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The long tail hypothesis claims that increased Internet usage will enhance the purchase of obscure items so that, in aggregate, these obscure items will become an important, perhaps primary portion of the market. We test this hypothesis with two analyses. First, using unusually rich data on book sales, we examine the share of niche titles as Internet retailing grew from obscurity to ubiquity. Using relative measurements of concentration, as has been common, provides results contrary to the hypothesis. But we also conclude that it is inappropriate to use relative measures of concentration with these data. Using absolute measures of concentration provides results consistent with the hypothesis’ sign but not with the magnitude. Second, we use the 2011 bankruptcy of the Borders bookstore chain and the resulting sudden shutdown of all its store locations, as a natural experiment. This analysis finds a shift in sales away from the top successful titles. But the major beneficiaries are not the most obscure titles but instead some quite successful titles and some mildly obscure titles. The former is contrary to the hypothesis, and the latter supports the direction but not the size of the hypothesis. Both analyses support, at best, an enfeebled version of the long tail where the share of relatively obscure titles changes from one unimportant small value to a somewhat greater but still unimportant value. Thus, the use in the title of “longish” as a diminutive form of “long.”

Researchers have frequently used publicly available data on product ranks to estimate nonpublic sales quantities under the assumption that the distribution of sales follows a power law. Using population sales data for a product frequently thought to follow a power law—books—we find the (double logged) rank-sales relationship, contrary to assumption, is not linear but is instead concave. We demonstrate that this concavity is sufficiently strong to require a reevaluation of hundreds of results from analyses that had assumed linearity and we go on to demonstrate that the nonlinearity can cause poor predictions of sales for either poor selling or high selling titles, and sometimes both. We illustrate some of the problems of applying a linear technique to a nonlinear relationship by examining the claim that the greater product variety made available to shoppers on the Internet has a large positive impact on social welfare and also claims about sales levels in top 20 and top 50 “charts.” In spite of these difficulties, the concavity appears to be sufficiently similar across time and book categories to allow the use of simple nonlinear specifications that provide reasonable predictions of sales from ranks using samples with only a modest number of observations.

In November of 2018 Matt Kelly and I published a ranking of states based on the performance of K-12 students on exams known as the “nations report card.” Among the novelties of our study were that the rankings were based only on the student’s performance, that performance was measured on disaggregated ethnic data preventing states from doing well just because they had mainly white students, and that states were given higher scores when they achieved high ranks while using less money. Within weeks of the publication of our study, Bruce Baker published a comically inept NEPC report critical of our study. Virtually everything Baker says is wrong.

Economists have long debated the degree to which inventive and artistic activities were either the result of instinctual urges on the part of creators, or the responses of creators to potential pecuniary rewards. Copyright and patent laws are based on a view that rewards are an important factor. In this paper we attempt to provide an empirical analysis of this question by using a recent data set covering the book production industry. We find evidence that authors publish more new books when they earned higher payments for previously written books, although at high enough levels of payment their production of new works begins to decline, consistent with a backward bending supply function. We also find that few authors are in the backward bending region and that the overall effect of payments to authors is to increase their output. Our results are also consistent with the belief that instinctual elements may play a large role in the creation of books.

State education rankings published by U.S. News and World Report, Education Week, and others, play a prominent role in legislative debate and public discourse concerning education. These rankings are based partly on achievement tests, which measure student learning, and partly on other factors that do not measure student learning. When achievement tests are used as measures of learning in these conventional rankings, they are aggregated in a way that provides misleading results. To overcome these deficiencies, we create a new ranking of state education systems using disaggregated achievement data and excluding less informative factors that are not directly related to learning. Using our methodology changes the order of state rankings considerably. Many states with right-to-work laws in the South and Southwest score much higher. Furthermore, we create another ranking of states based on the efficiency of education spending. In this efficiency ranking, achieving successful outcomes while economizing on education expenditures is considered better than doing so through lavish spending. Again, Southern states that are ranked low in conventional rankings experience a reversal of fortune. Finally, our regression results indicate that unionization has a powerful negative influence on educational outcomes.

Safe harbors allow User Upload Content (UUC) services such as YouTube to escape normal copyright liability and notice and takedown provisions, which were supposed to provide a less costly substitute for copyright, have been unable to keep UUC services from having an inefficient bargaining advantage when they negotiate rates for permission to use copyrighted works on their sites. Nor have algorithms such as YouTube’s Content ID been able to correct this defect. This means that UUCs either do not pay for copyright permissions or, if they pay something, they pay less than the market rate. Other online services (such as subscription services, e.g. Spotify and Apple Music) are at a competitive disadvantage when competing with UUC platforms. These traditional services generate lower revenues and a reduced user base because of the distorting impact of safe harbors. As a net result, copyright owners are seeing reduced copyright payments from both UUC and other services, which would appear to be very substantial.

This document provides the raw data and calculations supporting results in the main paper. First, I include data on the number of German students on vacations, since this is analysis demonstrates a previously unrecognized error having to do with OS’s download data being mismatched by a week with the student vacation data. The data includes a calendar (from a web page) of holidays for each German state in 2002, and it also provides its own figure showing the share of German students on vacation during the year. I also provide a listing of the number of students (those above 5th grade) in each German state. Next, I provide a table with the raw numbers behind Figure 1a and 1b, as well as the correlations discussed in the material surrounding Figures 1a and 1b. The raw numbers in that Table are then sourced to a copy of a Table from an early version of OS’s 2007 article, and data from the Internet2 website, which takes up many pages, but the relevant numbers are highlighted in orange to make it easier to follow. I should note that the raw data for downloads (from OS) and vacations are on these pages, so the correlations and regressions linking the two can be easily replicated.

Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf recently responded in these pages to some of my negative assessments of their influential 2007 piracy article. In this article, I analyze their responses to my assessments. Several of their responses have the appearance of being plausible, if they are read without reference to the content of my assessments. A careful reading of my assessments and Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf’s responses, reveals that Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf generally misrepresent or ignore my arguments, while making numerous factual assertions that are clearly refuted by the data, when tested. My negative assessments are only further enhanced by the weakness of their response.

This paper reviews an estimate of the economic effect on the New Zealand economy of copyright term extension which was recently released by the New Zealand Government but which was tabled as part of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations on the IP Chapter. The estimate is that the average cost to New Zealand from the obligation under TPP to extend New Zealand’s copyright period from 50 to 70 years would average around $55 million per year. Our review of this estimate suggests it is clearly incorrect, and indeed seriously over-estimates costs. As we demonstrate, the expert report by Henry Ergas on which it was based made major errors. First it focused only on the well-known social costs of copyright while completely excluding the equally well-known social benefits from copyright, thus ensuring, given that New Zealand is a net importer of copyrighted goods, that term extension would be found to have a negative impact. Second it made serious errors in its calculations of the costs of copyright, leading to an enormous overestimation of the costs of term extension, as much as 77 times higher than a correctly performed analysis that follows Ergas' general procedure generates. Finally the New Zealand Government exacerbated these misleadingly high costs by assuming, completely out of thin air, a cost of term extension for film and television that was not estimated by Ergas, and then compounded this unfounded claim by including in its cost estimate “range” a high value from the Ergas report that was contingent on a particular legal result that was known to have not occurred by the time the government came up with its range. Finally, when converting Ergas’ present value results into a yearly value, the government inappropriately used a discount rate inconsistent with that used by Ergas, a decision that increased the estimated costs from what they would have been had a consistent discount rate been used, as was appropriate.

The payments to British authors by American publishers during the mid-19th century, when the works of British authors lacked American copyright protection, has been presented as evidence that copyright might have little benefit to authors. This paper reexamines the evidence that has been used to support this claim and then presents previously unexamined information on payments to British authors by leading American publishers of the period. The main finding is that payments to British authors were minimal or non-existent prior to the establishment of a no-compete agreement among leading American publishers. Even after implementation of this agreement, many British authors were not paid, and those who were paid received considerably less than they would have received under copyright. Because antitrust disallows such agreements, this 19th natural experiment indicates that the removal of copyright in modern economies would likely eviscerate payments to authors.

The influential piracy paper by Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, although mainly based on proprietary data, contained an “important complement” to the main results, consisting of four “quasi-experiments” using publicly available data. This replication examines all of these quasi-experiments, narrowly using identical data and statistical methods, as well as in a broader sense by extending or augmenting the data or methods. The results of these replications are that the great majority of their claims are unsupported by the narrow replications and none of their economic conclusions hold up under narrow or broad replication.

The payment by American publishers to British authors during the mid-19th century, when the works of British authors did not have any American copyright protection, has been presented as evidence that authors can be well paid without the need of copyright protection. The empirical support for this claim putatively comes from a UK Royal Commission Report published in 1878. In this paper I examine the evidence put forward in the Royal Commission Report, as well as data on payments to British Authors from a leading American publisher during the mid-1800s. This reexamination of the Royal Commission Report, combined with the examination of publishing costs, lead to a conclusion that most British authors were not paid by American publishers and the majority of those who were paid received considerably less than they would have received under copyright. Further, two additional historical factors, a cartel-like agreement among leading American publishers and an American market that was larger than the British market, make the instances of American payments to British authors an overestimate of the likely author payments that would exist in a world without copyright.

This article endeavors to explain the nature of some copyright criticisms and expose the fallacies behind them. This article demonstrates that applying a general label of “monopoly” to what are actually only property rights, is a misleading (although rhetorically effective) tactic. Assertions claiming that creators of copyrighted works do not increase output in response to price increases are shown to be contrary to economic logic and sui generis when compared to our belief about other markets. A fascinating claim that American book producers in a highly competitive environment paid British authors (without copyright) amounts similar to what they could have earned with copyright, is shown to be a largely fanciful story.

The file-sharing literature has focused mainly on whether file-sharing has decreased record sales, with less attention paid to the size of any decline. Although there is still some contention, most studies have concluded that file-sharing has decreased record sales. What has not been noted is that most estimates indicate that the file-sharing has caused the entire enormous decline in record sales that has occurred over the last decade. This heretofore hidden result is due to the lack of a consistent metric that would allow easy comparability across studies. The task of this paper is to provide such a metric, translate the results reported in the literature into that metric, and then summarizes the results from this exercise.

It appears that the Internet is soon going to fulfill its potential to become a giant on-demand repository of television shows (and movies) available asynchronously. As companies such as Netflix and Hulu increase their activities in this sphere, there are many unanswered questions about the impacts of this transition. In this paper we attempt to foretell the impact of this shift on one key aspect of television viewing: the amount of time viewers devote to it. We use cable and satellite television’s impact on viewing as a proxy for the likely impact that future Internet transmission of programs will have. Using country-based panel data going back to the mid 1990s we find that the increased variety brought about by cable and satellite has had virtually no impact on time devoted to television viewing. We discuss the import of this finding for Internet business models of television transmission.

I examine the key instrument (German kids on vacation) used by Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf in their analysis of the impact of file-sharing on record sales, published as the lead article in the Feb 2007 JPE. Their measured relationship between the instrument (German students on vacation) and the variable that it is instrumenting for, American downloading, is seen to have outlandish implications in the often overlooked first stage regressions. The coefficient implies that if German secondary students all go to school, American file-sharing would drop to zero. A nonsensical result of this sort indicates an important error somewhere in their data or analysis. The instrument is also shown to be related to American record sales, contrary to the claims of Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, and contrary to the requirements of their analysis. Further, their measurement of downloading varies wildly from week to week and is inconsistent with downloading data from Big Champagne. In addition, their data on file-sharing, which Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf state is representative of worldwide file-sharing, is actually biased according to some of their own statistics which they failed to examine, considerably overstating the share of German files. Finally, I demonstrate that German students on vacation cannot have a measurable impact on American downloading (and thus American record sales) negating its potential usefulness and implying that the approach taken by Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf could never have provided useful information about the impact of file-sharing on record sales.

Paul David (1985), Brian Arthur (1989) and others introduced a 'new economics' of increasing returns, alleging problems of path dependence and lock-in. These conditions were claimed to constitute market failure and were soon featured in antitrust actions, most famously in Microsoft. We (1990, 1994) challenged the empirical support for these theories and their real-world applicability. Subsequently, David and others have responded, arguing that lock-in theories require no empirical support, market failures were never an important feature of their writings, and the empirical evidence that had been forward was never meant to be taken literally. Nevertheless, David and others claim that their theories have policy significance. Indeed, lock-in claims continue to appear as a basis for antitrust action. We now respond to the response of David and others, review new developments in this literature, and consider antitrust implications in light of the deficiencies in lock-in theories and related empirical work.

Through a stroke of luck, a referee report in the review process at the JPE has been positively identified as the Oberholzer-Gee/Strumpf (O/S) response to my earlier comment. Regardless of the response's provenance, what counts is whether it solidly refuted my comment. This 'sequel' analyzes the O/S response. The O/S response only deals with four of the nine points discussed in my comment, leaving the five remaining critiques unchallenged. The conclusion of my review is that the O/S response fails as a defense of these four points and contains many of the same types of errors that marred their original paper. This sequel also discusses the history of this dispute including O/S' various reasons for not making their data available. Finally, this sequel provides full documentation on the JPE's decision not to publish the comment.

This paper attempts to determine the impact of copyright on the prices of books, which is a task that has not, to my knowledge, been undertaken before. Recent prices of best-sellers written between 1895 and 1940, some with copyright and some without, are compared. One set of empirical findings based on typical regressions indicate that the prices of copyrighted works do not appear higher than the prices of non-copyrighted works. Another set of findings, based upon giving greater weights to books that have greater unit sales, implies that copyright raises price by up to 14.5%. This bifurcated result allows the contemplation of two scenarios. In the first, copyright does not raise price at all. This is explained by appealing to the nascent literature on uniform pricing. If books are best described by this model I show that increases in copyright unambiguously increase welfare. The increased-price scenario notes that authors appear to receive all the industry rents and examines the possible deadweight losses due to the higher price of copyrighted books. I calculate a range of deadweight losses based upon seemingly reasonable market assumptions and find the size of the deadweight loss is small compared to industry revenue. Importantly, the size of this deadweight loss appears to be much less than the deadweight losses from a leading alternative system that has been proposed for distributing creative works.

This is a lengthy critique of the empirical findings, factual claims, and logic of the empirical examination of file-sharing by Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Koleman Strumpf. It is written for a general audience and provides details of calculations, data, and industry measurements that allow replication by the reader whenever possible. It provides much of the detail for the shorter, more academic version that is also posted.

This paper undertakes an econometric investigation of the impact of radio play on sales of sound recordings using a sample of American cities. The results indicate that radio play does not have the positive impact on record sales normally attributed to it and instead appears to have an economically important negative impact, implying that overall radio listening is more of a substitute for the purchase of sound recordings than it is a complement. This finding indicates that creating a set of property rights to allow this market to function properly is different than has been suggested by prior research. This research also exposes a fallacy of composition in applying to an entire market a generally accepted positive relationship that holds for individual units. New technologies changing the nature of radio broadcasts are likely to make this topic increasingly important in the coming years.

Although previous forms of copying have been found to often have benign effects on copyright owners the rise in file-sharing has coincided with a steep decline in the sale of sound recordings. This paper attempts to empirically examine the extent, if any, to which file-sharing has caused the decline in record sales. Using a data set for 99 American cities containing information on Internet use, record sales, television viewing, radio listening, and other demographic variables, an econometric analysis is undertaken to examine the relationship between record sales and file-sharing, as proxied by Internet use, from 1998 to 2003. First, we find that the Internet itself reduces time spent on other entertainment activities, but only by a small amount. We then subtract this generic Internet impact from the overall Internet impact and conclude that the decline associated with that component of Internet use that we can attribute to file-sharing indicates that file-sharing has caused the entire decline in record sales and appears to have vitiated what otherwise would have been growth in the industry. Looking at sales in individual musical genres reinforces the primary conclusion since those genres that seem most likely to fall prey to file-sharing have the strongest measured negative impact from Internet usage.

There appears to be a common misconception, even among economists, that all instances of new technologies driving out old technologies are beneficial. This short essay attempts to point out that some new technologies do not so much replace an old technology as destroy an old technology without a superior technology left in place. The example provided concerns a technology whose sole function is to remove advertising from advertising based programming. Such a technology would unambiguously decrease total surplus.

The impact of copying, in the form of file-sharing, has become a stormy policy issue. Previous copying technologies have mostly failed to live up to the extravagant predictions of harm that arose with those new technologies although precise measurements of copying's impact was rarely accomplished or attempted. One impediment to measuring the impact of copying with prior technologies was the difficulty of measuring copying activity. File-sharing is the newest technology for making copies and carries with it the possibility of more precise measurement of copying than has been possible in the past. This paper examines the measurement of file-sharing activity, the theory of file-sharing's likely impact, and the impact of file-sharing. Analysis of various data sets indicate that they do not yet live up to their hoped for precision. Data limitations not withstanding, the evidence seems compelling that file-sharing is responsible for the recent large decline in CD sales for which it has been blamed.

This paper surveys the extant literature on the impact of file-sharing. It begins by examining the theory behind the impact of file-sharing. One novelty from this analysis is the finding that the effect of 'sampling' of copyrighted materials can be expected to have a negative impact on copyright owners, quiet the opposite of the impact normally assumed. Overall, although one can create hypothetical situations where network effects might allow file-sharing to be beneficial to copyright owners, the expectation that file-sharing would harm copyright owners appears a far more realistic outcome. The analysis then turns to the empirical work that has been performed to date. The various approaches are critiqued and compared. Although much of this literature is preliminary, most of the conclusions are consistent with one another, although the results are not unanimous. I then posit some explanations for the variations in results and conclude that the evidence to date strongly suggests that file-sharing harms the sound recording industry.

Unlike television broadcasters, who must negotiate with the copyright owners before they can broadcast movies, radio broadcasters need not negotiate with the copyright holders for the sound recordings broadcast on radio. In the United States radio broadcasters have no obligations whatsoever to the copyright owners of the sound recordings (although they do have obligations to the copyright holders of the music contained in the sound recording). The reason for this discrepancy appears to be that radio broadcasters have argued, and it is generally accepted, that radio play benefits record sales and thus there is no need for radio broadcasters to purchase the rights to broadcast the sound recording. This impact of radio play on record sales is commonly referred to as a "symbiotic" relationship between these two industries. Yet there appears to be no systematic examination of this relationship. In this paper I present evidence indicating that radio play does not benefit overall record sales. There are obvious implications for copyright. I also examine, by way of comparison, television's negative impact on the movie industry.

The case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, which sought to have the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA, aka Sonny Bono Copyright Act) found unconstitutional, was recently argued before the Supreme Court. A remarkable group of seventeen economists including five Noble laureates, representing a wide spectrum of opinion in economics, submitted an amicus curie brief in support of Eldred. The economists condemned CTEA on the grounds that the revenues earned during the extension are so heavily discounted that they have almost no value, while the extended protection of aged works creates immediate monopoly deadweight losses and increases the costs of creating new derivative works. More important, we believe, than the particulars of this case, is the articulation of the economic issues involved in copyright extension. The articulation of those issues is not well framed in the brief. Nor is the case as one sided as the Eldred economists have claimed. First, private ownership of creative works may internalize potentially important externalities with respect to the use of existing works and the creation of derivative works. Second, the Eldred economists neglect the elasticity of the supply of creative works in their analysis, focusing instead solely on the benefits received by authors, leading to potential underestimation of additional creativity that confers benefits immediately. Third, the Eldred economists neglect certain features of copyright law, such as fair use, the distinction between idea and expression, and the parody exemption, which mitigate the costs of copyright. Finally, we present data that counters a common claim that copyright extension so far out in the future can have little effect on creativity. The small fraction of books that have the majority of commercial value when they are new appear to remain valuable for periods of time that are consistent with the expanded term of copyright under CTEA.

This paper investigates the impact of unauthorized downloading of MP3 files on the recording industry. Although the no longer extant Napster was the most famous system used for such downloading, its progeny have continued to allow millions of music listeners to download music (and other) files without remuneration to the copyright owners. Using data on the historical sales of prerecorded music I examine in detail the recent decline in record sales and attempt to gauge the importance of various alternative factors that have been put forward to explain this decline. I conclude that the evidence supports a claim that MP3 downloads decrease sales.

This paper examines the relationship between the research impact of Business Schools, as measured by citations per capita adjusted by area norms, and rankings in leading magazines. Recent attempts by magazines to include measures of research impact appears to lower the correlation between magazine ratings and research influence. As a byproduct of this analysis I create rankings of approximately 60 business schools (including the top 50). I also rank functional areas, listing the top 15 schools for each field. A chart of faculty citations by area and percentile provides some insight as to distribution of research influence. Although a listing of the most highly cited individuals is obviously a by-product of this work, that list is not included in the paper.

This paper is an analysis of the economics underlying the Betamax case. It was written in 1985 but never published. With the renewed interest in copying and copyright in recent years, and because it has been cited and appeared on some reading lists, I thought it might be useful to make it available.

Why did the dot.coms burn and die? The answer is that they followed the advice given to them by a set of economists preaching that being first to market was the key to success thanks to lock-in effects. I explore these events and this thinking in this paper.

New Internet-based technologies appear to threaten the ability of copyright owners to collect revenues for their intellectual creations, as epitomized by the recent public trials and tribulations experienced by Napster. As a response, new legislation against pirating and new technologies to protect intellectual products have arisen. These new technologies and counter-technologies have each attracted attention and analysis, sometimes bordering on the apocalyptic, from competing camps. The basic issue, whether technologies that enhance the ability to create unauthorized copying are destructive to the principles of copyright, is not a new one, however. Technologies that make it easier to pirate copyrighted materials have undergone economic examination for over two decades. Prior analysis, and prior experience, has indicated that the previous generations of copying technologies have not had dire consequences for copyright owners. This paper, after examining a history of previous copying technologies, examines the question as to whether new Internet copying technologies are actually likely to be different from the prior generations of copying technologies in being likely to destroy the value of the intellectual property rights, and concludes that the answer is yes, unless consumers are extremely law abiding. It then examines that evidence that has been put forward to support a claim that Napster was destructive of the revenues of CD industry, and concludes that the evidence does not support such a finding. I then explain why it is that the negative impacts of Napster were unlikely to have been felt at the time these examinations were undertaken. Finally, the analysis examines the impact of a possible market-based solution to this potential problem, based on new anti-piracy technologies known as digital rights management. This technology not only promises to make copying harder, but also allows the copyright owner to charge tiny micropayments for various degrees of use of the product. This extra control by copyright owners over the usage of the copyrighted material has set off a firestorm of controversy by individuals concerned that traditional 'fair-use' of a product will disappear and further claiming that digital rights management will lead to economic inefficiency. I show that digital rights management, contrary to these claims, does not eliminate fair use and is likely to enhance economic efficiency. Nevertheless, attempts by government to force the adoption of anti-copying technology appear misguided.

This paper analyzes some consequences of the district courts proposed remedy. Due to changes in pricing strategies and/or the double marginalization problem, prices for operating systems and applications are likely to rise. I estimate what these extra costs to consumers might be. My best guess (actually quite conservative) is $120 billion worldwide over 3 years, although it could be over $300 billion. I also note that the remedy decreases competition in several important markets, including high end servers and game consoles. The paper also includes an analysis of how the remedy is likely to be interpreted.

This is a followup paper to an earlier paper of mine estimating the costs to developers of a Microsoft breakup. It responds to papers by Levinson, Romaine, and Salop (lrs.pdf) and Lenard (lenard.doc).Among other things, this paper examines the changes in the windows operating system and explains why, if broken into three competing versions, they must lose complete compatibility, imposing additional costs on developers. It also explains why these extra development costs are deadweight losses.Other papers related to the Microsoft Case:"Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A Structural Remedy for Microsoft" by Thomas M. Lenard."The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case" by Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop."Breaking Windows: Estimating Some Costs of Breaking up Microsoft Windows" by Stan J. Liebowitz.Our database includes more than 20 other papers about the Microsoft case. To find them, please use an "abstract body" search,. and enter "Microsoft" as the search term.

Warning: This is not an academic paper, but a relatively short applied advocacy article for non economists. Because of the high level of interest in the topic, I thought it might be worthwhile to make it available on the Social Science Research Network Library. This article attempts to roughly estimate one of the costs of breaking Microsoft Windows operating system into three components. It is found that developers are likely to incur extra costs of $30 billion over 3 years. Other papers related to the Microsoft Case: "Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: A Structural Remedy for Microsoft" by Thomas M. Lenard. "The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case" by Robert J. Levinson, R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop. "A Fool's Paradise: The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of Microsoft" by Stan J. Liebowitz. Our database includes more than 20 other papers about the Microsoft case. To find them, please use an "abstract body" search,. and enter "Microsoft" as the search term.