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This paper investigates the relationship between individuals' attitudes towards fairness and their views about tax compliance in developing countries. It argues that individuals' attitudes regarding fairness shape their views about paying taxes and their ethical stances regarding tax evasion. Using survey data for 18 major cities in Latin America, we find that individuals who are highly sensitive to fairness are less likely to consider paying taxes as a civic duty and more likely to justify tax evasion. These attitudes toward tax compliance are not inelastic. We also find evidence that individualst argues about reciprocity and merit mediate the effect of fairness on personal views about tax compliance. Finally, this paper shows that the heuristics people use to explain their position in the income distribution make them sensitive to inequality, and it affects their tax morale. These findings help us better understand the concept of reciprocity and provide valuable lessons on the urgent task of expanding fiscal capacity to promote economic growth and inequality in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue examines environmental governance, conceptualized as environmental protections, support for sustainable development, and the regulation of large-scale development projects. Through analysis of dynamics during the commodities super-cycle of the 2000s–2010s, contributors explore the multifaceted ways that societal actors interact with the state to support, oppose, or modify environmental governance, with a focus on communities impacted by export activities and economic elites who favor their expansion. Several papers seek to understand the governance of sectors—mining, oil, and soy. Others begin with natural areas threatened by development—urban wetlands and forests. As a collection, the papers reveal three commonalities that affect the extent to which environmental governance institutions address demands of impacted communities: (1) the question of whether a policymaking process takes place in reaction to mobilizing, or whether it proactively engages environmental questions as they pertain to local populations; (2) strategies by civil society, and above all impacted residents, to ensure the implementation of environmental policies; and (3) debates over knowledge, including community efforts to harness expertise and information to counter paradigms advanced by business actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between counterinsurgency and institution-building? When do wartime institutions persist once conflict has ended? Classic theories examine how war spurs new institutions within the central state, while extensive research on rebel governance examines how insurgent actors forge new rules to garner civilian compliance and cement control. However, the legacies of armed conflict for state institutions in the theater of war remain relatively neglected. We theorize the process of local counterinsurgent institution-building and the drivers of institutional endurance following counterinsurgency. By analyzing two local counterinsurgent institutions in Nicaragua and a shadow case drawn from Indonesia, we find that while state leaders may generate new institutional arrangements to elicit information and garner resources, institutional persistence is driven by local reappropriation as communities pursue their own postwar governance and development goals. Overall, this paper contributes a new understanding for the divergent postwar paths of local institutions generated amid counterinsurgency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research shows that domestic unrest, and especially violent conflict, raises political risk and discourages foreign direct investment (FDI). However, prior work primarily has studied private Western multinational corporations, not authoritarian China, the second largest overseas investor, which has both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). This paper investigates the effects of domestic conflict on overseas Chinese FDI. We first compare Chinese SOE and POE investments in host states facing political unrest. Next, we disaggregate political unrest, examining the effect of violent and non-violent campaigns on Chinese SOEs and POEs. We then disaggregate the sector of FDI inflows. Contrary to prior conflict studies, we find host states under political unrest, and specifically violent campaigns, attract Chinese SOEs no matter the economic sector, whereas POEs are more risk averse. Our findings show that Chinese SOEs favor higher risk investments, suggesting the need for theoretical nuance in the domestic conflict and FDI literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, agribusiness expansion in Argentina involved the exponential growth of pesticide use throughout the country. Pesticide exposure has become a widespread problem in rural areas and farming towns, but protests and conflicts about this issue are the exception rather than the norm. Why? Based on archival work, interviews, and ethnographic observations, in this paper, we scrutinize pesticide governance at the subnational scale to elucidate this puzzle, focusing on a) informal arrangements (face-to-face negotiations between pesticide users and people affected by them), b) juridical conflicts (lawsuits against farmers over exposure of people and crops to herbicides), and c) regulatory challenges (when rural populations and environmentalists push for local ordinances to curb pesticide exposure). We find that local cultural codes encourage informal agreements and that social inequalities prevent conflicts from arising in the public sphere. The interventions of social movements and civil society organizations (or lack thereof) and the mobilization of expertise also shape pesticide governance. Our analysis highlights that pesticide governance is context-dependent or situated, and informed by subtle but significant power asymmetries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To meet the growing global demand for minerals and new energy sources, governments in the Global South advance policy interventions to improve the unequal distribution of the cost and benefits of resource extraction. This paper explains the politics behind the implementation of the Closing Development Gaps (CDG) Plan, a new redistributive plan on behalf of Amazonian Indigenous peoples near the oil circuit in the Loreto region of Peru. It emphasizes the long-lasting impact of mobilizing strategies of indigenous organizations, which relayed critical information to policymakers about the claims both old and new of Indigenous peoples neighboring the oil circuit. It also draws attention to the permeability of state institutions, which allowed newer state agencies with distinct policy streams to advance new solutions to old problems. While the CDG Plan seeks to improve resource governance by focusing on infrastructure gaps (e.g., water and sanitation, electrification), it excludes the "political gaps" and the most contentious claims related to the environment that have moved Amazonian Indigenous peoples into struggle in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental governance in the mining sector, focusing on the case of CODELCO, a Chilean copper mining company. The study examines the factors that triggered changes in CSR strategies and the types of organizational changes that were introduced. The article argues that CSR strategies in the mining sector are influenced by a combination of national and subnational factors, including tightening environmental regulations, social conflicts, and reputational crises. The paper contributes to the literature on CSR and environmental governance by providing empirical evidence and proposing a three-level institutional framework to analyze the evolution of CSR. [Extracted from the article]

Under what conditions do incumbents support, tolerate, or try to rein in armed groups within their borders? The paper argues that incumbents strategize toward armed groups in ways that help them manage the ruling coalition and remain in power. I find that incumbents support armed groups in provinces where provincial politicians have defected from the ruling coalition to opposition parties, recruiting armed groups to deliver the province in national elections with fraud and violence and punish elite defectors. Where incumbents are not fighting to keep provinces in the ruling coalition, I show that they tolerate non-dissident groups that enjoy social contracts with local communities, and try to contain their dissident counterparts. Incumbents are likely to repress predatory armed groups, dissident and non-dissident alike. Doing so helps boost elite and mass support for incumbents and project central government power into the province. The argument was inductively built with comparative case studies from Nigeria and then evaluated in Kenya. The findings contribute to an important research agenda on government-armed group relationships and carry implications for security sector aid and reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development economics has long focused on growth patterns to explain countries' ability to catch up and forge ahead. We argue, however, that resilience to economic shrinking matters more. Using the examples of Brazil and Indonesia, we propose that a framework consisting of social capabilities—namely structural transformation, autonomy, and inclusion—can explain why Indonesia is more resilient to economic shrinking than Brazil and why the country is more likely to be successful in its catching-up process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the semi-peripheral-dependent market economies (DME) of East Central Europe (ECE), foreign investors are major contributors to economic growth and tend to establish low value-added operations. At the same time, they enjoy superior bargaining power over central governments. The domination of FDI constrains domestic agency in shaping economic outcomes, thereby locking DMEs into the semi-periphery. Moving to the sub-national level, this paper challenges these views by arguing that there is considerably more scope for local development agency in DMEs than the comparative political economy literature suggests. Moreover, FDI-led upgrading, defined as multinational companies engaging in high value-added activities, can take place at the local level even without the direct involvement of the state. The paper draws on fieldwork conducted in two formerly declining industrial cities in ECE (Cluj and Gdańsk) that have recently emerged as knowledge-intensive hubs targeted by high value-added FDI. The paper shows that FDI-led upgrading in Gdańsk occurred with the active contribution and cooperation of both local private and public economic actors, whereas in Cluj, upgrading took place with the contribution of local universities and through the forging of business links between foreign capital and local firms established by expatriates and local engineers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the lack of electoral accountability, China has built an expanding welfare system that is set to include most citizens. Why does China defy the conventional prediction of an exclusive authoritarian welfare state? This paper looks at the critical time when China first established its social security system in the 1990s and argues that the state adopts a “threat-driven strategy” where the redistribution effort varies with the expected collective action of economic losers. Analyzing an original granular county-level dataset of China’s laid-off workers and social security taxation, the paper finds that a group of newly emerged economic losers, precipitated by state policy, drives the local states’ efforts to redistribute. In particular, the number of laid-off state-owned enterprise workers explains 46% of the variations in social security collection among non-state-owned enterprises. Instrumental variable estimation, with legacy state-owned enterprises established in historical contingencies as the instrument for laid-off workers, shows consistent results. Further analysis on mechanisms demonstrates that layoffs lead to an increase in SOE protests, which in turn foster greater redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governance in China is often characterized as dualistic. On the one hand, the state invests in stable, rule-based institutions to support effective policy implementation. Yet the state also engages in sudden regulatory campaigns, overstepping its own laws to implement rapid changes in key sectors. Businesses in China have developed coping mechanisms to weather these uncertainties; they cultivate political ties or learn to accommodate unexpected disruptions. Yet in the sphere of environmental policy implementation, businesses across the spectrum are starting to complain that local environmental enforcement feels unpredictable, even arbitrary. What constitutes unpredictable enforcement in an environment already characterized by high levels of regulatory uncertainty? What changes in environmental enforcement are driving these complaints? Using original data on nine years of city-level enforcement measures, I show that both campaign-style and rule-based enforcement have been increasing in intensity and frequency since the mid-2010s. Through qualitative evidence, I show how these two approaches work at cross purposes, generating mixed signals on which strategies businesses should use to reduce pollution or to mitigate regulatory uncertainty. Data shows that this is a nationwide pattern, which explains why business—even experienced, well-connected businesses—are complaining about arbitrary state action. This study draws attention to emerging stress tests of China's dualistic governance, while delving into what these changes portend for state-business relations in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What determines the process and scale of socioeconomic reform—such as land redistribution—in a new political regime? While the existing literature on land reform has emphasized the role of coalitions and class dynamics, I argue that central-local dynamics play a prominent part in determining a regime's redistributive ambitions. Using the case of the National Land Reform Campaign (1950–1953) under the nascent Chinese Communist Regime as the empirical focus, I find that the subnational variation in redistributive outcomes was the result of central overseers tolerating policy ineffectiveness of some local agents, but intervening against others. This variation can be traced to the regime principal's discriminatory attitudes toward different types of local agents in the new revolutionary bureaucracy: centrally deployed versus locally embedded agents. Using a most similar case design involving two Chinese provinces (Zhejiang and Guangdong), I draw from primary and secondary historical sources to trace how the two provinces diverged in redistributive outcomes despite shared political and socioeconomic backgrounds. I suggest that historical contingencies such as wartime guerrilla mobilization and the post-1949 military occupation environment shaped the initial composition of regime agents, leading to the tolerance of centrally deployed agents in Zhejiang, and sanctions toward locally embedded agents in Guangdong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although scholars often portray Mexico as caught in the "middle-income trap," this description obscures important subnational variation in patterns of economic development. We leverage this variation by examining the case of Querétaro, a state with high levels of structural transformation and economic growth since the 1980s. We reconstruct the historical trajectory of its two leading industries, automotive and aerospace. We observe that while both have cumulatively delivered real developmental gains, each also exhibits a complex mix of strengths and weaknesses. We further find that these industries' advancements and hindrances over time appear closely related to the kinds of "partial" coalitions — groups of actors from the state, private firms, and civil society organizations such as labor unions — which participate in industry-level decision-making. Both industries saw periods of "upgrading" when the partial coalitions supporting them were expanding their cognitive diversity while avoiding gross imbalances in the distribution of power among their members. They likewise experienced periods of stagnation when either of those coalition conditions underwent major change. These findings suggest that debates on escaping the middle-income trap should consider how changes in partial political coalitions affect policy models and options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a novel conceptualization and dataset of post-neoliberal populism in contemporary Latin America and Eastern Europe. By drawing insights from structuralist theories, which understood populism as historically grounded in political economy developments, I critique dominant minimal definitions and propose a synthetic conceptual alternative for the analysis of multidimensional and dynamic challengers of the watershed neoliberal revolutions that both regions have undergone since the late twentieth century. To this end, I disaggregate populism's key dimensions of anti-establishment discourse, illiberal ideology, and strategic organization into functionally interactive attributes; justify post-neoliberal populism as a family resemblance category; and develop a roadmap for case selection and measurement. I then illustrate the empirical validity and theoretical relevance of my approach by assessing the magnitude of post-neoliberal populism in 198 national-level elections in 33 Latin American and Eastern European democracies and by identifying the decline of the traditional Left as its correlate in both regions. By focusing on conceptual unity and cross-regional parallels, the article demonstrates that, contrary to conventional misconceptions, a family resemblance categorization of contemporary populism not only facilitates empirically rigorous research, but also stimulates mid-range theorizing at the intersection of intra-regional specificity and more general historicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Semi-peripheral economies are reliant on foreign capital for innovation and upgrading into higher-value-added economic activities. This characteristic of dependent development is coupled with unreliable government support for domestic businesses, resulting in fragmented state-business ties. How then did a local electrical vehicle (EV) battery startup InoBat manage to build an upgrading alliance in Slovakia and capitalise on the accelerating automotive shift to electromobility despite these barriers being present in the semi-peripheral economy of Slovakia? By developing a network-based analytical approach and using the unlikely case study of InoBat, this paper argues that developmental entrepreneurship, the mobilisation of private sector resources by venture capital or a large domestic firm, and support by private-public institutions were key determinants for the emergence of the InoBat upgrading alliance. The findings underline that local firms can also be the drivers of upgrading efforts even in the absence of consistent government support and the heavy presence of large transnational corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do voters in ethnically polarized settings evaluate coethnic candidates in an environment of hybrid provision of public goods, especially where such hybrid provision includes links to criminal actors? In numerous urban settings around the world, local public goods provision involves a complex mix of private vendors, state services, and criminal actors. This paper explores how voters in Karachi, Pakistan evaluate candidates making distinct claims to water provision. We present findings from a survey experiment of over 2000 Karachi residents surveyed in 2021–2022. We find that while voters generally prefer coethnic candidates regardless of their ability to provide water, a non-coethnic candidate’s access to the state water bureaucracy can decrease the coethnic advantage and increase the credibility of a non-coethnic candidate. This is particularly the case among voters least satisfied with their water supply and most reliant on private sources of water. However, contrary to literature that finds that criminality can signal competence or the likelihood of goods and services being directed to coethnics, ties to the illegal water mafia do not offer either coethnic or non-coethnic candidates any additional advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many Latin American countries, the state is to inform communities about proposed large-scale development that affects them, often in a public hearing on the environmental impact study (estudio de impacto ambiental, EIA). This article explores the role of the EIA public hearing in environmental governance, specifically in terms of local community participation in extractives. Analysis of nine mining and hydrocarbon conflicts in Colombia and Peru reveals that sometimes the public hearing is a space for project opponents alone to participate intensively, with a focus on altering development outcomes; in other cases, activists and project supporters compete at hearings; and, finally, some communities eschew the hearing entirely. The study points to two factors to explain this variation: first, whether the public hearing is a mandatory stage in environmental licensing, and second, the cohesion of impacted communities. Running counter to existing criticisms of the structures that govern public hearings in Colombian environmental licensing, the article finds that the hurdle for Colombian communities of requesting the hearing has contributed to effective organizing by movements opposed to large-scale development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subnational implementation of forest protection legislation is an important aspect of forest governance. In this article, I explore how competing interests regarding production and conservation affect forest protection at the local level in the Argentine Chaco Forest, which represents 60 percent of the Chaco Americano, the second largest forest in South America. Employing original and administrative data, I assess whether deforestation is associated with large producers, who seek to expand soy cultivation into forestlands, and the presence of indigenous communities, who favor forest protection. Quantitative analysis of the departments in the Chaco region suggests that overall deforestation is associated with soy cultivation and past deforestation. In contrast, forest loss in protected areas, which should be zero but represents almost half of total deforestation during the studied period, is positively associated with the number of indigenous communities in the department, the share of protected forestlands, the power of large producers, and past deforestation. Qualitative analysis suggests that lands inhabited by indigenous communities were generally granted protected status, as requested by national legislation and consistent with demands of indigenous groups and their allies. Yet, this protected status has been watered down by permissive regulations and the overall lax enforcement of forest protection legislation, which were in turn driven by large producers invested in cropland expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wetlands provide ecosystem services such as flood protection, improved water quality, and wildlife habitat, but are under attack in urban land-use conflicts in the Global South. This article presents two cases of local wetlands governance conflicts in Colombia (Humedal la Conejera, Bogotá, Cundinamarca) and Argentina (Laguna de Rocha, Esteban Echeverría, Gran Buenos Aires) to illustrate divergent pathways toward improved environmental governance via citizen pressures: the collaborative method (Bogotá) and the adversarial method (Buenos Aires). While existing scholarship on citizen-led regulation stresses the importance of collaboration between community organizations and the state, this article argues that adversarial tactics are also a key component of environmental governance. In both cases, citizen-led pressures led to increased enforcement of regulatory measures to restore wetlands and gain protected-area status. Citizen-led governance involved adversarial strategies such as marches, litigation, and shaming and blaming in the media, as well as collaborative strategies such as creating broad-based educational forums, working inside city government, and partnering directly with public institutions to set new policies. Against the backdrop of extensive collusion between elected officials and land developers, citizen-led subnational environmental governance has become the regulatory regime of last resort in urban Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research suggests that people concerned about corruption use elections to punish corrupt incumbents. I argue that when people grow concerned with corruption, they may turn to exit rather than voice, using emigration to escape corruption. Highly educated citizens in particular, who are most informed about corruption and hold valuable human capital, likely see exit as attractive in the face of persistent corruption. Using a wealth of micro-level data on potential emigration, I show that when people perceive widespread corruption, they are more likely to have taken concrete steps to emigrate. Advanced degree holders are much more likely to have prepared to emigrate in response to corruption. I also show that corruption-concerned potential emigrants choose less corrupt destination countries and are less likely to have faith, and participate, in electoral institutions. My argument and findings hold implications for the corruption literature and generate new questions about the relationship between emigration and accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What motivates private firms' willingness to invest in green technologies and environmentally friendly operations? Some emphasize enhanced government regulation and enforcement, while others point to the greater potential of societal pressure. In this study, we use a survey experiment with more than 10,000 firms in Vietnam to test which type of stakeholder pressure has the strongest impact on domestic and foreign business leaders' intention to invest in green operations. We find that the effectiveness of stakeholder pressure is conditioned by the firms' target markets. Foreign investors are more susceptible than domestic firms to intensive regulatory pressure. Accounting for export orientation, however, we find that the most amenable policy targets for regulatory pressure are foreign firms aiming to sell in the Vietnamese domestic market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some countries escape the political resource curse while others do not? Most scholars argue that avoiding the claimed anti-democratic effects of natural resources, especially oil, largely depends on the quality of pre-existing political institutions and/or the effectiveness of contemporary resource management institutions. Drawing on the most-likely case of Timor-Leste, one of the world's most oil-dependent countries that nevertheless successfully consolidated democracy, we challenge these dominant theories and highlight new important factors to consider. We show that Timor-Leste did not avoid the curse because of good pre-existing political institutions, good natural resource governance institutions, or an otherwise favorable environment for democracy. Instead, we find that the ideological beliefs of major political actors, their strong popular legitimacy, the absence of a hegemonic actor among them, as well as the approaches of external actors, have produced a consolidated democracy despite strong incentives for the development of authoritarianism. These findings highlight the importance of ideology and agency, of the composition of independence movements, and of constructive international engagement, in particular at critical historical junctures. In short, even countries facing serious political and economic challenges can avoid the political resource curse, and both scholars and policymakers should consider a broader approach to the phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governmental fiscal transfers can be important tools for redistributing resources and enhancing public services in areas with limited local resources. Meanwhile, politicians can use fiscal transfers to build patronage networks, weaken opposition candidates, or engage in rent-seeking. An understudied feature of governmental transfers is that local governments can become fiscally dependent on higher-level government. This dependence might lead local officials to favor the priorities of higher-level government while compromising responsiveness to local residents. Using panel data from Chinese villages, I demonstrate that when villages become more dependent on fiscal transfers from townships, they provide fewer public goods to villagers, pay more wages to village elites, and have stronger incentives to enforce the policies favored by higher-level governments. The results also suggest that fiscal transfers will not undermine local representation when electoral competition for village leadership positions exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aid effectiveness is widely understood to suffer when multiple donors operate in the same space, but recent studies indicate benefits of fragmentation. We posit that these mixed findings may reflect differences across aid sectors — and also show how the level of implementation can condition the interpretation of results. Cross-national time-series analysis of 152 countries implies aid fragmentation can promote child survival and improve governance. However, analysis of subnational variation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria suggests the presence of more donors is associated with worse health outcomes, but better governance outcomes. Having more donors in a locality may thus be beneficial when they are working to improve the systems through which policies are implemented, but harmful if they target policy outcomes directly. A survey of Nigerian civil servants suggests potential mechanisms: fragmentation in health aid may lead to internal "brain drain" and pressure to alter projects, whereas diversity in governance aid might promote meritocratic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]