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The need for a credible professional credential became apparent early in the history of applied behavior analysis. The first efforts to develop a system that identified behavior-analytic practitioners having a specified level of expertise in the profession began in the early 1970s. Over the years, a number of credentialing initiatives were developed in an effort to meet the profession's growing needs for a means of establishing a meaningful professional identity. This article reviews the evolution of these initiatives, culminating with the Behavior Analyst Certification Board and the more recent movement toward state licensure.

Behavior analysis has a marketing problem. Although behavior analysts have speculated about the problems regarding our technical behavior-analytic terminology and how our terminology has hindered the dissemination of behavior analysis to outsiders, few have investigated the social acceptability of the terminology. The present paper reports the general public’s reactions to technical behavioral jargon versus non-technical substitute terms that refer to applied behavior-analytic techniques. Two-hundred participants, all non-behavior analysts, were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and completed a survey on the social acceptability of behavioral jargon and non-technical terms. Specifically, participants rated the acceptability of how the six pairs of terms (technical and non-technical) sounded if the treatments were to be implemented for each of 10 potential populations of clients that behavior analysts typically work with. The results show that, overall, members of the general public found non-technical substitute terms more acceptable than technical behavior-analytic terms. The finding suggests that specialized vocabulary of behavior analysis may create hurdles to the acceptability of applied behavior-analytic services. The implication of these findings suggest the importance of a systematic investigation of listener behavior with respect to behavior analysis terms.

Reinforcers comprise sequences of actions in context. Just as the white of snow and black of coal depend on the interaction of an organism’s visual system and the reflectances in its surrounds, reinforcers depend on an organism’s motivational state and the affordances—possibilities for perception and action—in its surrounds. Reinforcers are not intrinsic to things but are a relation between what the thing affords, its context, the organism, and his or her history as capitulated in their current state. Reinforcers and other affordances are potentialities rather than intrinsic features. Realizing those potentialities requires motivational operations and stimulus contexts that change the state of the organism—they change its disposition to make the desired response. An expansion of the three-term contingency is suggested in order to help keep us mindful of the importance of behavioral systems, states, emotions, and dispositions in our research programs.

Complex ambivalence refers to situations in which high-valued temporally extended and abstract patterns of acts (such as healthy behavior) are opposed to high-valued particular acts (such as smoking a cigarette). In such situations, a self-controlled act differs from an impulsive act not by virtue of the source of control (inside versus outside the organism) but by virtue of the temporal extent of the contingencies controlling the behavior (extended versus constricted contingencies). Soft commitment is another name for patterning behavior over time so that it may come into contact with temporally distant or extended contingencies. Behavioral methods of establishing self-control typically target particular impulsive acts. The present article suggests that self-control in situations of complex ambivalence also may be achieved by focusing not on reducing the impulsive act itself but on the establishment of patterns (soft commitment) so that behavior comes into contact with the extended contingencies. As an illustration of how this may be accomplished, a specific self-control program is outlined for smoking.

This study further develops the theoretical and empirical literature on the Behavioral Perspective Model (BPM) in three ways through an empirical analysis of the Great Britain (GB) biscuit category. First, following a literature review and a category analysis, a more complex model is constructed using the BPM structure and then testing the hypothesis uncovered. Second, the structure of the data theoretically calls for a hierarchical structure of the model, and hence, this is introduced into the BPM framework and is compared to a non-hierarchical structure of the same model. Finally, a discussion is undertaken on the advantages of a Bayesian approach to calculating parameter inference. Two models are built by utilizing vague and informed prior distributions respectively, and the results are compared. This study shows the importance of building appropriate model structures for analysis and demonstrates the advantages and challenges of utilizing a Bayesian approach. It also further demonstrates the BPM’s suitability as a vehicle to better understand consumer behavior.

By integrating the temporal discounting perspective, according to which the value of rewards is progressively discounted as a function of delay, and the Behavioral Perspective Model (BPM), according to which the purchase of products can produce utilitarian (directly obtained from use) and informational (social, mediated by others) reinforcing and punitive consequences, the present research investigated: 1) if temporal discounting would be better described by an exponential or a hyperbolic function; 2) if differently priced products would differ with respect to temporal discounting rates; and 3) if brands offering different levels of informational reinforcement would differ with respect to temporal discounting rates. In a first phase of the research, 73 undergraduate students evaluated brands of cell phone, tablet and TV set, in order to rank each brand according to the informational reinforcement level they offered. In a second phase, during an online purchasing simulation of these products, 51 students were asked to state how much they were willing to pay in order to anticipate product delivery, which was free after 21 days. Results indicated that the hyperbolic function fitted the data significantly better than the exponential function for two of the products, that products with higher prices showed lower temporal discounting rates than products with lower prices, and that brands associated with higher informational reinforcement showed higher temporal discounting rates. These findings suggest that there are complex interactive patterns of temporal discounting within- and between-products and that temporal discounting framework has great potential to inform research in consumer behavior and marketing.

This paper investigates the ability of connectionist models to explain consumer\ud behavior, focusing on the feedforward neural network model, and explores the possibility\ud of expanding the theoretical framework of the Behavioral Perspective Model to incorporate\ud connectionist constructs. Numerous neural network models of varying complexity are\ud developed to predict consumer loyalty as a crucial aspect of consumer behavior. Their\ud performance is compared with the more traditional logistic regression model and it is\ud found that neural networks offer consistent advantage over logistic regression in the\ud prediction of consumer loyalty. Independently determined Utilitarian and Informational\ud Reinforcement variables are shown tomake a noticeable contribution to the explanation of\ud consumer choice. The potential of connectionist models for predicting and explaining\ud consumer behavior is discussed and routes for future research are suggested to investigate\ud the predictive and explanatory capacity of connectionist models, such as neural network\ud models, and for the integration of these into consumer behavior analysis within the\ud theoretical framework of the Behavioral Perspective Model

Behavior analysis has often simultaneously depended upon and denied an implicit, hypothetical process of reinforcement as response strengthening. I discuss what I see as problematic about the use of such an implicit, possibly inaccurate, and likely unfalsifiable theory and describe issues to consider with respect to an alternative view without response strengthening. In my take on such an approach, important events (i.e., “reinforcers”) provide a means to measure learning about predictive relations in the environment by modulating (i.e., inducing) performance dependent upon what is predicted and the relevant motivational mode or behavioral system active at that time (i.e., organismic state). Important events might be phylogenetically important, or they might acquire importance by being useful as signals for guiding an organism to where, when, or how currently relevant events might be obtained (or avoided). Given the role of learning predictive relations in such an approach, it is suggested that a potentially useful first step is to work toward formal descriptions of the structure of the predictive relations embodied in common facets of operant behavior (e.g., response-reinforcer contingencies, conditioned reinforcement, and stimulus control). Ultimately, the success of such an approach will depend upon how well it integrates formal characterizations of predictive relations (and how they are learned without response strengthening) and the relevant concomitant changes in organismic state across time. I also consider how thinking about the relevant processes in such a way might improve both our basic science and our technology of behavior.

Some twenty-five years ago The Behavior Analyst published a paper by David Rider (The Behavior Analyst, 14, 171–181, 1991) titled “The speciation of behavior analysis.” Rider’s thesis was that basic and applied behavior analysis, for a variety of reasons, are destined to become independent species. In a commentary on this paper I pointed out, for example, that scientists and engineers are interdependent, especially at the frontiers of application. I was sanguine about a continuing analogous relationship between basic and applied behavior analysis. However, especially in the last decade, indications are that basic and applied behavior analysis may indeed be emerging as distinct species. I discuss several themes in a review of the “literature of survival” addressing the evolving complex relations between basic and applied behavior analysis, including constraints on training leading to narrow foci of application, our often self-imposed isolation from those with whom we could productively collaborate, and the difficulties of obtaining sufficient support for our science. All these challenges reflect a briar-patch of interlocking contingencies; each one depends crucially on the others and we cannot effectively address any in isolation. Thus solutions will not be easy, but our long-term survival as a coherent discipline absolutely depends on finding some.

BDataPro is a Microsoft Windows®-based program that allows for real-time data collection of multiple frequency- and duration-based behaviors, summary of behavioral data (in terms of average responses per min, percentage of 10-s intervals, and cumulative responses within 10-s bins), and calculation of reliability coefficients. The current article describes the functionality of the program. BDataPro is freely available for download from the authors’ institution websites. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0079-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

In successful multiple exemplar training, a set of exemplars that sample the range of stimulus and response topographies is trained, and the full range of performances results. Examples abound in experimental psychology and include abstraction and concept learning, responding to relations, identity matching, rule following, behavioral variability, responding to wh-questions, describing past events, learning sets, and continuous repertoires. Thus, behavior analysts often allude to a history of multiple exemplar training to account for different generalized performances. It is easy to see how a strategy of multiple exemplar training can work with many types of performances, even performances that involve relations between objects or events. However, there appear to be at least two exceptions, where direct multiple exemplar training does not work well: (1) when there are no physical dimensions at all along which generalized performances can emerge, and (2) when the relation between a stimulus and an effective response is complex. Interpretation of the latter type of cases in terms of mediated generalization is outlined and discussed. An experimental and conceptual research program should produce an account of the general limits of multiple exemplar training, and guidelines for the most effective training for generalized skills.

We describe here two approaches introduced by Abrahamsen (1987) that can be used by behavior analysts to interpret neuroscientific data. The first is a “boundary-bridging” approach aimed at understanding the interdisciplinary interactions between the behavioral and the neural levels of analysis while keeping the two domains independent. When presenting the boundary-bridging approach, we describe neuroplasticity, a perspective that describes how changes at the brain level can be understood by examining behavioral factors. In the second part of the paper, we contrast two “boundary-breaking” perspectives: neuropsychology and behavior analytic neuroscience. In neuropsychology, localized brain activation is used to explain behavior. In behavior analytic neuroscience, brain responses are interpreted as behavior. We discuss the conditions under which brain responses can be considered behavior and propose that including brain responses within a behavioral framework may allow carrying out a more sophisticated and temporally detailed behavior analysis.

This issue of The Behavior Analyst (TBA) marks changes for the journal, some of which are reflected in this issue, and others of which are on the temporal horizon. First we have a new editorial team. Second, we have some possible new directions to explore for TBA. Third, we have a new issue of TBA.

We describe an early operant conditioning chamber fabricated by Harvard University instrument maker Ralph Gerbrands and shipped to Japan in 1952 in response to a request of Professor B. F. Skinner by Japanese psychologists. It is a rare example, perhaps the earliest still physically existing, of such a chamber for use with pigeons. Although the overall structure and many of the components are similar to contemporary pigeon chambers, several differences are noted and contrasted to evolutionary changes in this most important laboratory tool in the experimental analysis of behavior. The chamber also is testimony to the early internationalization of behavior analysis.

A probable list of causes for the limited acceptance of behaviorism in our society is identified. This is followed by a summary review of the proposed solutions identified in other papers in this special issue of The Behavior Analyst, most of which relate to either better marketing of either the behavior analytic process or the results achieved as a consequence. One paper proposes a more broad conception of behavior analysis. This paper endorses the solutions identified in previous papers and then goes on to propose an even more broad conception of behavior analysis and makes the point that behavior analysis is unlikely to flourish unless behavior analysts understand a good deal more about the cultural and other contextual features of the environments in which they work.

Increased demand for applied behavior analysis (ABA) services has increased the need for additional masters-level practitioners and doctoral-level academicians and clinical directors. Based on these needs, the University of Nebraska Medical Center’s (UNMC) Munroe-Meyer Institute has developed a PhD program. The academic structure at UNMC allowed us to create our PhD program in a relatively quick and efficient manner. Our PhD program has many unique features, including (a) close integration of didactic instruction with clinical and research training provided by leading experts in ABA in which students immediately apply concepts introduced in the classroom during coordinated clinical and research practica; (b) structured grant writing training in which students learn to write and submit an NIH-level grant; (c) financial support in the form of a stipend of $23,400 per year, free health benefits, and a full-tuition waiver for up to 12 credits per semester for UNMC courses (a benefits package worth approximately $50,000 per year for an out-of-state student); and (d) encouragement and financial support to present papers at local, regional, and national behavior analysis conferences.

Since 2004, faculty members at Caldwell University have developed three successful graduate programs in Applied Behavior Analysis (i.e., PhD, MA, non-degree programs), increased program faculty from two to six members, developed and operated an on-campus autism center, and begun a stand-alone Applied Behavior Analysis Department. This paper outlines a number of strategies used to advance these initiatives, including those associated with an extensive public relations campaign. We also outline challenges that have limited our programs' growth. These strategies, along with a consideration of potential challenges, might prove useful in guiding academicians who are interested in starting their own programs in behavior analysis.

Seemingly everyone is interested in understanding the causes of human behavior. Yet many scientists and the general public embrace causes of behavior that have logical flaws. Attributing behavior to mental events, emotions, personality, or abnormal personality, typically, is committing one of a number of common errors, such as reification, circular reasoning, or nominal fallacies (Schlinger & Poling, 1998). An increasingly frequent error is embracing genetic explanations of behavior in the absence of an identified gene. Similarly, explaining behavior in terms of brain structure or function fails to ask what caused that brain structure or function to develop or function in a particular way.

Behavioral momentum theory (BMT) provides an integrative framework for evaluating the strength of a response when it contacts a disruptor, such as the discontinuation of reinforcement (i.e., extinction). Grounded in Newtonian physics, BMT distinguishes response rate (behavioral velocity) from response strength or persistence (behavioral mass). Behavioral velocity is affected by response-reinforcer contingencies, whereas behavioral mass is affected by stimulus-reinforcer contingencies (Nevin and Wacker 2013). We describe the determiners of behavioral mass, as well as common sources of disruption that are used to measure behavioral mass. Learning activities are embedded throughout this discussion to help readers better understand BMT and its implications for practice across a range of contexts. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40614-016-0050-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Skinner is commonly accused of being against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. However, in his writings, he did not criticize neuroscience itself as an important independent field from behavior analysis. The problem was in how some authors were using a pseudo-physiology in the explanation of behavior. Skinner was explicit in showing which authors and theories were using physiology incorrectly. Therefore, my goal is to present an analysis of the main targets of Skinner's critiques against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. This analysis will be divided as follows: (a) the targets of Skinner's critiques, (b) when the critiques were presented, and (c) the specific critiques that were made. The analysis was based upon 73 papers written by Skinner that were selected through keywords related to the issue. When placed in proper historical context, Skinner did not criticize neuroscience, but the misuse of pseudo-physiological theories in the explanation of behavior.

Behavior analysis has produced a robust theoretical analysis of the contingencies involved in cultural evolution. Yet, thus far, the empirical yield of this work remains quite limited. With this paper, I attempt to provide specific examples of the ways to advance an experimental analysis of the contingencies involved in cultural evolution. I begin with a review of the theoretical analyses developed by behavior analysts and other contextually oriented scientists. Next, I submit that, if the goal of our science is both predicting and influencing cultural phenomena, we must produce experimental analyses of the impact of meta-contingencies on organizations’ practices. There is no more pressing reason for doing this than the threat of climate change posed by the continuing growth in human use of fossil fuels. Therefore, the paper provides an analysis of the contingencies influencing organizational practices now affecting continued use of fossil fuels and the contingencies for organizations seeking to prevent their use. One concrete step to advance a science of cultural change relevant to climate change would be to create a database of organizations that are promoting vs. working to prevent fossil fuel consumption and the consequences that seem to maintain their practices. I call for experimental analysis of the impact of altering consequences for these practices and for experimental analyses of interventions intended to change the norms, values, and behavior of organizational leaders who can influence fossil fuel consumption. I then discuss the role of prosocial behavior and values in affecting behavior relevant to reducing fossil fuel consumption because the empirical evidence shows that prosociality favors more “green” behavior. Recent advances in prevention research have identified interventions to promote prosociality, but we need experimental analyses of how advocacy organizations can be more effective in getting these interventions widely adopted.

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.

The potential impact of behavior analysis is limited by the public’s dim awareness of the field. The mass media rarely cover behavior analysis, other than to echo inaccurate negative stereotypes about control and punishment. The media instead play up appealing but less-evidence-based approaches to problems, a key example being the touting of dubious diets over behavioral approaches to losing excess weight. These sorts of claims distort or skirt scientific evidence, undercutting the fidelity of behavior analysis to scientific rigor. Strategies for better connecting behavior analysis with the public might include reframing the field’s techniques and principles in friendlier, more resonant form; pushing direct outcome comparisons between behavior analysis and its rivals in simple terms; and playing up the “warm and fuzzy” side of behavior analysis.

Science is the construction and testing of systems that bind symbols to sensations according to rules. Material implication is the primary rule, providing the structure of definition, elaboration, delimitation, prediction, explanation, and control. The goal of science is not to secure truth, which is a binary function of accuracy, but rather to increase the information about data communicated by theory. This process is symmetric and thus entails an increase in the information about theory communicated by data. Important components in this communication are the elevation of data to the status of facts, the descent of models under the guidance of theory, and their close alignment through the evolving retroductive process. The information mutual to theory and data may be measured as the reduction in the entropy, or complexity, of the field of data given the model. It may also be measured as the reduction in the entropy of the field of models given the data. This symmetry explains the important status of parsimony (how thoroughly the data exploit what the model can say) alongside accuracy (how thoroughly the model represents what can be said about the data). Mutual information is increased by increasing model accuracy and parsimony, and by enlarging and refining the data field under purview.

In science we study processes in the material world. The way these processes operate can be discovered by conducting experiments that activate them, and findings from such experiments can lead to functional complexity theories of how the material processes work. The results of a good functional theory will agree with experimental measurements, but the theory may not incorporate in its algorithmic workings a representation of the material processes themselves. Nevertheless, the algorithmic operation of a good functional theory may be said to make contact with material reality by incorporating the emergent computations the material processes carry out. These points are illustrated in the experimental analysis of behavior by considering an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics, the algorithmic operation of which does not correspond to material features of the physical world, but the functional output of which agrees quantitatively and qualitatively with findings from a large body of research with live organisms.

Three categories of behavior analysis may be called molecular, molar, and unified. Molecular analyses focus on how manual shaping segments moment-to-moment behaving into new, unified, hierarchically organized patterns. Manual shaping is largely atheoretical, qualitative, and practical. Molar analyses aggregate behaviors and then compute a numerical average for the aggregate. Typical molar analyses involve average rate of, or average time allocated to, the aggregated behaviors. Some molar analyses have no known relation to any behavior stream. Molar analyses are usually quantitative and often theoretical. Unified analyses combine automated shaping of moment-to-moment behaving and molar aggregates of the shaped patterns. Unified controlling relations suggest that molar controlling relations like matching confound shaping and strengthening effects of reinforcement. If a molecular analysis is about how reinforcement organizes individual behavior moment by moment, and a molar analysis is about how reinforcement encourages more or less of an activity aggregated over time, then a unified analysis handles both kinds of analyses. Only theories engendered by computer simulation appear to be able to unify all three categories of behavior analysis.

I thank Linda Hayes, Maria Malott, and Jack Marr for organizing a most stimulating conference, and for inviting me to participate. I also thank Billy Baum and Charlie Shimp for their interesting and provocative papers, and the B. F. Skinner Foundation for permission to reprint the material shown in Figure 1. Finally, I thank Christine Hughes and Kim Sawrey for serving as sounding boards for some of my thoughts on the issues raised by these papers.

In his seminal paper, “An Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,” Skinner (1945) offered the revolutionary suggestion that, rather than endlessly debating the meanings of psychological terms, psychologists should analyze the variables that control their occurrence as verbal behavior. Skinner's suggestion reflected the essence of his 1957 book, Verbal Behavior, wherein he argued that the behaviors of which language is composed (i.e., speaking and listening) are controlled by variables found in the social environment (which he called the verbal community), and that analyzing those variables would lead to an understanding of the behaviors. Although Skinner formally introduced his radical approach to language in 1945, it has yet to be fully realized. The result is that psychologists, including behavior analysts, still debate the definitions of terms. In the present paper, I review Skinner's functional approach to language and describe ways in which behavior analysts have already applied it to traditional psychological terms. I conclude by looking at other current terms in behavior analysis that engender some confusion and encourage behavior analysts to apply a functional analytic approach to their own verbal behavior.

Morality has long been conceived as divinely instituted, so otherworldly, rules meant not to describe or explain behavior but to guide it towards an absolute good. The philosophical formulation of this theory by Plato was later grafted onto Christian thought by Augustine and Aquinas. The equally ancient theory of the Greek sophist Protagoras (that the good is relative to personal preferences and morality to man-made social customs) was forgotten until revived in the 18th and 19th centuries by such empiricists as David Hume and J. S. Mill. Then it was dismissed again in the 20th century by G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross as naturalistic fallacy, that is, conflation of what is with what ought to be. However, those who took this dismissive attitude themselves made the reverse mistake of conflating what ideally ought to be with what actually is. In other words, they mistook ideals for actualities. As B. F. Skinner (1971) said in Beyond Freedom and Dignity, sorting things out requires behaviorist parsing of the good (the personally reinforcing) and duty (the socially reinforced).

Because the definition of behavior changes as our understanding of behavior changes, giving a final definition is impossible. One can, however, rule out some possibilities and propose some others based on what we currently know. Behavior is not simply movement, but must be defined by its function. Also, our understanding of behavior must agree with evolutionary theory. I suggest 4 basic principles: (a) only whole organisms behave; (b) behavior is purposive; (c) behavior takes time; and (d) behavior is choice. Saying that parts of an organism behave is nonsense, and, moreover, evolutionary theory explains the existence of organisms mainly through their adaptive behavior. Behavior is purposive in that behavior is shaped by its consequences, through an organism's lifetime or through interactions with the environment across many generations of natural selection. Behavior takes time in that behavior is interaction with the environment that cannot take place at a moment. Moreover, at a moment in time, one cannot definitely identify the function of behavior. Identification of an activity requires a span of time. Behavior is choice in the sense that a suitable span of time always includes time spent in more than 1 activity. Activities include parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale and compete for time. Thus, behavior constitutes time allocation. An accounting problem arises whenever any behavior is attributed to multiple consequences. In the molar multiscale view, this raises the question of whether 2 activities can occur at the same time. The question remains open.