Search

The returns from public investment, especially during periods of scaling up, are often lower than expected. To understand the mechanisms behind this regularity we exploit original information on investment projects obtained from World Bank project reports to document the extent and the drivers of time delays in project implementation. We find that almost 60 percent of investment projects are delayed by at least one year. Time overruns are common across sectors and countries. A sound planning and preparation matter for the timing of project execution. Country characteristics also play a role, as projects undertaken in countries with weaker institutions and in periods of public investment scaling up are completed with longer delays.

Urbanisation is the continuous and dynamic process. Development is a result of requirement of infrastructure, formation of new towns, political decisions, de-congestion policies, requirement for events like sports and games, Initiation of various programs as planning policies converted into development projects. Paper describes about the various approaches of inclusive sustainable development for Peri-urban area of Navi Mumbai, during the formation of new nodal centers surrounding the transit hub and along the transit corridors taking into account the spatial characteristics of existing Peri-urban town. It includes the study of spatial characteristics of area with various transformations are going on within such areas. These transformations are part and process of undergoing development but this can be regulated by sustainable approaches for development. Initially along with the regional level planning for the area there is need to identify of various issues due to transformation and such sustainable approaches then converted into strategies, policies, guideline for the further development and then practically implemented through project formulation and project execution.

We exploit a large dataset of contracts for public works awarded in Italy between 2000 and 2007 to document two empirical facts about time and cost renegotiations. First, although both types of renegotiations are systematic, their correlation is nearly zero. Second, several factors typically suggested to explain renegotiations have different, and in certain cases opposite, effects on price and time renegotiations. Moreover, the estimates confirm that, as suggested by the literature, the type of awarding procedures and the complexity of the job are associated with renegotiations, but they also provide evidence in favor of an important role for the linkage between the project design stage and renegotiations during the project execution.

After the 2008 financial panic, long term compensation measures have gained favor as a way to limit managerial opportunism and excessive risk-taking. These measures, which may become mandatory for systemically important institutions, include restriction (i.e., deferral) of stock grants for a period of years, and, in the event of performance reversals, divestment of deferred stock and clawbacks of bonus compensation. These measures are considered uncontroversial enough that some have suggested that all public companies, not just systemically important firms, should adopt them.In this article, I argue that benefits of long term compensation have been overstated while the potential downsides have been largely ignored. Restricted periods for equity grants must be large compared to the executive’s tenure in order to have a great effect upon behavior overall, and mandatory clawback provisions end up transferring what would have been bonus pay into salary. Further, to the extent that long-term compensation does affect behavior, these consequences are not necessarily good. I show that given fairly reasonable assumptions of executive risk aversion, information content of long term and short term price signals, and managerial control over the timing of project execution and disclosure, a long-term focus can have significant negative effects.

The resource-constrained project scheduling problem involves the determination of a schedule of the project activities, satisfying the precedence relations and resource constraints while minimizing the project duration. In practice, activity durations may be subject to variability, such that a stochastic approach to the problem is more appropriate. We propose a methodology for the determination of a project execution policy and a vector of predictive activity starting times with the objective of minimizing a cost function that consists of the weighted expected activity starting time deviations and the penalties or bonuses associated with late or early project completion. In a computational experiment, we show that our procedure greatly outperforms existing algorithms described in the literature