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This paper discusses aspects of certain notions such as "critique" and "taste" that bring together and distance authors of British philosophy, such as Shaftesbury and Hume, on the one hand, and Kantian critical philosophy, on the other hand. It also discusses how Schiller's notion of formation of sensibility blurs the limits of the Kantian distinction between taste and morals, resuming elements of the British notion of «taste». [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ultimate goal of this paper is to make it emerge the merit, pertinence and urgency of Kant's aesthetic theory, its beauty, to our art and our time. There will be, first, a presentation of the Kantian judgment of taste as narrowly connected with pleasure, disinterest, and contemplation, a description of Kant's posterity hostile attitude towards a conception of beauty linked with contemplative and disinterested pleasure, and an explanation of the close relation between the characterization of the judgment of taste as an aesthetic and universally valid a priori judgment and the entire Kantian project; then, there will be a dive into the meaning and sense of the contemplation, disinterestedness, and pleasure that are inherent to the aesthetic experience of beauty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a note in Religion within the limits of reason alone (1793), Kant comments Schiller's utterance, contained in On grace and dignity (1793), as having associated the aesthetic element (grace) to the purely moral element (dignity). However, such an approach is impracticable due to the dignity of the law. From other texts by Schiller, such as the fragment of the Lectures on aesthetics (1792-3), On the sublime (1793), On the usefulness of moral customs aesthetic (1793) and Letters on the aesthetic education of man (1795) one can show that he does not thought the interaction between grace and dignity in the form it was imputed him by Kant. Without attracting to itself the aesthetic element (grace), in Schiller's understanding the dignity does not reject it, in the face of it should not leave involve itself in the extremes of the human condition, to the savage and the barbarian. We demonstrate this by thematising the notions of allocation and disinterested affection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the brief Methodology of taste that closes the Critique of aesthetic judgment (§ 60), in order to examine the Kantian theory of the aesthetical origin of legal sociability, which allegedly gave rise to the first political body in the ancient Greece. Insofar as both conditions of universal feeling of sympathy and intimate and universal communication are determinants for the sociability appropriate to the man, they constitute, in our opinion, the basis for every future culture of method. Moreover, they show that the manner (Manier) or aesthetical mode of exposure prepares and leads to the culture of a logical method (Methodus), where the unity of discourse depends on universal and objective principles and not merely on subjective feelings. We want to stress especially that the question of method is indissoluble in Kant of a long process of communitarian education concerning social customs, humaniora culture and juridical and political harmony, which gives priority to the interests of men and to the cosmic sense of philosophy with regard to monopolies of schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]