This paper examines the contrasting experiences with universal telecommunications service policies in China and India as manifestations of the two states’ differing self-conceptualizations and legitimation strategies. China and India, two of the fastest growing developing economies with 37% percent of the world population between them, have been extensively compared, mainly in terms of economic development and their growing competition for resources. Their telecommunications systems and policies too have come in for considerable research attention. However, few studies have explicitly compared the two nations’ experiences in telecommunications policy-making despite the fact that the many similarities between them in geographical extent, population, stage of economic development and history, as well as the marked contrast in political systems, make them natural choices for comparative analysis. In this paper, we attempt a comparison of the two countries’ experience with universal telecommunications service policies. This area of policy provides a fruitful field for policy analysis because it implicates not only economic, but also social and political considerations. In this paper, we focus our attention not on the comparison of specific universal service policies and programs, but on the institutional arrangements, philosophies of governance, and socio-cultural imperatives that result in those policies. Our objective is to understand what the motivations for universal service policy are in China and India, and how those motivations have conditioned the specific policies and programs that are implemented. It has been argued elsewhere that the motivation for universal access policies are predominantly cultural, based on civilizational concepts such as ecumenism (manifested as a drive for social unity through interconnectedness), equality, and social justice. Others have argued that universal service resulted from interest group conflicts for the reallocation of economic resources from business users to residential users, or from urban to rural areas. While not rejecting the truth of these perspectives, we argue that both tend to portray the state and state elites as relatively passive and reactive to cultural imperatives or external pressures; instead we offer an alternative based on theories of state legitimation, wherein state elites actively pursue policy options grounded in a particular vision of the state, and intended to gain or perpetuate the legitimacy of state institutions, practices and actors. We cite the work of thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas, John Rawles and Amartya Sen, propounding different models and pathways to state legitimation. We argue that universal access policies in China and India are especially good examples of such policies of state legitimation, and that the differences in universal service policies in the two states are due to the contrasting self-conceptualizations of the two states. In China, it has been argued that the main objective of telecommunications reforms was to enable the sector to play a leading strategic economic role and to deliver economic benefits to the Chinese people in order to legitimize the Communist Party’s leadership. Every telecommunications policy objective was instrumental to confirming the legitimacy of the state: network deployment because it enables the system to serve all people; increasing revenues because it contributes tax income; network security and sovereignty because it serves the political needs of the Party and the government. Even on universal access, the initial emphasis on village connectivity under the VAP gave way to the Village Informatization Project (VIP) which laid stress on the diffusion of electronics and information technology in the rural areas, encouragement to ICT-related entrepreneurship, and the informatization of traditional industries—all objectives that help the state achieve economic growth.In India, a number of separate universal service programs support village telephones, mobile infrastructures, and broadband connectivity in rural areas. The emphasis is on connectivity to the exclusion of access, affordability and usage; moreover, connectivity is preferentially provided to government institutions or members of local elites. Also, perhaps uniquely among major economies, the universal service fund is regularly underutilized, with program surpluses almost every year. This points to a lack of conviction about the goals and objectives of universal service programs, except as a means of reinforcing a state presence in rural areas and establishing connections with rural elites. We argue that this is symptomatic of the mode of governance established in India in the last six decades. Though nominally democratic, India does not fit the mold of the Habermasian “deliberative democracy,” in which open, rational and well-intentioned discourse leads to consensus on pressing social questions. Instead, India is an “interlocutory democracy,” a term that we coin to identify a polity in which the democratic process serves only to identify interlocutors — leaders of social formations, religious personalities, regional leaders — with the authority to speak on behalf of their constituents, but no reciprocal obligation to consult widely or be guided by public opinion. Universal service programs in India, with their emphasis on connectivity to rural elites and government officials, reflect the model of “interlocutory democracy” in the wider polity.In both countries, we argue that the close dependency between universal service policies and state legitimation strategies prevent the full utilization of the telecommunications infrastructure: in China by creating a critical contradiction between the commercial interest (profitability) of state-owned telcos and their political obligations of supporting state ideology; and in India by neglecting aspects of access, affordability and usage, and ignoring feedback from user populations. Our recommendations suggest how policy-makers in the two countries might make universal service programs more relevant and effective in light of these findings.