (24 February 1966), Nigeria once again (29 July, 1966), Burundi (28 November 1966), Togo (13 January 1967), and Sierra Leone (23 March 1967) fell victims tocoups d'état.

The O.C.A.M. Charter was signed on 27 June 1966 in Tananarive by the Heads of State of the following 14 countries: the Federal Republic of Cameroun, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo–Brazzayule, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Chad, and Togo.

One major problem facing the countries of Western Africa is the rapid process of urbanisation and the inability of the towns to integrate untrained and generally illiterate immigrants from the rural areas.In March 1956, U.N.E.S.C.O. established a ‘Pilot Project for the Application of New Techniques and Methods of Education’; the Dakar seminar was held to discuss the results of this project and, in particular, the use of television in social education. Delegates attended from 11 countries—Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo–together with observers from interested ministries in Senegal, the I.L.O., W.H.O., the U.N. information services, O.R.S.T.O.M. (the French scientific research organisation for overseas territories), the World Association for Christian Radio and Television, the African Union of National Radio and Television Services, and the International Union for Public Health Education. Most strongly represented, of course, was U.N.E.S.C.O. itself, both by headquarters and local staff, and by the experts and consultants at work on the pilot project.