1. Externalities of Bank Loan and Loan Insurance Under Risk Regulations in Supply Chain Finance
- Author
-
Wenli Wang and Gangshu Cai
- Subjects
Finance ,History ,Polymers and Plastics ,business.industry ,Collateral ,Supply chain ,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering ,Trade credit ,Order (exchange) ,Loan ,Value (economics) ,Stackelberg competition ,Business and International Management ,business ,Externality - Abstract
Due to firms' lack of creditworthiness and collateral, banks have imposed loan limits as a result of risk-control regulations in bank financing. As such, loan insurance has emerged as a useful instrument to lift loan limits. To study the joint value of bank loans and loan insurance, this article investigates a supply chain composed of one supplier and one capital-constrained retailer who borrows a bank loan and potentially purchases loan insurance. The analysis reveals that both the supplier and the retailer can benefit from the bank financing with loan insurance in an insurance-cooperation region wherein the supplier is willing to undercut the wholesale price to entice the retailer to buy insurance. Furthermore, in the insurance-cooperation region, worse externalities of the bank loan (i.e., a higher fixed bank fee or a lower initial loan limit) benefits the supplier, whereas worse externalities of loan insurance (i.e., a higher fixed insurance premium or a lower insured loan limit) helps the retailer. Such benefits can lead to a higher order quantity than the capital-abundant one and partially coordinate the whole supply chain. However, when the production cost is low, the supplier and the retailer can encounter a Stackelberg prisoner's dilemma, in which both firms no longer cooperate with each other and both are worse off. Our extended analysis further demonstrates that a bank loan with/without insurance can conditionally outperform trade credit financing and it is better for the retailer to borrow loans from fewer banks, even if there are no fixed bank fees.
- Published
- 2021