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Over the period under consideration, the RF Ministry of Finance released1 the Main Directions of Tax Policy for 2016 and the Planning Period 2017-2018 (hereinafter – Main Directions), where it is stated that no increase in the tax load on the economy is intended, and measures are envisages which, in the opinion of the document’s authors, will be designed to boost Russia’s economic development. The prospects for business development in Russia were also the main theme of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) (18-20 June 2015).

This paper explores the relationship between financial conditions and real economic activity in the euro area as a whole and for Greece in particular. We use a financial conditions index (see Angelopoulou et al., 2014) which is constructed using a wide range of prices, quantities, spreads and survey data in line with theory. We update the indices and use them within a VAR framework to estimate the potential impact of the TLTROs on aspects of economic activity. Our results suggest that financial conditions do have a significant effect on economic activity and thus the TLTROs, to the extent that they are designed to improve financial conditions, will provide a boost to the real economy.

The paper investigates quantitatively the economic implications of the various stabilization and adjustment policies, adopted by the Greek government in the period 2008-2013, to deal with the unsustainable public finances. To this end a static computable general equilibrium model is presented, that is capable of simulating the main macroeconomic and especially distributional aspects of the Greek crisis that has afflicted the country since 2008. The model is designed to explore in a comparative static manner the outcomes of different policies, and has considerable sectoral and distributional detail. The model is fitted to a 2004 social accounting matrix that includes much detail about the relevant economic actors. Policy simulations are made under a closure rule that seems to fit the Greek economy during the crisis. Simulations of the large shocks that have affected Greece between 2008-2013 indicate that the model reproduces the main outcomes of the economy during the implementation of the policy package adopted during the crisis, and indicates that the package adopted has been very regressive. The policy simulations suggest that the mixture of policies adopted during the stabilization programme by the Greek government has resulted in a large GDP decrease, a large employment decline, and as a painful consequence, a substantial decrease in the public sector deficit, but at the cost of very large decreases in private real incomes and an even larger increase in income inequality. It remains to be seen whether there can be other policy packages that can achieve similar public sector deficit reductions without the adverse income and distributional implications

We use high-frequency intraday interest rate data to measure euro area monetary policy shocks on the days of ECB interest rate announcements between 2002 and 2013. In line with Gürkaynak et al. (2005), we look at monetary policy shocks along two time dimensions: one related to the current level of short-term interest rates and a second related to expectations for the future path of these rates. We undertake regression analysis in order to determine the impact of monetary policy shocks on euro-denominated financial asset prices and confirm that shocks related to the future path of monetary policy are an important driver, particularly for longer-term bond yields. We find that this relationship has changed for certain asset classes since the onset of the crisis, notably the sovereign bonds of stressed euro area countries. These findings highlight the changed nature of the monetary policy transmission mechanism for some euro area countries during the sovereign debt crisis.

The period under review saw events that will have a signifi cant eff ect on Russia’s economic policies in the near term: Russia imposed a prepayment regime on natural gas supplies to Ukraine and signed an agreement on the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) embracing Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The discussion on dividend taxation initiated by the Ministry of Finance of Russia continued, as well as the discussion on restoration of the right of the Investigative Commitiee of the Russian Federation (IC of Russia) to initiate at its own discretion criminal cases related to violations of the tax legisltion was resumed.

In recent years, the number of theoretical models on sovereign default exploded. I take a step back and investigate how good our current theoretical understanding of real world sovereign debt crisis really is. This is done by deriving implications that are hard wired into our models and comparing the evolution of nearly 20 sovereign debt crises in Latin America with them. I find that the available models capture aspects of virtually all crises, yet there are only a few crisis that are fully consistent with the available models.

In this paper we develop a comprehensive short-term fiscal forecasting system of use for the real-time monitoring of the Spanish government’s borrowing requirement. Spain has been at the centre of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, not least because of sizeable failures in meeting public deficit targets. The system comprises a suite of models, with different levels of disaggregation (bottom-up vs top-down; general government vs sub-sectors), which are suitable for the automatic processing of the large amount of monthly/quarterly fiscal data currently published by the Spanish statistical authorities. Our tools are instrumental in the ex-ante detection of risks to official projections, and can thus help reduce the ex-post reputational costs of budgetary slippage. On the basis of our results, we discuss how official monitoring bodies could expand, on one hand, their toolkit to evaluate regular adherence to targets (moving beyond a legalistic approach) and, on the other, their communication policies as regards sources of risks to (ex-ante) compliance with budgetary targets.

This paper proposes tests of policy ineffectiveness in the context of macroeconometric rational expectations models. It is assumed that there is a policy intervention that takes the form of changes in the parameters of a policy rule, and that there are sufficient observations before and after the intervention. The test is based on the difference between the realisations of the outcome variable of interest and counterfactuals based on no policy intervention, using only the pre-intervention parameter estimates, and in consequence the Lucas Critique does not apply. The paper develops tests of policy ineffectiveness for a full structural model, with and without exogenous, policy or non-policy, variables. Asymptotic distributions of the proposed tests are derived both when the post intervention sample is fixed as the pre-intervention sample expands, and when both samples rise jointly but at different rates. The performance of the test is illustrated by a simulated policy analysis of a three equation New Keynesian Model, which shows that the test size is correct but the power may be low unless the model includes exogenous variables, or if the policy intervention changes the steady states, such as the inflation target.

In the period under review, the Government of the Russian Federation has confirmed its position which consists in the fact that in the next few years it will not change the existing rules of taxation. At the same ?? me, the business has become more active in promo?? on of proposals to reduce a tax load: the platform of the All-Russia People’s Front, a new political alliance is actively used for putting forward initiatives as regards tax holidays, privileges are proposed to financial market participants within the frameworks of realization of the RF Government’s idea to create the MFC in the territory of the Russian Federation and initiatives on adjustment of the existing scheme of taxation in the oil industry are voiced 1. In our opinion, at present it is important to be cautious in promotion and realization of any financial initiatives as the economy of the Russian Federation has to go through an inevitable stage of market adaptation and losses of budget revenues are as undesirable as an increase in the tax burden.

The paper provides an overview of the sovereign debt crisis. I first consider the build-up of the crisis.I then discuss policy choices when a financial crisis erupts and assess the adjustment processes in the crisis countries, including alternatives to policies of austerity. Finally I take up institutional improvements that can help in resolving the current crisis and avoiding a future one. These include the banking union and the strengthened Stability and Growth Pact and related institutional rules. Current high levels of public and private debt together with still weak bank balance sheets are a major unsolved problem.

After entering the EU in 1986, Portugal benefited from low interest rates and some growth momentum. However, the difficulty in taming fiscal imbalances, the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, the use of extraordinary fiscal measures, coupled with the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis led to a fiscal debacle and to an international financial rescue in 2011. We briefly review here those developments.

The Chinese government has been pursuing economic growth under the guidance of "growth is a hard principle". In the context of the Chinese political and economic governance system, local governments have employed the overtaking strategy (placing primary emphasis on the development of capital and technology-intensive industries) and the real estate development strategy to push for economic growth and fiscal revenue growth. This has led to a repressed labor share and an elevated capital and government share in primary and secondary income distribution structure. Using the empirical strategy of Acemoglu et al. (2003), we confirm that the development strategies have shaped an imbalanced consumption-investment structure through primary and secondary income distribution as well as other channels. It suggests that the Chinese government will be able to accomplish China's transition from an investment-led growth model to a consumption-based growth model only if it modifies its political and economic governance system and removes the distortions in development strategies.

This study seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, whereas regulators in other ‘safe’ countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank.

Although the latest period saw failure in coping with economic stagna?? on in Russia, it should be noted that Russian’s economy demonstrated a good stress resistance. In our opinion, this can be indica?? ve of its gradual adapta?? on to the market. The ‘budget rule’ has proved effi cient – the fi scal rela?? ons system didn’t collapse due to high water in the area of Amur River; Pushkino Bank’s (the Moscow Oblast (Region)) sudden bankruptcy required no extra infusion of public funds and was localized with the resources allocated by the Deposit Insurance Agency. This is all indica?? ve of that protec?? on mechanisms of public fi nances were actuated in a proper manner in emergency, there was no need to increase tax burden or resort to unscheduled emergency-related fundraising. The key topic of discussion in the period under review a new pension formula and proposal to use its funded component to finance pay-as-you-go system in 2014. Furthermore, certain tax ini?? a?? ves which needs to be polished were discussed in the economic process

The financial crisis that started in August 2007 has led to a worsening in the conditions of credit supply to customers. Since the second half of 2008, several measures have been adopted in order to sustain access to credit for both firms and households, such as debt moratoria, provisions of guarantees on specific types of loans, and various forms of incentives to increase the supply of lending. The initiatives aimed at firms have been sizeable, involving financial resources up to as much as 5 per cent of total bank loans granted between the beginning of 2009 and September 2011. The corresponding value for households has been more modest, slightly above 1 per cent; this is mainly because of the strict qualification requirements applied to some of the initiatives and to their limited financial endowment.

The policy innovations that followed the recent Great Recession, such as unconventional monetary policies, prompted renewed interest in the question of how to measure the effectiveness of such policy interventions. To test policy effectiveness requires a model to construct a counterfactual for the outcome variable in the absence of the policy intervention and a way to determine whether the differences between the realised outcome and the model-based counter-factual outcomes are larger than what could have occurred by chance in the absence of policy intervention. Pesaran & Smith propose tests of policy ineffectiveness in the context of macroeconometric rational expectations dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. When we are certain of the specification, estimation of the complete system imposing all the cross-equation restrictions implied by the full structural model is more efficient. But if the full model is misspecified, one may obtain more reliable estimates of the counterfactual outcomes from a parsimonious reduced form policy response equation, which conditions on lagged values, and on the policy measures and variables known to be invariant to the policy intervention. We propose policy ineffectiveness tests based on such reduced forms and illustrate the tests with an application to the unconventional monetary policy known as quantitative easing (QE) adopted in the UK.

The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progres- sivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity, except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and technological factors that have also affected the skill premium. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We find that optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demo- graphic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of the observed skill premium.

Financial market crises with the threat of a subsequent debt-deflation depression have occurred with increasing regularity in the United States from 1980 through the present. Almost reflexively, when confronted with such circumstances, US institutions and the policymakers that run them have responded in a fashion that has consistently thwarted debt-deflation-depression dynamics. It is true that these "remedies," as they succeeded, increasingly contributed to a moral hazard in US and global financial markets that culminated with the crisis that began in 2007. Nonetheless, the straightforward steps taken by established institutions enabled the United States to derail depression dynamics, while European 1930s-style austerity proved as ineffective as it was almost a century ago. Europe's, and specifically Germany's, steadfast refusal to embrace the US recipe has fostered mushrooming economic hardship on the continent. The situation is gruesome, and any serious student of economic history had to have known, given European policy commitments, that it was destined to turn out this way. It is easy to understand why misguided policies drove initial European responses. Economic theory has frowned on Keynes. Economic successes, especially in Germany, offered up the wrong lessons, and enduring angst about inflation was a major distraction. At the outset, the wrong medicine for the wrong disease was to be expected. What is much harder to fathom is why such a poisonous elixir continues to be proffered amid widespread evidence that the patient is dying. Deconstructing cognitive dissonance in other spheres provides an explanation. Not surprisingly, knowing what one wants to happen at home completely informs one’s claims concerning what will be good for one’s neighbors. In such a construct, the last best hope for Europe is ECB President Mario Draghi. He seems to be able to speak German and yet act European.

Supply and demand responses to financial crises result in fluctuations in credit flow to the private sector. Policy makers concerned with the sustainability and growth of viable firms should disaggregate these responses. Utilising firm level data, this study investigates characteristics of firms applying for external finance before and after the financial crisis, along with characteristics of successful applicants. Notwithstanding changes in credit conditions, salient features of external financing demand endure across the period, including ownership, asset structure, age and size. Failure to secure debt in an earlier period does not deter firm owners from applying for loans in a subsequent period. Evidence suggests that the most financially distressed firms are suffering the greatest consequences of the credit crunch.

As the recent crisis has forcefully suggested, understanding financial-market interconnectedness is of a paramount importance to explain systemic risk, stability and economic dynamics. In this paper, we address these issues along two related perspectives. First, we explore the statistical properties of the International Financial Network (IFN), defined as the weighted-directed multigraph where nodes are world countries and links represent debtor-creditor relationships in equities and short/long-run debt. We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis has resulted in a significant change in the topological properties of the IFN. Our findings suggest that the crisis caused not only a reduction in the amount of securities traded, but also induced changes in the topology of the network and in the time evolution of its statistical properties. This has happened, however, without changing the disassortative, core-periphery structure of the IFN architecture. Second, we perform an econometric study to examine the ability of network-based measures to explain cross-country differences in crisis intensity. We investigate whether the conclusion of previous studies showing that international connectedness is not a relevant predictor of crisis intensity may be reversed, once one explicitly accounts for the position of each country within the IFN. We show that higher interconnectedness reduces the severity of the crisis, as it allows adverse shocks to dissipate quicker. However, the systemic risk hypothesis cannot be completely dismissed and being central in the network, if the node is not a member of a rich club, puts the country in an adverse and risky position in times of crises. Finally, we find strong evidence of nonlinear effects, once the high degree of heterogeneity that characterizes the IFN is taken into account.

The literature on public employment policies such as the job guarantee (JG) and the employer of last resort (ELR) often emphasizes their macroeconomic stabilization effects. But carefully designed and implemented policies like these can also have profound social transformative effects. In particular, they can help address enduring economic problems such as poverty and gender disparity. To examine how, this paper will look at the reform of Argentina’s Plan Jefes into Plan Familias. Plan Jefes was the hallmark stabilization policy of the Argentine government after the 2001 crisis. It guaranteed a public sector job in a community project to unemployed male and female heads of households. The vast majority of beneficiaries, however, turned out to be poor women. For a number of reasons that are explored below, the program was later reformed into a cash transfer policy, known as Plan Familias, that still exists today. The paper examines this reform in order to evaluate the relative impact of such policies on some of the most vulnerable members of society; namely, poor women. An examination of the Argentine experience based on survey evidence and fieldwork reveals that poor women overwhelmingly want paid work opportunities, and that a policy such as the JG or the ELR cannot only guarantees full employment and macroeconomic stabilization, but it can also serve as an institutional vehicle that begins to transform some of the structures and norms that produce and reproduce gender disparities. These transformative features of public employment policies are elucidated by turning to the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen and elaborated by Martha Nussbaum — an approach commonly invoked in the feminist literature. This paper examines how the access to paid employment can enhance what Sen defines as an individual’s “substantive freedom.” Any policy that fosters genuine freedom begins with an understanding of what the targeted population (in this case, poor women) wants. It then devises a strategy that guarantees that such opportunities exist and removes the obstacles to accessing these opportunities.

The main contribution of the paper is to identify the socio economic characteristics that affect the perception of the euro across the original 12 Euro Area countries by specifying and estimating a multilevel multinomial model for polytomous data. The analysis is based on the Flash Eurobarometer dataset that contains cross-country data augmented specific country macroeconomic and political series. The use of the multilevel multinomial logistic regression allows to estimate the model considering individuals features and countries characteristics in a single analysis with two-level structure. This structure takes into account dependence between individuals within the same country given a certain component of unobserved heterogeneity between countries. The attitudes towards the euro vary across individuals and across countries and are driven by personal considerations based on the benefits and costs of using a single currency within a common area. Individual features, as a high level of education and living in a metropolitan area, have a positive impact towards the perception of the euro, since people having these characteristics can benefit more from new markets opportunities created by the common area. Moreover, a positive country economic context (low inflation and high growth) can influence people attitudes.

Since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Portuguese economy has exhibited real divergence vis-a-vis the wealthier Euro-zone countries. We analyze the causes of the underperformance of the Portuguese economy in the last decade, discuss the different policy options available to the newly-elected Portuguese government, and make several proposals for institutional reform of the EMU. We argue that, in the absence of deep reform of the governance structure of the EMU, Portugal faces a long period of economic stagnation and unemployment. We conclude that, in the face of the tremendous legal, political, and practical obstacles that any single Euro-zone country would face were it to withdraw from the Euro-zone, pushing for reform of the EMU currently represents the best way forward to Portugal.

This paper reconsiders fiscal policy effectiveness in light of the recent economic crisis. It examines the fiscal policy approach advocated by the economics profession today and the specific policy actions undertaken by the Bush and Obama administrations. An examination of the labor market renders the contemporary aggregate demand–management approach wholly inadequate for achieving certain macroeconomic objectives, such as the stabilization of investment and investor expectations, the generation and maintenance of full employment, and the equitable distribution of incomes. The paper reconsiders the policy effectiveness of alternative fiscal policy approaches, and argues that a policy that directly targets the labor demand gap (as opposed to the output gap) is far more effective in stabilizing employment, incomes, investment, and balance sheets.

This paper investigates how expectations about future government spending affect the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. We study the effects of two different types of government spending shocks in the United States: (i) spending shocks that are accompanied by an expected reversal of public spending growth below trend; (ii) spending shocks that are accompanied by expectations of future spending growth above trend. We use the Ramey (2011)’s time series of military build-ups to measure exogenous spending shocks, and deviations of forecasts of public spending with respect to past trends, evaluated in real-time, to distinguish shocks into these two categories. Based on a structural VAR analysis, our results suggest that shocks associated with an expected spending reversal exert expansionary effects on the economy and accelerate the correction of the initial increase in public debt. Shocks associated with expected spending growth above trend, instead, are characterized by a contraction in aggregate demand and a more persistent increase in public debt. The main channel of transmission seems to run through agents’ perception of the future macroeconomic environment. JEL Classification: E62, E65, H20

The paper analyzes developments in bank lending in Italy during the financial crisis, assessing the relative contribution of demand and supply factors to lending deceleration. We find that the slowdown in lending was mainly due to a reduction in demand. For households, this can be attributed to the weakness of the real estate market and to the fall in consumption; for firms, a diminution in financing needs, due in turn to the sharp contraction of investment. Credit market indicators and empirical studies suggest that lending growth may also have been curbed by tensions in credit supply. These tensions mainly reflected the increase in borrower risk, as well as the impact of the crisis � especially in its first phase � on banks� capital, liquidity, and ability to access external funding. Econometric analyses corroborate these indications, suggesting that the overall impact of banks� conditions on the lending slowdown was modest. Over the next few months, supply tensions could persist, but the risk of a limitation of credit will be moderated by the economic recovery and the consequent reduction in borrower default risk. There will also be support from public interventions, which have provided financial support to firms, improving their creditworthiness, and strengthened banks� capital and liquidity position.

This paper explores patterns of discrimination between residents and foreign creditors during recents sovereign debt restructurings. We analyze 10 recent episodes distinguishing between neutral cases in which the sovereign treated creditors equitably irrespective of their nationality and instances of discrimination against residents and non-residents. We then present evidence in support of the hypothesis that these patterns of discrimination can be explained by the origin of liquidity pressures, the ex ante soundness of the banking system and the extent of the domestic corporate sector’s reliance on international financial markets. On the theoretical side, we present a simple model of a government’s strategic decision to diferentiate between the servicing of its domestic and its external debt. In our model, the basic trade-off facing the authorities is to default on external debt and in so doing restricting private access to international capital markets or to default on domestic debt, thereby curtailing the banking sector’s capacity to lend to domestic firms.

The recent recession has affected all countries around the world in an almost synchronous way. Interestingly, not only has it hit countries with bad macroeconomic fundamentals, but also those with AAA rating. The degree to which countries have been affected by the crisis, on the other hand, has differed and, quite surprisingly, countries with a higher income per capita have experienced the most severe output loss. The global nature of the recession and cross-country heterogeneity in the depth of the downturn give the researcher a unique opportunity to identify the link between the structural characteristics of economic and institutional systems before the crisis and their resilience with respect to the global recessionary shock.

This paper models the causes of the 2008 financial crisis together with its manifestations, using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Our analysis is conducted on a cross-section of 107 countries; we focus on national causes and consequences of the crisis, ignoring cross-country “contagion” effects. Our model of the incidence of the crisis combines 2008 changes in real GDP, the stock market, country credit ratings, and the exchange rate. We explore the linkages between these manifestations of the crisis and a number of its possible causes from 2006 and earlier. We include over sixty potential causes of the crisis, covering such categories as: financial system policies and conditions; asset price appreciation in real estate and equity markets; international imbalances and foreign reserve adequacy; macroeconomic policies; and institutional and geographic features. Despite the fact that we use a wide number of possible causes in a flexible statistical framework, we are unable to link most of the commonly cited causes of the crisis to its incidence across countries. This negative finding in the cross-section makes us skeptical of the accuracy of “early warning” systems of potential crises, which must also predict their timing.

The impact of macroeconomic management (monetary policy) and administrative price adjustments on price variability in a low inflation economy characterized by relatively frequent administrative price adjustments is examined. Fluctuations of market determined prices, prices of agricultural goods in particular, are linked to the lack of synchronization between administrative price changes and monetary policy. If monetary policy does not account for expected changes in administrative prices, demand in "free" goods markets will shift causing fluctuation of prices for agricultural goods, because the supply of these goods is highly inelastic in Armenia. The findings contribute to a better understanding of agricultural price variability during 1998-2002. The impact of macroeconomic policy and structural adjustments on income distribution and rural poverty incidence are also examined. This research has immediate policy implications since Armenia will undergo major upward price adjustments for goods and services with regulated prices, which may have a negative impact on income distribution if aggregate demand management is unchanged.

We use the ten years of experience in inflation-targeting in New Zealand since 1989 to test whether monetary policy appears to conform to the simple rules that have been recommended for it in the literature. Of the inflation targeting central banks, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has both the longest experience and probably the most clearly defined target and policy framework for achieving it. We show that while a Taylor rule with the standard parameters used in the US does indeed describe New Zealand monetary policy quite well, the Reserve Bank has focused rather more strongly on price stability, as required by its Policy Target Agreements. However, while the conduct of New Zealand monetary policy as set out in the Monetary Policy Statements is firmly based on targeting the inflation rate in the future we find, using the Bank’s own forecasts, that nevertheless targeting inflation close to the present appears to be a better description of policy. Furthermore, restricting the policy choice to the information available to the Reserve Bank at the actual time of policy settings and ignoring subsequent revisions to published statistics does not result in a much improved explanation of its actions. We find a clear ‘smoothing’ element to the Bank’s policy rather than immediate response to every small fluctuation. We show further that some of the variables that enter the policy rule have slightly asymmetric cycles. From symmetric and asymmetric cointegration tests on the long-run relationship between interest rates, the output gap, and inflation we show that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that monetary policy has been asymmetric in treating upside inflationary pressures differently from those towards deflation.

EU Member countries have shown different degrees of ambition to reach a budget position of “close to balance or in surplus”. Differences in ambition can only partly be explained by the relative size of cyclical safety mar­gins or differences in the number of votes in the ECOFIN Council. It is also shown that in the medium run there is no evidence for a trade-off between budget consolidation and growth. Of the eight countries with the strongest reduction of structural budget deficits in the period 1992-2001, only one showed growth rates below the EU average. The other seven countries even managed to achieve higher growth rates than in the period 1974-91 during which structural deficits had increased.