Search

The paper considers the purposes and evolution of Interpretation Acts, including the following points: •  how, as default law, they inform and interact with other legislation; •  their scope as, and interaction with other, interpretation law (including links with interpretation legislation in related jurisdictions); •  ways they can stop being, or fail to be, great law (that is, law that is accessible, fit for purpose, and constitutionally sound); •  ways policy-makers and drafters can meet the challenges (in Te Reo Māori: ngā wero) of making them, and all the other law that interacts with them, great law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It's main focus is how legislated examples can, and should, feature in statutory interpretation. But it also addresses: (i) whether a drafter can rely on a legislated example to solve significant problems in the provision the operation of which the example illustrates; and (ii) the risks a drafter faces in trying to interpret authoritatively an enactment that he or she has drafted. Risks of that kind arise even if the drafter's life-long involvement with (‘zeal for’) statute law in general, and special knowledge of the relevant Act in particular, means that his or her views deserve the greatest of respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an outline of the New Zealand Court of Appeal's decision in Tyler v. Attorney-General. Ways and grounds in granting community wage; Application for an emergency hardship benefit; Usage of the term 'marginal notes.'