The key note of the following remarks will be the distinction between two kinds of attitudes towards the relations between syntax and semantics, which I shall call without any claim to historical accuracy the Fregean and the Russellian attitudes, respectively. My main point will be that as far as the formal analysis of natural languages is concerned, the trend in recent years has been contrary to what Hintikka would have us believe towards more Fregean approaches. By naming them thus I by no means want to imply that these two important precursors of contemporary research in the philosophy of language and linguistic semantics would agree with most of what I will attribute to them. The distinction I want to draw does, however, cut across many of the issues dealt with in Hintikka's paper; to some of these I will turn shortly. But I would first like to motivate the distinction and to argue briefly for one of the two. The Fregean and Russellian attitudes are essentially alternatives to ways of considering the relation between syntax and semantics within one's theory of language. The Fregean attitude consists in regarding the relation between entities from the two domains as roughly one-to-one. What it basically entails is that the syntactic decomposition of the expressions of the language must enter directly into the semantic computation. A Fregean analysis is typically surface oriented and forsees in general for each syntactic category of the language (or rather of the syntax) a corresponding semantic category. On the other hand, what I am calling the Russellian attitude towards the relation between syntax and semantics is based on the view that the direct surface structure of a language (here I am of course referring to natural languages) is not a faithful guide to its semantic structure, or if you want, to its logical form. Typically, a Russellian attitude will lead to a kind of "syntactic transformationalism", best known, for example, from the kind of work done within the various trends of generative trans formational grammar (where the motivation for transformational analyses was of course not explicitly semantic). One could cite among