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Education in America today demands a radical rethinking of the sites of pedagogy. While it may be obvious that pedagogical processes are affected by the setting in which they occur, we understand far too little about this relationship to be able to maximize its learning potential. Gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of sites in which we teach and learn is critical to improving education.

Di Leo: Why does foregrounding the significance of criticism and interpretation make you a curmudgeon? I would say just the opposite. I don't think that teachers have really thought enough about how to incorporate theory into the teaching of literary texts. The result is either a misappropriation of theory and criticism in their classroom, or an avoidance of theory and criticism in the classroom. The worst instance of the former is what I call the "cookie cutter approach" to theory which works something like this: apply literary theory "A" to literary text "B". Result: a valid interpretation of literary text "B" (and a successful use of literary theory "A"). On this strategy, students think that criticism and theory is some kind of game wherein points are scored for the production of valid interpretations. Textbooks like many of the volumes in the Bedford series in Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism that have primary texts along with selections like "What is Deconstruction?" and "What is Feminism?" promote this type of trivial use of theory, albeit I think unwittingly. In other cases, theory and criticism is entirely avoided in the classroom either because it is perceived by the teacher to

At no other time have there been so many literary and critical theorists on university faculties. Furthermore, the number of theory courses offered to undergraduate and graduate students seems to be only increasing. Yet despite these institutional trends, there are a number of indications that the contemporary scene in literary and critical theory is undergoing a radical transformation. One senses a noticeable change in attitude in academia regarding the use of theory and its general value. What then is the impetus for this change? Why now after theory and theorists have finally come of age in the academy is the term "posttheory" appearing with greater frequency in the very communities that struggled so hard to establish a place for theory within the academy? Moreover, how does this alleged "posttheoretical turn" alter the role and significance of postwar French theorists like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze? Does the coming of posttheory signal a diminishing role in scholarship for "theorists" like Deleuze? Paradoxical as it might sound, the coming of an age of posttheory need not necessarily entail the dwindling significance of traditionally theoretical writers. One finds, for example, that the work of Deleuze only increases in value and relevancy in the age of posttheory. We see this very clearly when we look at just what brought us into the "age of posttheory," and what exactly is meant by this enigmatic phrase. The road to posttheory begins in the '70s, when doubts about the usefulness of theory began to give way to the practice of rich, theoretical readings of literary artifacts. Elegant and close structuralist, deconstructive, Marxist, and psychoanalytic interpretations began to seriously compete with older, more traditional ways of reading like the New Criticism; competing not just for credibility among academics, but also for limited institutional space. The practice of theory in the academic curriculum as well as

The figure of Europe experienced through "margins" and "borders" is becoming undone perhaps even permanently undone. It is resulting in a fundamental refiguring of Europe; a refiguring of how Europe appears to us as well as what it is and can be. Moreover, it is leading many to reconsider the very notions of "border" and "margin" in themselves in addition to their relationship with that entity which goes by the name, "Europe." Discussion of the refiguring of Europe has come from many different directions, and to a number of different conclusions. Some argue that, like the contemporary world in general, Europe in particular is increasingly losing its borders that it is gradually transforming into part of the "world without borders." Evidence of this is many times linked to increased globalization globalization whose net effect is the weakening of the borders of empires, nations and camps. Others though contend that just because borders are being undone, it does not follow that the consequence of this should or will be a "world without borders." In a 1993 conference entitled "L'idee de l'Europe et la philosophie ," the French philosopher Etienne Balibar, for example, argues that borders are being "reduced in their localization and their function" and "thinned out" at the same time that they are being "doubled" and "multiplied." The consequences of this are "border zones, regions or countries where one can reside and live" as well as an inversion of the quantitative relationship between "border" and "territory" (220). Writes Balibar

��� If austerity is the measure of responsible academic conduct in the age of neoliberalism, then transparency is its watchdog. It is widely touted today as that which protects the public from both the misuse of academic resources and poor governance of the university. The public has come to expect increasing levels of transparency in the administration and governance of higher education both as a means of accountability and a mode of publicity. Implied in these calls for more transparency is a mistrust and cynicism regarding higher education in America. But transparency carries with it a lot of baggage. 1 For one thing, calls for transparency always carry with them an implicit opposition to privacy and secrecy. Namely, increased transparency entails decreased privacy; and more publicity means less secrecy. The roots of the latter, in particular, can be connected to the rise of the modern state as one grounded not on secret practices, but rather on transparency, or more accurately, publicity. The emergence of representative governments in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century established a consideration of publicity and transparency as protections against bad administration and misrule. 2 As such, philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant played a large role in establishing the social, political, and ethical foundations of transparency. And it is these foundations that need to be recalled in order to gain some perspective on the role and function of transparency in higher education theory and practice today. The general questions raised in this essay are fairly transparent ones. Namely, what does it mean to call for “transparency” in the conduct of higher education? And is this a good thing? That is, is transparency something that contributes to the well-being of the university and those whose lives and education are connected to it—or is it something that works in the opposite direction? For that matter, what do we mean when we ask for “more” transparency from our colleagues? And how is this different from those whose aim is “perfect” transparency in the conduct of academe? While there is no doubt that transparency often can bring about greater levels of understanding and 1 For an account of austerity as the measure of responsible academic conduct, see Di Leo

Austerity is the measure of responsible academic conduct in the age of neoliberalism. To tout its power and promise is a key aspect of being a fully engaged member of neoliberal academe; to deny its value and benefi t is a central component of resisting neoliberal academe—and perhaps even moving beyond it. The docile subjects of the neoliberal academy are perfectly constituted to follow austerity measures into one of the darkest chapters in the history of democratic education. 1 Those within the academy who even offer the slightest hint of resistance to the allegedly perfect logic of austerity open themselves to marginalization—and ultimately failure. However, assessing the role of austerity in the academy is not as uncomplicated as it may seem. From the perspective of austerity as an arm of the repressive and destructive neoliberal practices and policies of higher education, austerity is all darkness and no light. But even if this is the most recent and high profi le aspect of austerity in the academy, it is not its only dimension—nor even its most longstanding. Rather, austerity has played a large role in defi ning the emotional, moral, and pedagogical life of the academy. Namely, austerity has come to be a regulative emotional, if not also moral, imperative in the conduct of academic life. Furthermore, these emotional and moral imperatives pre-date the rise of neoliberalism and its austerity agenda. Austerity as an emotional and moral imperative has long shaped the conduct of academic life. For some, this has been a problem; for others, it has been simply a part of being an academic. Nevertheless, the rise of neoliberalism in the academy has intensifi ed the emotional and moral effects of its traditional relationship with austerity to the point where one must ask whether the resultant academic environment is a healthy or an unhealthy 1 The notion of the docile subjects of neoliberal academe is established in some depth in my recent book, Corporate Humanities in Higher Education: Moving Beyond the Neoliberal Academy (2013a). Two other sources on this topic are Davies, Gottsche, and Bansel (2006) and Fanghanel