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Philosophers since Plato, at least some philosophers, have, from time to time, seen music as an appropriate object of philosophical scrutiny. And, of course, in the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche elevated music to a level of philosophical importance never reached before that time. But the marriage of music to philosophy ended in divorce at the close of the nineteenth century, and, as well, there occurred a sharp decline in the philosophical study of the arts tout court. However, with the rise of interest in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, in the late 1960s, it was inevitable that philosophy and music should again enter into matrimony. And it is that remarriage, during the past thirty-five or so years, that I explore in the present article.

On offer here is a tradition-neutral way of understanding the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy of music. The distinction is drawn in terms of methodology, rather than content, by identifying contrasting methodological tendencies of each tradition—initial maneuvers that frame an investigation, which are related to one another insofar as they involve, or do not involve, two kinds of methodological detachment. These maneuvers are extracted through a consideration of contrasting pairs of examples. The pairs consist of an analytic and a continental account of a core issue in the philosophy of music. The issues considered are musical experience, musical ontology, and the relationship between music and the emotions. The philosophers considered are Roger Scruton and Pierre Bourdieu, Jerrold Levinson and Lydia Goehr, Peter Kivy, and Andrew Bowie.

Accounts of the ontology of musical works seek to uncover what metaphysically speaking a musical work is and how we should identify instances of musical works. In this article, I examine the curious case of the mash-up and seek to address two questions: are mash-ups musical works in their own right and what is the relationship between the mash-up and its source materials? As mash-ups are part of the broader tradition of rock, I situate this discussion within an ontology of rock as defended by Theodore Gracyk and Stephen Davies and offer some interpretation as to what their positions might be in regard to mash-ups. Finally, I argue that the account of mash-ups that best makes sense of our evaluative practices would hold that they are emergent musical works that are distinct in their own right and yet also happen to be cases of musical works that instantiate parts of other musical works

Several prominent philosophers of art have worried about whether Kant has a coherent theory of music on account of two perceived tensions in his view. First, there appears to be a conflict between his formalist and expressive commitments. Second (and even worse), Kant defends seemingly contradictory claims about music being beautiful and merely agreeable, that is, not beautiful. Against these critics, I show that Kant has a consistent view of music that reconciles these tensions. I argue that, for Kant, music can be experienced as either agreeable or beautiful depending on the attitude we take toward it. Although it is tempting to think he argues that we experience music as agreeable when we attend to its expressive qualities and as beautiful when we attend to its formal properties, I demonstrate that he actually claims that we are able to judge music as beautiful only if we are sensitive to the expression of emotion through musical form. With this revised understanding of Kant's theory of music in place, I conclude by sketching a Kantian solution to a central problem in the philosophy of music: given that music is not sentient, how can it express emotion?

A thesis that is rarely stated but often assumed in art criticism and aesthetics concerns the inseparability of form and content in art. The thesis of inseparability states that (1) it is impossible to have the same content in two different forms; and (2) it is impossible to have the same form in two different contents.' Clearly, the thesis needs elucidation in terms of a plausible account of the distinction between form and content. It also needs to be considered whether the inseparability of form and content motivates a theory of art or, less ambitiously, identifies an important criterion in an account of art.2 The inseparability thesis is traditionally associated with formalism, which, as a general theory of art, has been widely condemned. Nevertheless, formalism is currently making a comeback in particular philosophies of the arts-notably, philosophy of music and philosophy of film.3 Sophisticated formalism in relation to both music and film allows for the aesthetic relevance of other features of the work besides form while recommending a structural focus for aesthetic appreciation. If the assumption that formalism is no longer relevant to our understanding of the arts involves a major oversight, then the inseparability thesis cannot be ignored just because of its traditional association with formalism. But even if one persisted in this oversight, it does not warrant ignoring the importance of the inseparability thesis for the thesis bears no necessary relation to any theory of art, including a formalist one. In what follows, I consider whether the inseparability thesis is compatible with aesthetic cognitivism, the view that art is valuable in part because it can give us nontrivial knowledge. Ultimately, I argue that the two are compatible because there are ways of learning from art that depend on the inseparability of form and content. Given the long and tangled history of the debate over the possibility and value of learning from art, it is supremely important to recognize, finally, such compatibility. Against defenders of aesthetic cognitivism, skeptics and critics have regularly resorted to brandishing the inseparability thesis, defiantly claiming that you cannot expect to learn about the world from art if you cannot "get to" a work's content unaffected by style and medium. Here the assumption is that the kind of aesthetic transformation

I. EMOTION AS MUSICAL MEANING lament. On the face of it, it is hard to see what might give rise to any such sense of mismatch Although the issue of the emotional significance other than the conviction that cheeriness or sadof music hardly exhausts the question of musical ness are (in some sense) no less features of the meaning as such, since music can clearly be jingle and the lament than irritation or hysteria meaningful in respects that have little to do with are states of this or that auditor. the expression of feeling, the conviction that That said, it is arguable that the wide divermusic has meaning at least partly by virtue of its sity of ancient and modem theories that have emotional associations remains compelling. The been advanced to explain the relationship prime source of this idea is surely the common between music and emotion is largely a consehuman experience of being moved by certain quence of tensions between these two basic kinds of musical productions: of being cheered intuitions. At one extreme, those theories that or uplifted by music that we are (perhaps place most of the weight on emotion as a perthereby) inclined to call joyful, gay, or witty, or sonal or subjective response to music, conexperiencing more melancholy or somber feelsidered as in itself no more than a feelingless ings in the presence of music we are prone to object or event, are inclined to regard the call sad. To be sure, this first thought is clearly music-emotion relationship as a purely causal too simple, insofar as it has been rightly or contingent one. Music arouses happy, sad, or observed that the feelings aroused by sad or other feelings, and has emotional significance, happy music are by no means themselves necesonly in the way that charging bulls arouse fear: sarily sad or happy.1 Indeed, many of us are indeed, since bulls are at least sentient whereas daily driven to extremes of annoyance or irritamusic is clearly not, it makes even less sense to tion by advertising or telephone queue-holding conceive of the music as actually sad or happy jingles that have quite the opposite of their than it does to think of the bull as fearful. Howclearly intended amusing or uplifting effect. ever, this view precisely attracts the objection If anything, however, this observation may that since we are often struck by the incongruity serve to reinforce rather than undermine a of feeling inappropriate emotional responses to second key intuition about music and emotion: music that we are otherwise inclined to describe that the emotional properties we are inclined to as sad or happy, it seems difficult to get entirely take this or that piece of music to express are away from the idea that the music is objectively nevertheless properties of the music rather than sad or happy, irrespective of how we happen to of our own mental states. If I am chased by a feel. bull in a field, I would not normally attribute At the opposite extreme, however, theories any terror I feel to the bull: but one powerful that try to explain why we regard emotional reason for ascribing the joy or sadness of this or qualities as inherent properties of the music are that musical work to the music rather than to often drawn toward some kind of representamyself may be the sense of incongruity I feel at tional view. It may also be that any idea that being irritated by that cheery tune or driven to music might represent or symbolize emotion extremes of helpless hilarity by that bagpipe derives some comfort from the thought that we

L'A. passe en revue les visions de certains estheticiens contemporains tels que Hanslick, Robinson, Sparshott, Sorbom, Walton et d'autres, de l'expressivite de la musique et de ses rapports avec les emotions. En ce qui concerne l'approche philosophique et politique de la musique, il analyse la position de Goehr, Detels et Rudinow

In what follows I will sketch an approach to understanding improvised music-one that discovers in certain outstanding jazz improvisations an emblem of what Emerson typically calls self-trust and Stanley Cavell, in recent years, has called moral perfectionism. Thus perhaps the greatest burden of these pages is to show how a way of attending to improvised music might reveal a form of knowledge that is essentially moral. By extending this general claim to moral perfectionism, I will be joining my discussion to a broader philosophical project-as well as to a tradition of thinking-to which the present occasion permits only the briefest of introductions. Moral perfectionism is best characterized not as a set of moral axioms or principles, as though it stood in competition with the dominant theories of morality (Utilitarianism and Kantianism), but as a kind of thinking that begins after or beyond such theories. It is a thinking whose distinctive features are a commitment to speaking and acting true to oneself, combined with a thoroughgoing dissatisfaction with oneself as one now stands. One might summarize these features by saying that they identify a way of living set against a life of conformity and a lifeless consistency. It is in his essay "Self-Reliance" that Emerson famously describes our human tendency to nullify ourselves in the face of our craving for conformity and consistency. The way out of this danger to the self is what Emerson means by selftrust or self-reliance; he speaks in similar contexts of heeding one's genius. There are of course trivial as well as arrogant ways to take up Emerson's call, exactly as many as there are trivial and arrogant ways of reading. ' But that it can be read as belonging to a tradition of thinking inherited from such figures as Plato and Pascal, and continued in such figures as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, was perhaps the most fertile conclusion of Stanley Cavell's 1988 Carus Lectures published as Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome.2 The central concern of those lectures, beyond that they identify this tradition of thinking, was to argue that the necessarily unending commitment to perfecting the self is not only in harmony with the equally unending or ongoing political commitment to democracy, but it is, in fact, democracy's precondition, even its fullest meaning. The feature of interest to me here, however, as I set out to suggest some connections between moral perfectionism and the work of some exemplary jazz improvisers, is the understanding that emerges from this tradition of how we manage to do anything new or different or original at all: to check our habitual responses to the world-for example, our reliance, when improvising a jazz solo, on familiar solutions to a pattern of chord changes-in favor of newly discovered or newly charted desires. This essay is divided into four sections. In the first section, I offer a critique of standard efforts to interpret improvised solos as though they were composed or preconceived, contrasting that approach to one that treats the procedures of improvisation as derived from and importantly at play in our everyday actions. The second section turns to a pair of discussions of artistic genius and originality: Kant's account of artistic genius in Critique of Judgment ??46-503 and especially Emerson's concluding essay in Essays: First Series-the one he calls "Art."4 My intent in this section is twofold: to show the extent to which Emerson's essay is written in response to