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Soviet Marxism is often characterized by the term ontologism. The latter could be defined as a totalizing assertion about material being as inherently dialectical, often coupled with an understanding of thought as mere reflection. This fundamental assertion is said to remain unchallenged among dogmatic party philosophers and critical Marxists alike. Far from an innocent misconception, Soviet ontologism is associated with some of the harshest historical events like the Lysenko affair, where the imposition of the dialectical optic onto the natural sciences resulted in an ideological blockade of research. Various sources of this peculiarity have been identified in Soviet Marxism, from the endorsement of dialectics of nature to the rejection of Cartesian metaphysics. However, a political account of Soviet ontologism is yet to be written. This article will address the question of ontologism as it has been theorized in relation to the philosophy of Evald Ilyenkov. Tracing the history of Russian ontologism from the nineteenth century, we will recover its nationalist dimension. Then, drawing on the philosophical controversies between Lenin and Bogdanov, which in turn will be linked to Ilyenkov's intervention, we will examine the various strands of ontological thinking in Soviet Marxism and identify Ilyenkov's position. Finally, we will ask what insights can the ontological thinking of Soviet Marxism provide in the context of contemporary philosophical turns towards ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russian philosophy underwent many phases: Westernism, Slavophilism, nihilism, pre-revolutionary religious philosophy, and dialectical materialism or Soviet philosophy. At first sight, each one of these phases seems antithetical to the preceding one. Yet, they all appear to have in common a certain negative attitude towards the subjectivism of Kantianism and German Idealism. In contrast to the latter, Russian philosophy typically displays a tendency towards ontologism, which is generally defined as the view that there is such a thing as being in itself, i.e., being independent of cognition, and that this being is to some extent knowable. We discern, in these otherwise diametrically opposed movements, an underlying ontologism that constitutes a common thread running in a straight line through the history of Russian philosophy. In this article, I provide an overview of Russian ontologism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shpet's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology has caused puzzlement because of the lack of clarity with which he treats the transcendental turn in Appearance and Sense (1914). I suggest that we find a more comprehensive discussion on the topic in Shpet's 1917 article, "Wisdom or Reason?" There, Shpet reacts to Husserl's treatment of a cluster of problems related to the latter's transition to transcendental idealism. I read "Wisdom or Reason?" not only in relation to Husserl's Logos article of 1911, but also to his 1907 lecture series "The Idea of Phenomenology." My analysis of Shpet's phenomenology reveals that he followed through with the transcendental turn, although his philosophy developed in a direction different from Husserl's transcendental idealism. Shpet postulates a collective consciousness, in which meaning-constitution takes place, and discovers the "word" as the foundation for any cognition. Shpet's phenomenology remains ontological, as he considers language or culture as the "form of being" in which human beings live. In "Wisdom or Reason?," Shpet argues that we can have direct knowledge of this meaningful reality: being is not "represented" but "presented" in a word. A certain compatibility thus exists between Shpet's phenomenology of cultural reality and Husserl's search for the absolute validity of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semyon Frank (1877–1950) opposed the Neo-Kantian School and admitted the real existence of the objects of cognition. He treated ontologism as essential to the entire movement of Russian religious philosophy. For Frank, one can only know about something thanks to the absolute, which exists prior to the knowing subject. Ontologism, affirming the priority of being over cognition, has a great significance not only for metaphysics and epistemology, but also for the philosophy of religion. In particular, Frank taught that the most privileged mode of cognition of God is intuition, an immediate experience of God or faith (the so-called living knowledge). Intuition is at the heart of the ontological proof, which can be found in St. Anselm, Descartes, and Frank himself. Frank dedicated a number of articles to this topic: "K istorii ontologicheskogo dokazatel'stva" ("On the History of the Ontological Proof," 1915), "Ontologicheskoe dokazatel'stvo bytiya Boga" ("Ontological Proof of the Existence of God," 1930), as well as texts recently discovered at the Bakhmeteff Archive, including "Dokazatel'stvo bytiya Boga" ("Proof of the Existence of God"). In this way, Russian ontologism leads to a new interpretation of the traditional ontological proof, one which acknowledges the existence of God, not on the basis of arguments resting on His definition, but on the basis of the intuitive recognition of His being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents-but also critics-of Bergson's philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky's key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky's 'Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy' (The Defects of Bergson's Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson's, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]