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A large body of empirical research suggests better free recall for bizarre than common verbal information; however, the bulk of those studies used a method that does not consider the contextual and relational accuracy of recovered memories. The conclusions drawn from that research therefore are based on tests of memory not for holistic stimuli but for decontextualized memory fragments. In response to this anomaly and recent findings suggesting that bizarre memories are more likely to be distorted than common memories, a holistic analysis of free recall for common and bizarre verbal material was conducted. Two experiments indicated that bizarreness both facilitates and disrupts recall. Specifically, better recall (both in part and in full) was found for bizarre information, but a greater tendency to merge bizarre memory fragments into other partially recovered memories was also found. This pattern of results was demonstrated under immediate and delayed testing conditions (Experiment 1) and using both incidental and intentional learning procedures (Experiment 2). Overall, the results are consistent with a weak account of disruption caused by bizarreness.

In two experiments, we examined whether hypermnesia occurs in cued recall when response bias is controlled by instructing subjects to generate more responses than they normally produce under standard cued recall instructions. Subjects processed 36 pairs of words using a relational processing, item-specific processing, or intentional learning strategy. A well-categorized list was presented in Experiment 1, whereas a loosely categorized list was used in Experiment 2. Three standard or forced cued recall tests were then administered. Hypermnesia was observed even when subjects were forced to guess. Furthermore, as in previous studies, relational processing resulted in greater net improvement than item-specific processing or intentional learning. We conclude that cued recall hypermnesia is a genuine phenomenon.

In three experiments, subjects who had rated 35 stimulus words on a seven-point affective scale (like/dislike or pleasant/unpleasant) showed better recall and recognition after incidental learning that subjects who had not so rated words did after intentional learning. Clustering by rating categories was not consistently related to, while the number of rating categories was significantly correlated with, level of recall. It is argued that the critical variable is not the intention to learn but the effectiveness of the operations to learn, and the facilitation with affective ratings is interpreted in terms of Bartlett's 'schemata.'

After studying a pair of words (AB), subjects were tested either for cued recall (B is provided as a cue) or for cue recognition. Familiarization trials on A (prior to testing on B) affected both cued recall and cue recognition. This occurred in incidental and intentional learning paradigms, at slow and fast rates of presentation, and when the familiarization trial on A occurred prior to or after the study trial on the AB pair. However, single item recognition did vary as a function of whether single items or pairs had been studied. The questions of whether and how recall is affecting recognition decisions are discussed.

In a recent paper by Neimark and Saltzman it was found that the difference between the scores of incidental and intentional learning depends on the rate of presentation of the learning material.1 After four presentations of a list of 14 numbers where each number appeared for 2 sec., no difference was found between the scores of incidental and intentional learning. When, however, the numbers were presented at a slower rate of 6 sec. per number, the scores of intentional learning were significantly higher than those of incidental learning. While the scores of the incidental learners did not change significantly from the fast rate to the slow rate, the scores of the intentional learners, on the other hand, increased significantly. A similar relationship might be expected when the length of the time of exposure is held constant, but the number of exposures per item is increased. Specifically, one might expect that after only a few presentations of a list of numbers, no difference would be found between the scores of intentional and incidental learning, but that after many presentations of the list, a difference would be found. The present study was designed to investigate this relationship between the number of trials, on the one hand, and the difference between incidental and intentional learning scores, on the other. Procedure. The Ss were 160 Indiana University undergraduate students randomly divided into two groups of 80 each-an incidental learning group and an intentional learning group. Each group was further divided into four subgroups of 20 Ss each. The learning material was a list of 14 two-digit numbers selected from a table of random numbers. A different number of presentations of the list was given each of the subgroups. The subgroups in each group received either 2, 6, 8, or 16 presentations of the list. The rate of presentation of the list of numbers was the same for all subgroups: each number appeared for 3 sec. and then was replaced by the next number. The numbers were presented by means of an electrically operated memorydrum. A 10-sec. period intervened between successive presentations of the list. Four different random orders of the 14 numbers were used. The Ss in the incidental learning group were read the following instructions.

Winnick and Lerner studied the effects of three kinds of external distraction on intentional and incidental learning.' Although all three distractions effected a slowing down of intentional learning, no comparable effect was found on the amount of recall for irrelevant material shown simultaneously with the material to be intentionally learned. The apparent immunity of incidental learning to distractive effects was viewed as possibly due to the special characteristics of incidental learning. This type of learning, occurring as it does at the same time as other learning or with attention directed elsewhere, may be so highly selective as to occur even in the presence of distraction. On the other hand, the contrast shown by the effect of distraction on intentional learning and its lack of an effect on incidental learning may be a function of the experimental procedure. In the study cited, distraction was introduced only during intentional learning, not during the test of incidental recall; this raises the possibility that the findings reflect differential effects of performance. The present study, therefore, in its first experiment, attempted to determine whether the resistance of incidental learning to distraction would be maintained with distraction introduced during the attempt to recall the irrelevant material, as well as during the actual learning. Should incidental learning prove unaffected by distraction during both learning and recall, its immunity would be demonstrated at both the learning and the performance levels. A second experiment is also reported which, in contrast with the first, introduced a source of distraction inherent in the learning situation. Johnson and Thomson found incidental learning to occur when the incidental task (recall of nonsense-syllables being memorized by a partner) was a