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Why do some countries escape the political resource curse while others do not? Most scholars argue that avoiding the claimed anti-democratic effects of natural resources, especially oil, largely depends on the quality of pre-existing political institutions and/or the effectiveness of contemporary resource management institutions. Drawing on the most-likely case of Timor-Leste, one of the world's most oil-dependent countries that nevertheless successfully consolidated democracy, we challenge these dominant theories and highlight new important factors to consider. We show that Timor-Leste did not avoid the curse because of good pre-existing political institutions, good natural resource governance institutions, or an otherwise favorable environment for democracy. Instead, we find that the ideological beliefs of major political actors, their strong popular legitimacy, the absence of a hegemonic actor among them, as well as the approaches of external actors, have produced a consolidated democracy despite strong incentives for the development of authoritarianism. These findings highlight the importance of ideology and agency, of the composition of independence movements, and of constructive international engagement, in particular at critical historical junctures. In short, even countries facing serious political and economic challenges can avoid the political resource curse, and both scholars and policymakers should consider a broader approach to the phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While some governments use natural resources for immediate political gain, others create transparent institutions that promote sustainable development. What explains this variation? Using novel data for Latin America between 1990 and 2019, I show that executive incumbents are more likely to restrict their discretion over natural resource revenue when public approval is high and legislative opposition is strong. When rulers are safe in their seats, they can use public funds for long-run developmental strategies, rather than short-term political survival. When there is a strong legislative opposition, rulers can signal a desire to compromise by relinquishing control over resource revenue. These findings, illustrated by the case of Mexico, suggest that a combination of high support and strong opposition provides space to create long-term fiscal policy frameworks while generating short-term incentives to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, work on the natural resource curse thesis has extended to testing the effects of natural resources on public health. Focusing on the case of malaria, this paper examines the effects of the interaction between resource dependence and political institutions on malaria management. To be more specific, this work argues that in a resource-abundant state, democracy plays an active role in providing health goods to the general public and allocating government funds to public health. Democracies also combat corruption behaviors and diversify economies in a more effective way than their autocratic counterparts. By testing a series of interaction effects between natural resources and democracy, this paper finds a positive and robust effect of democracy on the reduction of malaria death rates in resource-rich states, based on data on malaria deaths during the period of 1990–2016. Resource-rich dictatorships demonstrated the worst performance in malaria control compared with resource-rich democracies and resource-poor democracies and dictatorships. This empirical evidence has policy implications for resource management, public health, and infectious disease control and prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development sociologists generally agree that states play a critical role in promoting, as well as in impeding, development. However, far less scholarly consensus exists on the precise historical processes that lead either to strong or to weak states. This paper investigates the factors that shape varied state capacities through a comparative-historical analysis of two similar countries with divergent development outcomes—Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon. In the 1960s, both countries had comparably large amounts of oil wealth, minimal state involvement in the economy, and low levels of development. In the 1970s, state capacity in Trinidad and Tobago dramatically increased and the country went on to achieve high levels of development. The Gabonese state, on the other hand, remained weak resulting in persistent low levels of development. This paper traces the divergence in state capacity to variations in working class mobilization, specifically the particular type of working class movements in each country and the political opportunity contexts. In doing so, this paper reveals new agents and contingencies producing state capacity that are not predominantly discussed in the contemporary development literature, and the meso-level mechanics by which these agents are successful or constrained in doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of natural resource abundance on social spending in dictatorships. Natural resources, particularly oil, provide authoritarian leaders with economic rents without widescale labor force participation. I argue that dependence on natural resource production thus reduces dictators' incentive to invest in human capital, which is reflected in lower levels of social spending. Using a panel dataset of authoritarian regimes between 1972 and 2008, I find that oil abundance leads to significantly lower levels of social spending by authoritarian governments. The negative effects are especially prominent concerning expenditures for public education and health: when an authoritarian country earns ten more dollars per capita from oil production, per capita spending on education and health decreases by approximately 1%. Extended analysis shows that the negative impact of oil on social spending is peculiar to authoritarian regimes; no impact of oil wealth on social expenditures is found among democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]