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Abstract: Our task in the paper is to examine some recent experiments (in the period 1996–2002) bearing on the issue of whether there is dark matter in the universe in the form of neutralino WIMPs (weakly interacting massive particles). Our main focus is an experiment performed by the DAMA group that claims to have found an ‘annual modulation signature’ for the WIMP. DAMA''s result has been hotly contested by two other groups, EDELWEISS and CDMS, and we study the details of the experiments performed by all three groups. Our goal is to investigate the philosophic and sociological implications of this controversy. Particularly, using an innovative theoretical strategy suggested by (Copi, C. and L. M. Krauss (2003). Comparing interaction rate detectors for weakly interacting massive particles with annual modulation detectors. Physical Review D, 67, 103507), we suggest a new way of resolving discordant experimental data (extending a previous analysis by (Franklin, A. (2002). Selectivity and discord. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press). In addition, we are in a position to contribute substantively to the debate between realists and constructive empiricists. Finally, from a sociological standpoint, we remark that DAMA''s work has been valuable in mobilizing other research teams and providing them with a critical focus. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In her 1996 book, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Deborah Mayo argues that use- (or heuristic) novelty is not a criterion we need to consider in assessing the evidential value of observations. Using the notion of a “severe” test, Mayo claims that such novelty is valuable only when it leads to severity, and never otherwise. To illustrate her view, she examines the historical case involving the famous 1919 British eclipse expeditions that generated observations supporting Einstein''s theory of gravitation over Newton''s. My plan here is to defend use-novelty as a valuable methodological principle. I begin by exposing a weakness in Mayo''s criticism of use-novelty. Remedying this weakness re-establishes the worth of use-novelty under specific conditions; in particular, heuristically novel data are to be preferred, as I will say, “prima facie”. Armed with this revised version of use-novelty, I re-examine the history of the eclipse experiments and offer an interpretation of this episode that to an extent—and contrary to Mayo—restores the mildly heretical, Earman/Glymour evaluation of this episode offered in their (1980). I conclude by responding to criticism of my assessment of Mayo''s work. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]