Search

Research Summary: This paper develops an inheritance theory explaining the diffusion and persistence of detrimental management practice. Received wisdom, in both management theory and practice, would suggest that a practice that lowers the life expectancy of adopting firms, over time, will vanish because it puts those firms at a competitive disadvantage. In this paper, I challenge this view. I develop a conceptual model that details how a practice that lowers the survival chances of adopting organizations may still spread and continue to exist across a population of firms. I propose that a combination of three basic conditions is sufficient to bring about this phenomenon: if the practice is somehow associated with success, if there exists causal ambiguity, and if the rate of its diffusion is high compared with the rate at which it accelerates firms’ demise, the practice may continue to thrive and become a widespread and persistent feature in an industry. A pivotal conceptual insight is that the endurance of particular management practices and strategies is not merely a corollary of the competitiveness of the organizations that use them but that they have fitness levels of their own. Managerial Summary: All organizations have “best practices”: habits that they have picked up in the past or mimicked from others. Managers often believe that these must be the best ways of doing things, because otherwise market forces would have eliminated them. The theory in the paper explains why this belief may be wrong. Some enduring practices may be harmful without managers realizing it because it is not necessarily the most optimal practices that survive (just like harmful viruses persist in nature). As a corollary, the paper discusses how the identification and cessation of detrimental practices can form a new source of and way to understand innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: We revisit Zuckerman's (1999) "The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount," which theorizes that when organizations are recognized as legitimate players in a category, they perform better. A replication exercise fails to reproduce two of three sets of results. Assisted by data shared by the original author, we find evidence that the inconsistency is due to a coding error in the original and differences between analyst data sets. We illustrate the use of epistemic maps and evaluate the theory's predictive power across a broad set of plausible empirical assumptions and also for a subsequent time period. The results are not robust. We conclude that these data provide little evidence to support strategic recommendations. Challenges and remedies for replication are discussed. Managerial Summary: This paper replicates a 1999 study "The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy Discount" (Zuckerman, 1999). A key implication of the 1999 study is that firms should actively seek to be covered by analysts who specialize in their industries, and that a failure to be covered by analysts who are industry specialists will lead to lower capital market valuations. Our replication exercise indicates that there is insufficient evidence to recommend actively managing coverage along this dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: I conducted a nationwide replication of Baum and Mezias' (1992) pioneering single-market study of localized competition by pooling the populations of 90 urban U.S. hotel markets. Consistent with Baum and Mezias' three hypotheses, I demonstrate a negative market-level effect on survival duration of size-based, geographic-based, and price-based localized competition. When analyzing submarket 'windows,' I found support for size-based and geographic-based localized competition. In contrast, Baum and Mezias find support for only size-based localized competition at the market level, but for all three forms of localized competition when analyzing submarket windows. I extend their analysis by (1) using standardized measures of localized competition, and (2) showing separate results for key subpopulations. I conclude that there are indeed firm-level benefits of avoiding localized competition. Managerial summary: This paper demonstrates that-at a broad level of analysis such as a city-hotels are more likely to survive if there are fewer other properties (1) in their geographical vicinity, (2) of similar size, and (3) at their price point. Thus, prospective owners should be leery of location in the more crowded niches even if these may be plausibly more lucrative for some. Sparsely populated niches appear to be less risky on average. When we study this phenomenon within a narrower geographic scope such as a part of the city, the least crowded niches in terms of geography, price or size no longer appear to provide benefits in terms of survival. Thus, it is possible that only the most sparsely populated niches citywide improve a hotel's likelihood of survival. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: We inductively examine how the careers of employee entrepreneurs unfold, uncovering the role of motives and attribution for failure. Founders expressing organizational misalignment motives for leaving established organizations engaged in "venture crafting" whereby they actively sought to build well‐functioning organizations. They built successful initial ventures and careers. Founders lacking organizational misalignment motives generally founded initial ventures that failed: however, those making internal attributions altered their behaviors and built successful careers; in contrast, founders making external attributions continued founding unsuccessful ventures. These findings suggest that building organizational capabilities—and not merely inheriting capabilities from existing organizations—is a cornerstone of building successful entrepreneurial careers. Our findings are based on detailed career history and archival data on employee entrepreneurs in the disk‐drive industry. Managerial Summary: Our study follows careers of individuals leaving employment to create ventures, providing insights for entrepreneurs and managers. Though entrepreneurs often choose to focus solely on building a stellar product, our study underscores the importance of crafting well‐functioning organizations for career and venture success. Moreover, in case where initial ventures fail, founders who make internal attribution generate a "second chance" at success, whether as serial entrepreneurs or by returning to paid employment. Those who attribute failure to external factors, however, repeat their mistakes. For managers, our study reveals that the genesis of successful entrepreneurial careers is rooted in organizational deficiencies that prevent talented employees from thriving as intrapreneurs. The venture crafters typically left their jobs only after attempts to amend these issues were unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the central explanations of the high failure rates of de novo entrants is the liability of smallness. As a corollary, most prior literature has suggested that firms should experience survival benefits from growth. In this paper, we argue that survival benefits need to be balanced against the potential cost of rapid growth, and they are contingent upon the structure of the environment. We predict a curvilinear relationship between an entrant's growth rate and failure, and argue that the relationship is contingent upon the local agglomeration of economic activity and the local structure of competition. We test and find support for our predictions using firm-level longitudinal data of all de novo entrants into the Canadian manufacturing sector between 1984 and 1998. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses multilevel discourse analysis to advance strategic management research, focusing on the question of why firms fail in the face of radical technological change. Answering this question requires addressing how customers develop their interpretations and evaluation criteria of the new technology. This interpretive process occurs through discussions with other market participants. Firms can influence customers' interpretations through the use of language and visual images--what we call "discursive strategies." Firms can fail to navigate technological disruptions because their discursive strategies do not communicate effectively with customers. Yet, methodological limitations have restricted the study of discursive strategies. We draw on multilevel discourse analysis and apply this method to explain why IBM outperformed Remington Rand in the early insurance market for computers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Through a longitudinal study of the product development portfolios of 457 US‐based firms in the biotechnology industry, we investigate how prolific inventors shape a firm's innovative direction following product development failure. Contrary to received wisdom, we argue and demonstrate that an increase in the number of prolific inventors is associated with a decrease in firm propensity to pursue novel product innovation following such failure. We further find that the presence of prolific inventors with greater collaborative strength and longer tenure negatively moderate the positive relationship between failure and the pursuit of novel product development. We discuss the implications of our results for research on learning from failure and strategic human capital. Managerial Summary: In case of adverse events such as product development failure, managers often rely on the firm's prolific inventors to help the firm learn from failure. Our study shows that there are limits to this approach. While prolific inventors increase firm propensity for novel product development, such propensity is significantly decreased following product failure. We further establish that the presence of prolific inventors with greater collaborative strength and long tenures is especially likely to reduce firms' pursuit of novel products, while the presence of those with low collaborative strength and tenure tend to increase this propensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Do firms respond to tougher competition by searching for completely new technological solutions (exploration), or do they work to defend their position by improving current technologies (exploitation)? Considering the different times to fruition for exploration versus exploitation, in the presence of heightened competition, we argue that firms might not be able to wait for the benefits of technological exploration to materialize. With a panel data set of U.S. manufacturing firms, we show that tougher competition, due to import penetration, leads to a decrease in technological exploration and an increase in technological exploitation. These effects are heterogeneous across industries, firms, and time. To obtain exogenous variation in competition we rely on both instrumental variable regressions and a difference‐in‐differences design exploiting large changes in import tariffs. Managerial Summary: A firm's R&D strategy is one of the fundamental determinants of success or failure when responding to competitive threats. In this study, we examine how firms change the knowledge sources used in their R&D efforts in response to substantial increases in import penetration in their domestic market. We find that in the years that immediately follow an increase in import penetration, firms tend to rely more on familiar knowledge in the development of innovations and less on knowledge sources that were not previously used. This switch in R&D strategy also appears to be temporary (reversed in later years), and it is positively associated with an increased likelihood of survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: This article examines the role of competitive shocks in creating opportunities for new firm foundings. I argue that the sudden dissolution of rival firms may release resources that create opportunities for firm formation, particularly among employees facing impediments to capturing value in their current organizations. Analyzing microdata from the legal services industry, I use unexpected deaths of solo-practicing attorneys as quasi-exogenous sources of rival dissolution. Results indicate that these shocks increase the odds of founding by about 30%, with stronger effects among attorneys with weaker social connections or higher competition for promotion. The article thus highlights the role that founders play in reallocating dissolved rivals' resources while demonstrating that founding may be an important outlet for 'blocked' employees to capture value from opportunities. Managerial summary: This article finds that the shutdown and dissolution of a rival organization may spur employees to found new firms. As a consequence, managers may find it valuable to pay attention to employees' turnover intentions following the dissolution of a rival. Findings suggest that employees who are having trouble advancing in the firm may be the most likely to found a new organization when a rival dissolves, so managers may want to focus retention efforts on these individuals. To the extent that managers wish to capture customers, employees, and other resources that were formerly attached to a dissolved rival, managers may wish to be aware that they could be in competition with their own employees for these resources and opportunities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: Executives in declining firms may engage in ship-jumping behavior (i.e., voluntarily move to new employers before the failure occurs) to avoid the stigma of failure. However, it is unclear how executives decide whether or not to jump ship. Building on a network embeddedness perspective, we highlight how three network-based indicators (i.e., executive social capital, the social capital of other peers in the declining firm, and the declining firm's alliance network) influence the executive-level ship-jumping decision by shaping its benefits and opportunity costs. Using data from executives at failing firms in China, we find support for our hypothesized relationships. Our research provides important insight into the network mechanisms driving the ship-jumping decision. Managerial summary: Executives at failing firms have a choice: stay and attempt to rescue the firm from failure or exit and avoid the stigma of the failure (i.e., jump ship). Yet, little is known about what factors affect this choice. We propose that social capital plays an important role in the decision. Our evidence from specially treated (* ST) public firms in China finds that ship jumping is lowest at low and high values of social capital, and highest at moderate levels of social capital (an inverted U-shaped relationship). In addition, higher levels of peer social capital (in the declining firm) as well as a well-established firm-level alliance network discourage the ship-jumping choice. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: Combining the concept of resource relatedness with the economic notion of sunk costs, we assess how the potential for resource redeployment affects market entry and exit by multi-business firms. If the performance of a new business falls below expectations, a diversified firm may be able to redeploy its resources back into related businesses. In effect, relatedness reduces the sunk costs associated with a new business, which facilitates exit. This, in turn, has implications for entry: By decreasing the cost of failure, the potential for redeployment justifies the undertaking of riskier entries and greater experimentation. These dynamic benefits of relatedness are distinct from standard notions of 'synergy.' To show support for this idea, we provide a mathematical model, descriptive data, and company examples. Managerial summary: The ability to redeploy resources inside the firm reduces the cost of entry 'mistakes.' If a new business turns out to have poor profitability, the ability to redeploy more of its resources back into the firm's other businesses allows recycling of investment and can speed up the retreat. This reduces not only the cost of exit, but also the cost of entry. Managers should therefore be more willing to experiment and take risks in developing businesses that are more related to the firm's existing businesses, whereas if redeployment is likely to be difficult, managers should be cautious about entering. New businesses should be chosen in ways that facilitate redeployment, and managers should consider the implications of redeployment when setting the performance thresholds that justify entry and exit. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: R&D-based exploration and exploitation are necessary in order for firms to have sustainable competitive advantage. Yet, transitioning between these orthogonal types of R&D is considered profound organizational change. Building on recent research showing that compact, significant changes in R&D expenditure is an antecedent to the transition between explorative and exploitative R&D, I show that this leap between exploration and exploitation is quite hazardous. The magnitude of changes in R&D expenditure, whether increases or decreases, is positively associated with organizational failure. Firms maintaining higher levels of absorptive capacity are more capable of surviving the leap from R&D-based exploitation to exploration, and firms that do not use reductions in R&D expenditure to manipulate short-term earnings performance are more likely to survive the leap from exploration to exploitation. Managerial summary: In order to survive and thrive, innovative companies must be able to exploit their existing competencies, and to explore for new ones once those current competencies decline in value. However, transiting from one form of innovation to the other is difficult because the skills required to explore are fundamentally opposed to those required to exploit. In this article, I describe how difficult this leap between exploration and exploitation can be. I show that the move between R&D-based exploration and exploitation is related to organizational failure. In addition, firms that are superior learners are more likely to survive the leap from exploitation to exploration, and firms that are not cutting R&D expenditure to manipulate earnings are more likely to survive the leap from exploration to exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research summary: Entrepreneurial start-ups suffer high rates of business failure. Previous research on entrepreneurial failure has focused on two kinds of explanations: statistical and psychological. Statistical explanations attribute excess entry to random errors made by boundedly rational entrepreneurs attempting to estimate business opportunities in risky markets. Psychological explanations focus on entrepreneurial overconfidence and competition neglect. These explanations emerged independently and have not been tested or compared in the same study. In this experimental study, we distinguish entrepreneurial markets from other types of markets and test statistical and psychological hypotheses for all market types. We find that excess entry is significantly greater in small, risky markets than in other market types, and that confidence levels account for excess entry, over and above the effects of unbiased statistical errors. Managerial summary: How can we explain the fact that most entrepreneurial ventures fail within five years? Market risk, inadequate capital and inexperienced management certainly play a role. However, from an economic point of view, it seems odd that inexperienced, under-funded people continue to engage in risky behavior that is widely known to fail. We conducted experiments that tested two explanations of entrepreneurial failure. The first explanation - the statistical hypothesis - argues that entrepreneurship involves high uncertainty, so random errors are inevitable and can produce excess entry (or under-entry). The second explanation - the psychological hypothesis - says that entrepreneurs' mistakes are not random but skewed heavily toward excess entry; hence, their decisions are distorted by psychological factors such as overconfidence. Our experiments found support for both of these explanations. Random errors under uncertainty explained 60% of the excess entry in our experiments. However, the overconfidence hypothesis correctly predicted that excess entry exceeds under-entry, and our psychological measures of overconfidence found support in the data. We also found that the markets that most often attract entrepreneurial investment - emerging markets with high uncertainty - were the markets most conducive to excess entry, due to a combination of psychological and market factors. Hence, we conclude that potential entrepreneurs should pay less attention to their own abilities and aspirations, and more attention to the external realities of competition in the marketplace. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although critical resource providers offer ample access benefits to deficient firms, dependence on these resource providers is burdensome because dependency places deficient firms into a vulnerable position, especially when the dependency is asymmetric. Thus, we ask: Is it better to balance dependence among critical resource providers or asymmetrically depend on one if there is more than one resource provider? We use a unique context of the internet industry where satellite internet firms depend on portals that provide Web traffic and find that asymmetric dependence on portals increases the likelihood of failure, but market leaders suffer less from asymmetric dependence, while satellite internet firms with higher dependence on portals suffer more from asymmetric dependence. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using novel survey data on technology licensing, we report the first empirical evidence linking the three main sources of failure emphasized in the market design literature (lack of market thickness, congestion, lack of market safety) to deal outcomes. We disaggregate the licensing process into three stages and find that, although lack of market thickness and deal failure are correlated in the first stage, they are not in the latter stages, underscoring the bilateral monopoly conditions under which negotiations over intellectual property often occur. In contrast, market safety is only salient in the final stage. Several commonly referenced bargaining frictions (congestion) are salient, particularly in the second stage. Also, universities and firms differ in the stage during which they are most likely to experience deal failure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]