547 results on '"LOGIC"'
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2. Is validity circular?
- Author
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Fulmer, Everett C.
- Abstract
There is an old worry, which dates back to Mill but has analogs even in Sextus, that the very definition of ‘validity’ implies that all valid arguments are circular. This paper investigates how contemporary formal tools can ellucidate that old worry. Its main finding is the existence of a genuine puzzle: a difficult-to-avoid correspondence between the definitions of ‘valid argument’ and ‘premise circular argument’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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3. Conditionals, curry, and consequence: embracing deduction.
- Author
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Tourville, Nicholas and Cook, Roy T
- Abstract
We extend the Embracing Revenge account of the semantic paradoxes by constructing two distinct consequence relations that reflect, in different ways, the transfinitely-many-valued semantics developed in earlier work. In particular, we adapt the underlying ideas of “gappy” approaches based on K3, and “glutty” approaches based on LP, to the Embracing Revenge framework, by treating the infinitely many non-classical truth values as infinitely many ways that a sentence might fail to receive a classical truth value in the former case, and as infinitely many ways that a sentence might receive both classical truth values in the latter. In order to obtain deductive systems that are very nearly classical, we need to utilize different conditionals (and different negations) in each logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
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4. Ground first: against the proof-theoretic definition of ground.
- Author
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Litland, Jon Erling
- Abstract
This paper evaluates the proof-theoretic definition of ground developed by Poggiolesi in a range of recent publications and argues that her proposed definition fails. The paper then outlines an alternative approach where logical consequence relations and the logical operations are defined in terms of ground. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
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5. Reasoning in attitudes.
- Author
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Dietrich, Franz and Staras, Antonios
- Abstract
People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. , 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. , 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of choosing, in terms of a conscious activity or a partly subconscious process. Reasoning in attitudes differs fundamentally from reasoning about attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning in which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. We show that reasoning in attitudes has standard formal properties (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic, reflecting choice in reasoning. Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for a more radical reason, namely indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning. But it can be studied abstractly, using indeterministic consequence operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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6. Introducing new work on indeterminacy and underdetermination.
- Author
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Bowker, Mark
- Abstract
This paper summarises the contributions to our Topical Collection on indeterminacy and underdetermination. The collection includes papers in ethics, metaethics, logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language and philosophy of computation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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7. Interpreting philosophical interpretations of paraconsistency.
- Author
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Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker
- Abstract
In this paper, we critically discuss the idea of a ‘philosophical interpretation’ of paraconsistent logics. We do so by considering the epistemic approach to paraconsistency, by Carnielli and Rodrigues (2019a), according to which paraconsistent logics should be interpreted exclusively in terms of non-conclusive evidence, and also, by considering counter-arguments by Barrio (2018) and Barrio and Da Re (2018), according to whom paraconsistent logics are not specially tied to any specific interpretation. We begin by presenting the positions involved, and by arguing that the debate may be profitably understood in terms of the distinction between pure and applied logics. We argue that dialetheism is not an interpretation of paraconsistent logics, but rather a view on truth and negation which requires use of paraconsistent logics. Something similar may be said about the epistemic approach itself. The result is that there is nothing distinctive to be called a philosophical interpretation of paraconsistent logics, but rather what we have are distinct applications of paraconsistent logics. Arguments by Barrio (2018) and Barrio and Da Re (2018) may be then re-framed more effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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8. The problem of closure and questioning attitudes.
- Author
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Teague, Richard
- Subjects
PROPOSITIONAL attitudes ,ATTITUDE (Psychology) ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
The problem of closure for the traditional unstructured possible worlds model of attitudinal content is that it treats belief and other cognitive states as closed under entailment, despite apparent counterexamples showing that this is not a necessary property of such states. One solution to this problem, which has been proposed recently by several authors (Schaffer in: Hawthorne and Gendler (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 235–271, 2005; Yalcin in Philos Phenomenol Res 97(1):23–47, 2018; Hoek in: Kindermann (ed) Unstructured content, Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming), is to restrict closure in an unstructured setting by treating propositional attitudes as question-sensitive. Here I argue that this line of response is unsatisfying as it stands because the problem of closure is more general than is typically discussed. A version of the problem recurs for attitudes like wondering, entertaining, considering, and so on, which are directed at questions rather than propositions. For such questioning attitudes, the appeal to question-sensitivity is much less convincing as a solution to the problem of closure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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9. The introduction of topology into analytic philosophy: two movements and a coda.
- Author
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Fletcher, Samuel C. and Lackey, Nathan
- Abstract
Both early analytic philosophy and the branch of mathematics now known as topology were gestated and born in the early part of the 20th century. It is not well recognized that there was early interaction between the communities practicing and developing these fields. We trace the history of how topological ideas entered into analytic philosophy through two migrations, an earlier one conceiving of topology geometrically and a later one conceiving of topology algebraically. This allows us to reassess the influence and significance of topological methods for philosophy, including the possible fruitfulness of a third conception of topology as a structure determining similarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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10. Taming vagueness: the philosophy of network science.
- Author
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Elek, Gábor and Babarczy, Eszter
- Subjects
VAGUENESS (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY of science ,SCIENTIFIC models ,LOGIC - Abstract
In the last 20 years network science has become an independent scientific field. We argue that by building network models network scientists are able to tame the vagueness of propositions about complex systems and networks, that is, to make these propositions precise. This makes it possible to study important vague properties such as modularity, near-decomposability, scale-freeness or being a small world. Using an epistemic model of network science, we systematically analyse the specific nature of network models and the logic behind the taming mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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11. Diachronic trends in the topic distributions of formal epistemology abstracts.
- Author
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Kinney, David
- Abstract
Formal epistemology is a growing field of philosophical research. It is also evolving, with the subject matter of formal epistemology papers changing considerably over the past two decades. To quantify the ways in which formal epistemology is changing, I generate a stochastic block topic model of the abstracts of papers classified by as pertaining to formal epistemology. This model identifies fourteen salient topics of formal epistemology abstracts at a first level of abstraction, and four topics at a second level of abstraction. I then study diachronic trends in the degree to which formal epistemology abstracts written in a given year are likely to contain words associated with a particular topic, beginning in 2000 and continuing to 2020. My findings suggest that there has been a marked decline in the likelihood of a given formal epistemology abstract being about logical approaches to belief revision (e.g., AGM belief-revision theory). On the other hand, over the past two decades, the salience of probabilistic techniques in formal epistemology has increased, as has the salience of work at the intersection of formal epistemology and some areas of philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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12. Changing use of formal methods in philosophy: late 2000s vs. late 2010s.
- Author
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Fletcher, Samuel C., Knobe, Joshua, Wheeler, Gregory, and Woodcock, Brian Allan
- Subjects
TWO thousands (Decade) ,DIGITAL humanities - Abstract
Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that (a) the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but (b) the proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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13. Normalisation and subformula property for a system of intuitionistic logic with general introduction and elimination rules.
- Author
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Kürbis, Nils
- Subjects
LOGIC ,PROOF theory ,FUZZY sets - Abstract
This paper studies a formalisation of intuitionistic logic by Negri and von Plato which has general introduction and elimination rules. The philosophical importance of the system is expounded. Definitions of 'maximal formula', 'segment' and 'maximal segment' suitable to the system are formulated and corresponding reduction procedures for maximal formulas and permutative reduction procedures for maximal segments given. Alternatives to the main method used are also considered. It is shown that deductions in the system convert into normal form and that deductions in normal form have the subformula property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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14. Logic talk.
- Author
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Kocurek, Alexander W.
- Subjects
LOGIC ,SEMANTICS - Abstract
Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions (attitude verbs, conditionals, etc.) are hyperintensional. Yet it is not clear how to regiment "logic talk" in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. In this paper, I develop a formal system called hyperlogic that is designed to do just that. I provide a hyperintensional semantics for hyperlogic that doesn't appeal to logically impossible worlds, as traditionally understood, but instead uses a shiftable parameter that determines the interpretation of the logical connectives. I argue this semantics compares favorably to the more common impossible worlds semantics, which faces difficulties interpreting propositionally quantified logic talk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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15. Why classical logic is privileged: justification of logics based on translatability.
- Author
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Schurz, Gerhard
- Subjects
QUANTUM logic ,LOGIC ,INTUITION ,A priori - Abstract
In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics—multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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16. A paradox about sets of properties.
- Author
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Salmón, Nathan
- Subjects
PARADOX ,CONTRADICTION ,LOGIC - Abstract
A paradox about sets of properties is presented. The paradox, which invokes an impredicatively defined property, is formalized in a free third-order logic with lambda-abstraction, through a classically proof-theoretically valid deduction of a contradiction from a single premise to the effect that every property has a unit set. Something like a model is offered to establish that the premise is, although classically inconsistent, nevertheless consistent, so that the paradox discredits the logic employed. A resolution through the ramified theory of types is considered. Finally, a general scheme that generates a family of analogous paradoxes and a generally applicable resolution are proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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17. Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan.
- Author
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Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro, Pailos, Federico, and Calderón, Joaquín Toranzo
- Subjects
STATUS (Law) ,PREDICATE (Logic) ,LINGUISTICS ,PARADOX - Abstract
Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST -logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST -based hierarchy, of which LP and ST themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP , ST and the logics of the ST -hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains (just like classical logic)? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST -metainferential logics in general—and STT ω in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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18. Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?
- Author
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Passmann, Robert
- Subjects
PLURALISM ,CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy) ,NIHILISM ,LOGIC - Abstract
How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism is naturalistically appealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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19. Calculus as method or calculus as rules? Boole and Frege on the aims of a logical calculus.
- Author
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Waszek, David and Schlimm, Dirk
- Subjects
MATHEMATICAL notation ,PHILOSOPHY of mathematics ,CALCULUS - Abstract
By way of a close reading of Boole and Frege's solutions to the same logical problem, we highlight an underappreciated aspect of Boole's work—and of its difference with Frege's better-known approach—which we believe sheds light on the concepts of 'calculus' and 'mechanization' and on their history. Boole has a clear notion of a logical problem; for him, the whole point of a logical calculus is to enable systematic and goal-directed solution methods for such problems. Frege's Begriffsschrift, on the other hand, is a visual tool to scrutinize concepts and inferences, and is a calculus only in the thin sense that every possible transition between sentences is fully and unambiguously specified in advance. While Frege's outlook has dominated much of philosophical thinking about logical symbolism, we believe there is value—particularly in light of recent interest in the role of notations in mathematics and logic—in reviving Boole's idea of an intrinsic link between, as he put it, a 'calculus' and a 'directive method' to solve problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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20. Revisiting Reichenbach's logic.
- Author
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Estrada-González, Luis and Cano-Jorge, Fernando
- Subjects
LOGIC ,SEMANTICS - Abstract
In this paper we show that, when analyzed with contemporary tools in logic—such as Dunn-style semantics, Reichenbach's three-valued logic exhibits many interesting features, and even new responses to some of the old objections to it can be attempted. Also, we establish some connections between Reichenbach's three-valued logic and some contra-classical logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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21. A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective.
- Author
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Winstanley, M. A.
- Subjects
THEORY of knowledge ,PSYCHOLOGY ,LOGIC ,DIAGNOSIS ,PARADOX - Abstract
Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this paper, I outline Jean Piaget's psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget's use of psychology as a source of evidence for logical theory in light of reservations raised by psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of genetic epistemology, Piaget's research programme. I conclude that Piaget's psychological theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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22. Logic as a methodological discipline.
- Author
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Sagi, Gil
- Subjects
LOGIC ,SCIENTIFIC method ,CONCEPTION - Abstract
This essay offers a conception of logic by which logic may be considered to be exceptional among the sciences on the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook. The conception of logic focused on emphasises the traditional role of logic as a methodology for the sciences, which distinguishes it from other sciences that are not methodological. On the proposed conception, the methodological aims of logic drive its definitions and principles, rather than the description of scientific phenomena. The notion of a methodological discipline is explained as a relation between disciplines or practices. Logic serves as a methodological discipline with respect to any theoretical practice, and this generality, as well as logic's reflexive nature, distinguish it from other methodological disciplines. Finally, the evolution of model theory is taken as a case study, with a focus on its methodological role. Following recent work by John Baldwin and Juliette Kennedy, we look at model theory from its inception in the mid-twentieth century as a foundational endeavour until developments at the end of the century, where the classification of theories has taken centre-stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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23. Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning.
- Author
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Baltag, Alexandru, Rad, Soroush Rafiee, and Smets, Sonja
- Subjects
STATISTICAL learning ,LOGIC ,MULTINOMIAL distribution ,CERTAINTY - Abstract
We propose a new model for forming and revising beliefs about unknown probabilities. To go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the agent's beliefs about probability, we consider a plausibility map, associating to each possible distribution a plausibility ranking. Beliefs are defined as in Belief Revision Theory, in terms of truth in the most plausible worlds (or more generally, truth in all the worlds that are plausible enough). We consider two forms of conditioning or belief update, corresponding to the acquisition of two types of information: (1) learning observable evidence obtained by repeated sampling from the unknown distribution; and (2) learning higher-order information about the distribution. The first changes only the plausibility map (via a 'plausibilistic' version of Bayes' Rule), but leaves the given set of possible distributions essentially unchanged; the second rules out some distributions, thus shrinking the set of possibilities, without changing their plausibility ordering.. We look at stability of beliefs under either of these types of learning, defining two related notions (safe belief and statistical knowledge), as well as a measure of the verisimilitude of a given plausibility model. We prove a number of convergence results, showing how our agent's beliefs track the true probability after repeated sampling, and how she eventually gains in a sense (statistical) knowledge of that true probability. Finally, we sketch the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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24. Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic.
- Author
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Peregrin, Jaroslav and Svoboda, Vladimír
- Subjects
ARTIFICIAL languages ,LOGIC ,NATURAL languages ,LANGUAGE & languages - Abstract
In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable (and hence methodologically idle) theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices (and thus immune to Quinean criticism of basing logic on explicit conventions). We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a "genuine" language (independent of us) and hence for "genuine" logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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25. An analysis of Existential Graphs–part 2: Beta.
- Author
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Bellucci, Francesco and Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko
- Subjects
FIRST-order logic ,EXPRESSIVE language ,NINETEENTH century ,CHARTS, diagrams, etc. ,LOGIC - Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the notational difference between Beta Existential Graphs, the graphical notation for quantificational logic invented by Charles S. Peirce at the end of the 19th century, and the ordinary notation of first-order logic. Peirce thought his graphs to be "more diagrammatic" than equivalently expressive languages (including his own algebras) for quantificational logic. The reason of this, he claimed, is that less room is afforded in Existential Graphs than in equivalently expressive languages for different ways of representing the same fact. The reason of this, in turn, is that Existential Graphs are a non-linear, occurrence-referential notation. As a non-linear notation, each graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic that are obtained by permuting those elements (sentential variables, predicate expressions, and quantifiers) that in the graphs lie in the same area. As an occurrence-referential notation, each Beta graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic in which the identity of reference of two or more variables is asserted. In brief, Peirce's graphs are more diagrammatic than the linear, type-referential notation of first-order logic because the function that translates the latter to the graphs does not define isomorphism between the two notations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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26. Logic and science: science and logic.
- Author
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Rossberg, Marcus and Shapiro, Stewart
- Subjects
LOGIC ,PHILOSOPHERS ,A priori ,NATURALISTS ,PRIESTS - Abstract
According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic "isn't special", but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is revisable, and its truths are neither analytic nor a priori. And logical theories are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories are. What isn't special, we argue, is anti-exceptionalism about logic. Anti-exceptionalists disagree with one another regarding what logic and, indeed, anti-exceptionalism are, and they are at odds with naturalist philosophers of logic, who may have seemed like natural allies. Moreover, those internal battles concern well-trodden philosophical issues, and there is no hint as to how they are to be resolved on broadly scientific grounds. We close by looking at three of the founders of logic who may have seemed like obvious enemies of anti-exceptionalism—Aristotle, Frege, and Carnap—and conclude that none of their positions is clearly at odds with at least some of the main themes of anti-exceptionalism. We submit that, at least at present, anti-exceptionalism is too vague or underspecified to characterize a coherent conception of logic, one that stands opposed to more traditional approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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27. The presumption of assurance.
- Author
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Faulkner, Paul
- Subjects
LOGIC - Abstract
According to the Assurance Theory of testimony, in telling an audience something, a speaker offers their assurance that what is told is true, which is something like their guarantee, or promise, of truth. However, speakers also tell lies and say things they do not have the authority to back up. So why does understanding tellings to be a form of assurance explain how tellings can provide a reason for belief? This paper argues that reasons come once it is recognised that tellings are trusted. And the logic by means of which trust gives reason to believe is quite general; it applies equally to belief that is based on evidence rather than assurance. Outlining this logic requires the introduction of the idea of epistemic presumptions, whose truth plays the role of ensuring a connection between believer, justification and truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. Non-Boolean classical relevant logics II: Classicality through truth-constants.
- Author
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Øgaard, Tore Fjetland
- Subjects
LOGIC ,SYLLOGISM - Abstract
This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap's selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics which satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap's selection criteria, provided the truth-constant known as the Ackermann constant is available. One of the selection criteria related to expressive strength is having an "enthymematic" conditional for which a deduction theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and Belnap's take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about logical consequence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. Another way logic might be normative.
- Author
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Evershed, J. W.
- Subjects
LOGIC ,NORMATIVITY (Ethics) - Abstract
Is logic normative for reasoning? In the wake of work by Gilbert Harman and John MacFarlane, this question has been reduced to: are there any adequate bridge principles which link logical facts to normative constraints on reasoning? Hitherto, defenders of the normativity of logic have exclusively focussed on identifying adequate validity bridge principles: principles linking validity facts—facts of the form Γ ⊧ φ —to normative constraints on reasoning. This paper argues for two claims. First, for the time being at least, Harman's challenge cannot be surmounted by articulating validity bridge principles. Second, Harman's challenge can be met by articulating invalidity bridge principles: principles linking invalidity facts of the form Γ ⊭ ψ to normative constraints on reasoning. In doing so, I provide a novel defence of the normativity of logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. Everything is learnable, once it is settled.
- Author
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Xu, Kevin
- Subjects
EPISTEMIC logic ,PHILOSOPHERS ,LOGIC - Abstract
Since Fitch's proof that not all propositions are knowable, philosophers have analysed the concept of knowability and sought a schema for the knowable propositions. A recent development in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) has been to read 'knowable' as 'known after an announcement'. Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic (APAL) and Sequential Public Announcement Logic (SPAL) are two DELs that have depicted this reading of knowability. We argue that neither APAL nor SPAL provide a satisfactory and principled schema of the knowable propositions. Instead, we claim that knowability is linked with settledness; stability of truth. We augment SPAL with a settled operator to create a new logic, Dual Sequential Public Announcement Logic (DSPAL). We prove in DSPAL a principled schema of knowability, that all settled propositions are knowable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
31. Assertions and future tense semantics.
- Author
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De Florio, Ciro and Frigerio, Aldo
- Subjects
CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy) ,PRAGMATICS ,LOGIC ,PROPOSITION (Logic) ,SEMANTICS ,ARGUMENT ,PROBABILITY theory - Abstract
Non-bivalent semantics of the future tense assert that propositions regarding future contingents are neither true nor false. One of the most relevant non-bivalent semantics is supervaluationism (Thomason in Theoria 36(3):264–281, 1970; Thomason, in: Gabbay, Guenthner (eds) Handbook of philosophical logic, Springer, Berlin, 1984), which preserves important logical principles. Recently, non-bivalent semantics are under attack from some pragmatics arguments: these semantics would be incompatible with our practices of asserting future contingents and with the probability we ascribe to such assertions (Besson and Hattiangadi in Philosophical Studies 167(2):251–271, 2014; Cariani and Santorio in Mind 127(505):129–165, 2018). The aim of this paper is to defend supervaluationism against this kind of criticism. We argue that, if probability is interpreted as the subjective belief in a proposition and if a semantic contextualism is adopted, supervaluationism makes correct predictions concerning the norms that govern our practices of asserting future contingents. Obviously, other arguments can be proposed against supervaluationism, but they must be of a different kind, such as metaphysical arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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32. Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference.
- Author
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Priest, Graham
- Subjects
LOGIC - Abstract
Logic, in one of the many sense of that term, is a theory about what follows from what and why. Arguably, the correct theory has to be determined by abduction. Over recent years, so called logical anti-exceptionalists have investigated this matter. Current discussions have been restricted to deductive logic. However, there are also, of course, various forms of non-deductive reasoning. Indeed, abduction itself is one of these. What is to be said about the way of choosing the best theory of non-deductive inferences? It would seem clear that an anti-exceptionalist should hold that essentially the same method of choice should apply to non-deductive logic. A number of issues need to be faced in the process, not the least of which is the circularity involved in an abductive justification for a theory of abduction. This paper discusses matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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33. Ought-contextualism and reasoning.
- Author
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Bradley, Darren
- Subjects
INTUITION ,SEMANTICS ,LOGIC ,MACHINERY - Abstract
What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and I believe P, should I believe Q? I will argue that we should embed the issue in an independently motivated contextualist semantics for 'ought', with parameters for a standard and set of propositions. With the contextualist machinery in hand, we can defend a strong principle expressing how agents ought to reason while accommodating conflicting intuitions. I then show how our judgments about blame and guidance can be handled by this machinery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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34. Practical reasoning and the witnessably rigorous proof.
- Author
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Livingston, Eric
- Subjects
PRACTICAL reason ,LOGIC ,MATHEMATICAL logic ,MATHEMATICIANS ,MATHEMATICS - Abstract
This paper introduces an anthropological approach to the foundations of mathematics. Traditionally, the philosophy of mathematics has focused on the nature and origins of mathematical truth. Mathematicians, however, treat mathematical arguments as determining mathematical truth: if an argument is found to describe a witnessably rigorous proof of a theorem, that theorem is considered—until the need for further examination arises—to be true. The anthropological question is how mathematicians, as a practical matter and as a matter of mathematical practice, make such determinations. This paper looks first at the ways that the logic of mathematical argumentation comes to be realized and substantiated by provers as their own immediate, situated accomplishment. The type of reasoning involved is quite different from deductive logic; once seen, it seems to be endemic to and pervasive throughout the work of human theorem proving. A number of other features of proving are also considered, including the production of notational coherence, the foregrounding of proof-specific proof-relevant detail, and the structuring of mathematical argumentation. Through this material, the paper shows the feasibility and promise of a real-world anthropology of disciplinary mathematical practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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35. A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.
- Author
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Fano, Vincenzo and Graziani, Pierluigi
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHY of science ,LOGIC ,HYPOTHESIS ,EPISTEMIC logic ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
The Dunning–Kruger effect focuses our attention on the notion of invisibility of ignorance, i.e., the ignorance of ignorance. Such a phenomenon is not only important for everyday life, but also, above all, for some philosophical disciplines, such as epistemology of sciences. When someone tries to understand formally the phenomenon of ignorance of ignorance, they usually end up with a nested epistemic operator highly resistant to proper regimentation. In this paper, we argue that to understand adequately the ignorance of ignorance phenomenon we have to understand satisfactorily the concept of disbelief and, as we call it, the concept of "radical ignorance". We propose also prerequisites that a notion of radical ignorance useful for the philosophy of science ought to fulfill, and we sketch a possible formalization of this notion. Finally, we propose some comments on the problem of propagation of ignorance proposed by Fine (Synthese, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1406-z). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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36. On Kant and Husserl on transcendental logic.
- Author
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Shafiei, Mohammad and Mesgari, Ahmad Ali Akbar
- Subjects
LOGIC ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
It is well known that the notion of transcendental logic has a prominent role in both Kant's and Husserl's theories of knowledge. The main aim of the present paper is to study the links between formal and transcendental logic in Husserl on the one hand, and the links between general logic and transcendental logic in Kant on the other. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental logic and general logic in Kant's philosophy. By means of our definition of transcendental logic, mainly drawn from Husserl's analyses, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of Kant's view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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37. The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence.
- Author
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Arenhart, Jonas Rafael Becker
- Subjects
CONTRADICTION ,LOGIC - Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions; instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions (as dialetheists argue), it is suggested that we may understand such situations as involving only conflicting evidence, which restricts contradictions to a notion of evidence weaker than truth. In this paper, we first distinguish two conflicting programs entangled in the proposal: (1) interpreting paraconsistency in general through the notion of evidence, and (2) modeling reasoning with evidence by using paraconsistent logic. The first part of the program, we argue, does not succeed, on the grounds that it does not lead to a uniform proposal to the understanding of paraconsistency, and fails to engage with dialetheism in a legitimate dispute about interpretation of paraconsistency. Also, when seen through the lights of the second kind of approach, a 'logic as modeling' approach, weaknesses of dealing with evidence through paraconsistency come to light, basically because evidence does not seem to suggest the need of a paraconsistent treatment. As a result, one can neither approach paraconsistency in general through evidence, nor approach evidence with the use of paraconsistent logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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38. Logic in analytic philosophy: a quantitative analysis.
- Author
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Bonino, Guido, Maffezioli, Paolo, and Tripodi, Paolo
- Subjects
ANALYTIC philosophy ,QUANTITATIVE research ,LOGIC ,PERIODICAL publishing ,PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Using quantitative methods, we investigate the role of logic in analytic philosophy from 1941 to 2010. In particular, a corpus of five journals publishing analytic philosophy is assessed and evaluated against three main criteria: the presence of logic, its role and level of technical sophistication. The analysis reveals that (1) logic is not present at all in nearly three-quarters of the corpus, (2) the instrumental role of logic prevails over the non-instrumental ones, and (3) the level of technical sophistication increases in time, although it remains relatively low. These results are used to challenge the view, widespread among analytic philosophers and labeled here "prevailing view", that logic is a widely used and highly sophisticated method to analyze philosophical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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39. A modal analysis of phenomenal intentionality: horizonality and object-directed phenomenal presence.
- Author
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Banick, Kyle
- Subjects
MODAL logic ,PHILOSOPHY of mind ,PARADOX ,MENTAL representation ,LOGIC ,MODAL analysis - Abstract
In this article I argue that phenomenal intentionality fundamentally consists in a horizonality structure, rather than in a relation to a representational content or the determination of accuracy conditions. I provide a distinctive modal model of intentionality that conceives of phenomenal intentionality as the enjoyment of a plus ultra that points beyond what is actual. The directedness of intentionality on the world, thus, consists in "pointing ahead" to possibilities. The principal difficulty for the modal model is logical: the most obvious way of implementing such a structure results in an analogue of Russell's paradox. However, this paradox can be avoided by fine-tuning the modal logic deployed in this setting. This way of fine-tuning the logic ultimately amounts to intuitive benefits. For, it captures the intensional character of intentionality, since the way that our mental states refer to things is conception-dependent. Moreover, the way I interpret the modal model leads to a conception of intentionality as a feature of dynamic, diachronic patterns in the way that mental acts subjectively appear, rather than as a synchronic property. We ought to think of intentionality as fundamentally a temporal, subjective determination. In a generalization on Sellars' approach to concepts, I hold that phenomenally intentional mental presentations involve modal laws and are inconceivable without them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
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40. The Holmesian logician: Sherlock Holmes' "Science of Deduction and Analysis" and the logic of discovery.
- Author
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Genot, Emmanuel J.
- Subjects
LOGIC - Abstract
This paper examines whether Sherlock Holmes' "Science of Deduction and Analysis," as reconstructed by Hintikka and Hintikka (in: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), exemplifies a logic of discovery. While the Hintikkas claimed it does, their approach remained largely programmatic, and ultimately unsuccessful. Their reconstruction must thus be expanded, in particular to account for the role of memory in inquiry. Pending this expansion, the Hintikkas' claim is vindicated. However, a tension between the naturalistic aspirations of their model and the formal apparatus they built it on is identified. The paper concludes on suggestions for easing this tension without losing the normative component of the Hintikkas' epistemological model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Measuring evidence: a probabilistic approach to an extension of Belnap–Dunn logic.
- Author
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Rodrigues, Abilio, Bueno-Soler, Juliana, and Carnielli, Walter
- Subjects
PROPOSITION (Logic) ,LOGIC ,INCONSISTENCY (Logic) - Abstract
This paper introduces the logic of evidence and truth LET F as an extension of the Belnap–Dunn four-valued logic FDE . LET F is a slightly modified version of the logic LET J , presented in Carnielli and Rodrigues (Synthese 196:3789–3813, 2017). While LET J is equipped only with a classicality operator ∘ , LET F is equipped with a non-classicality operator ∙ as well, dual to ∘ . Both LET F and LET J are logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness in which the operator ∘ recovers classical logic for propositions in its scope. Evidence is a notion weaker than truth in the sense that there may be evidence for a proposition α even if α is not true. As well as LET J , LET F is able to express preservation of evidence and preservation of truth. The primary aim of this paper is to propose a probabilistic semantics for LET F where statements P (α) and P (∘ α) express, respectively, the amount of evidence available for α and the degree to which the evidence for α is expected to behave classically—or non-classically for P (∙ α) . A probabilistic scenario is paracomplete when P (α) + P (¬ α) < 1 , and paraconsistent when P (α) + P (¬ α) > 1 , and in both cases, P (∘ α) < 1 . If P (∘ α) = 1 , or P (∙ α) = 0 , classical probability is recovered for α . The proposition ∘ α ∨ ∙ α , a theorem of LET F , partitions what we call the information space, and thus allows us to obtain some new versions of known results of standard probability theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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42. Tarskian consequence relations bilaterally: some familiar notions.
- Author
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Drobyshevich, Sergey
- Subjects
LOGIC ,CONSERVATIVES - Abstract
This paper is dedicated to developing a formalism that takes rejection seriously. Bilateral notation of signed formulas with force indicators is adopted to define signed consequences which can be viewed as the bilateral counterpart of Tarskian consequence relations. Its relation to some other bilateral approaches is discussed. It is shown how David Nelson's logic N4 can be characterized bilaterally and the corresponding completeness result is proved. Further, bilateral variants of three familiar notions are considered and investigated: that of a fragment, of definitional equivalence, and of a conservative extension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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- 2021
- Full Text
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43. What is a logical theory? On theories containing assertions and denials.
- Author
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Blasio, Carolina, Caleiro, Carlos, and Marcos, João
- Subjects
LOGIC ,COLLECTIONS - Abstract
The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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44. Two traditions in abstract valuational model theory.
- Author
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French, Rohan and Ripley, David
- Subjects
MANY-valued logic ,MODEL theory ,LOGIC - Abstract
We investigate two different broad traditions in the abstract valuational model theory for nontransitive and nonreflexive logics. The first of these traditions makes heavy use of the natural Galois connection between sets of (many-valued) valuations and sets of arguments. The other, originating with work by Grzegorz Malinowski on nonreflexive logics, and best systematized in Blasio et al. (Bull Sect Log 46(3/4): 233–262, 2017), lets sets of arguments determine a more restricted set of valuations. After giving a systematic discussion of these two different traditions in the valuational model theory for substructural logics, we turn to looking at the ways in which we might try to compare two sets of valuations determining the same set of arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. (Meta)inferential levels of entailment beyond the Tarskian paradigm.
- Author
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Barrio, Eduardo Alejandro, Pailos, Federico, and Szmuc, Damian
- Subjects
LOGIC - Abstract
In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. Psychophysiological approach to the Liar paradox: Jean Buridan's virtual entailment principle put to the test.
- Author
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Rudnicki, Konrad and Łukowski, Piotr
- Subjects
PARADOX ,NATURAL languages ,PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY ,LOGIC ,EXPERIMENTAL philosophy - Abstract
This article presents an empirical examination of the consequences of the virtual entailment principle proposed by Jean Buridan to resolve the Liar paradox. This principle states that every sentence in natural language implicitly asserts its own truth. Adopting this principle means that the Liar sentence is not paradoxical but false, because its content is contradictory to what is virtually implied. As a result, humans should perceive the Liar sentence the same way as any other false sentence. This solution to the Liar paradox received criticism for making ad hoc claims about the natural language. However, thanks to modern advancements in psychophysiology, it became possible to empirically investigate if the human brain really perceives the Liar sentence like a false sentence. We designed and conducted an experiment to examine brain activity in response to true sentences, false sentences and self-referential sentences (including the Liar and the Truthteller). Our results provide support for the Buridan's hypothesis and show that the Liar sentence is processed by the human brain identically to false sentences, while the Truthteller sentence is perceived identically to true sentences. This agrees with predictions derived from the virtual entailment principle and supports the idea that humans think with the logic of truth—a logic for which the truth is a designated value of its adequate semantics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Composition, identity and plural ontology.
- Author
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Loss, Roberto
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,POSSIBILITY ,LOGIC - Abstract
According to 'Strong Composition as Identity' (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some 'weak' plural comprehension principle and, thus, 'exclude' some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most 'joint-carving' plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, 'unrestricted' plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over 'super-pluralities' of entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
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48. When clarity and consistency conflicts with empirical adequacy: conceptual engineering, anthropology, and Evans-Pritchard's ethnography.
- Author
-
Djordjevic, C. M.
- Subjects
ANALYTIC philosophy ,ETHNOLOGY ,ANTHROPOLOGY ,ENGINEERING ,WITCHCRAFT - Abstract
In recent analytic philosophy, there is a growing interest in the project of conceptual engineering. This paper examines two ways this project might be applied to scientific research, specifically anthropological research. It argues that both of them are harmful to this research. Specifically, it argues that a reliance on the axiological standards of analytic philosophy conflicts with the goal of empirical adequacy. Section one proffers two forms that the engineering project might take when applied to the science. Section two proffers a case study drawn from anthropology. Specifically, it lays out Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande, paying particular attention to the inconsistency he discovered in Azande witchcraft. Sections three and four argue that attempting to remove this inconsistency via the two forms of engineering disable critical features of emic research and discard empirical findings. Finally, I close by noting how the conflict between axiological standards and empirical adequacy might generalize beyond anthropology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Single-domain free logic and the problem of compositionality.
- Author
-
Rami, Dolf
- Subjects
MODAL logic ,SEMANTICS (Philosophy) ,LOGIC ,SEMANTICS - Abstract
In this paper, I will defend a new compositional semantics for single-domain free logic. This semantics makes use of a distinction between the semantic value of a singular term and its semantic referent. The semantic value of a singular term is conceived of as a set that either contains the semantic referent or no element at all. The semantic referent is the object that the term designates. Before I will introduce this new semantics for single-domain predicate and an S5-type modal logic in detail, I will present five related problems of compositionality of the standard semantics for these logical systems. After that I will show in detail how my new proposed alternative semantics can be used to solve nearly all of the outlined five problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Identifying logical evidence.
- Author
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Martin, Ben
- Subjects
EVIDENCE ,THEORY of knowledge ,LOGIC ,PARADOX - Abstract
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it's understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there's been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist's arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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