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Treaty-based tribunals that render binding decisions on states under international human rights law (IHRL) have long engaged with international humanitarian law (IHL) in their judgements but little attention has been given to the basis of their jurisdiction, if any, to do so. By revisiting fundamental questions on the jurisdictional basis of international tribunals, this article presents a methodological challenge to the uncritical engagement with IHL by certain IHRL tribunals. After surveying the jurisdiction of different IHRL tribunals explicitly founded on treaties, the article seeks not only to justify, but also delimit, the inherent jurisdiction of IHRL tribunals to consider IHL for interpretive purpose, in contrast to directly applying it to the dispute. Finally, the article analyses the substantive and practical implications of stricter observance of the jurisdictional limits of IHRL tribunals on the interpretation of IHRL, the determination of ‘absent’ states’ legal interest under IHL and the future of IHL dispute settlement.

This paper discusses whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’, in the meaning of this term under international humanitarian law (IHL). The paper begins by providing background on what is meant by ‘computer data’, explaining that the entirety of a computer’s functioning, and the content stored on it, depends on data, but that data itself is not tangible. The paper then describes the significance of any determination whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’ for the purposes of IHL, explaining the importance of the concept of ‘object’ in the application of rules relating to distinction, proportionality and precautions. At the same time, it recalls that there are rules of IHL that may protect computer data serving certain functions, the application of which is not dependent on whether data constitutes an ‘object’. The paper then proceeds to consider the meaning of the term ‘object’ as found in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (API). Recourse is made to the customary rules of treaty interpretation, enshrined in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, while focusing on both the English and French versions of API. The ordinary meaning of the term ‘object’ in its context in API solely connotes material things, thus excluding computer data. Moreover, recourse to the object and purpose of API, or to so-called ‘evolutionary’ interpretation, does not lead to a different conclusion. Considering the importance of customary international law for states non-parties to API, and for the purposes of non-international armed conflicts, the paper continues to address the question whether computer data constitutes an ‘object’ for the purposes of custom. The paper analyses the development of the term ‘object’ in legal discourse over the past century in determining what states intended this term to mean, and finds that here, too, states considered ‘objects’ in the context of IHL to be material things. It also explains that there is no apparent trend among states as to whether data constitutes an ‘object’, and the paucity of official statements on the part of states is far from the necessary volume for it to carry particular legal significance.

This paper focuses on Article 27(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the prohibition of sexual violence against women in armed conflict. One specific aspect of the norm is particularly controversial: the term “honour” as an allegedly obsolete concept related to an outdated view of female morality. This paper investigates whether the criticisms to the concept of honour have a merely symbolic-linguistic value or whether they also have a legal relevance in terms of impact on the effective protection of women from conflict-related sexual violence. To this end, interpreting the term “honour” in a gender-oriented way sheds light on the question whether the gendered limits of the norm may be overcome in order to better protect women from conflict-related sexual violence. Since sexual violence usually implies a gendered character, the analysis of Article 27(2) also contributes to reveal significant aspects on the conception of women under IHL in general. Ultimately, it is claimed that the term “honour” raises complex symbolic issues. However, the legal analysis of the concept suggests that it is possible to interpret it in an evolutive manner in so to give the term a meaning that accommodates gender-sensitive concerns.

International Humanitarian law set rules and principles that are necessary to guide the conduct of parties to a conflict. The law was not formulated to cover all kinds of conflicts and are only restricted to apply in the cases of International Armed conflict (IAC) and Non- International armed conflict (NIAC). In this article, we shall analyze IAC and NIAC with more focus on Non- International armed Conflict and thereafter, I shall consider in detail the conflict between Boko haram and Nigeria determining the specific kind of conflict it falls under International Humanitarian law, all necessary criterions for assessment will be fully analyzed. Going further, other recent issue bordering on its classification such as the extension of Boko haram conflict to neighboring countries will be assessed and then finally with a conclusion.

An Armed Conflict that has been brewing in the eastern coast of southern Africa has sparked a discussion as far as the Application and Enforcement of International Humanitarian law is concerned.Thereby prompting and exposing shortcomings and indeterminacy in Application and Enforcement of International Humanitarian law in Non International Armed Conflicts.Also raising serious concerns of the contemporary armed groups posing a serious threat with their level of organisation, technical ability, access to resources and strategic awareness.This paper seeks to assess the acts of violence and hostilities in Mozambique under the threshold of application set by IHL and initiating a much needed discussion of the intertwinement and convergence of IHL application against Terrorist groups and Armed groups and vice versa.

The systematic and well-planned coup d’etat attempt orchestrated in the morning of February 1, 2021 in Myanmar poses an international law breach indication, specifically pertaining humanitarian law and international human rights law. This research aims to analyze the qualification of such phenomenon as international law issue and the plausible acts of the international community pertaining this phenomenon. The method utilized is normative-legal approach by qualitatively analyzing the compliance between the international legal regulation and the series of events occurs in Myanmar during the coup d'etat. The result reveals that the current phenomenon of Myanmar coup d’etat have been firmly considered as an international issue through the violation of the international humanitarian law as its pivotal point. In relation to the plausible acts, the launching of humanitarian intervention to stop the extreme human rights violation in Myanmar shall be considered. Furthermore, ASEAN shall take an immediate action through a collective measure by recalling the purposes and principles enshrined in the ASEAN charter.

This article explores the rules governing the prevention and control of contagious diseases in occupied territory under international law. Although the article refers to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, its scope is broader and encompasses instances of state practice that have occurred over the last two centuries. After a careful analysis of the relevant treaties and episodes of state practice, the article concludes that occupying powers have duties under international humanitarian law and international human rights law to prevent and control contagious diseases, through cooperation with the local authorities and bringing the necessary medical supplies in the occupied territory. The article stresses that taking these measures, including facilitating the supply of vaccines, is a duty under international law rather than an arbitrary act of international solidarity.

Spanning across early history until modern day, military application of human enhancements has consistently challenged the evolutionary trajectory of the human species with the promise of providing soldiers abilities beyond current ones on the battlefield. As States pursue the tantalizing ‘bio-revolution’ to dramatically alter the makeup of their military capabilities, concerns have been raised as to whether these unprecedented advances in human enhancement technologies mark a paradigm shift that cannot be easily accommodated by current IHL frameworks that could either improve adherence to or degrade soldiers’ respect for the fundamental principles of IHL.

Death is an anticipated outcome of war and those who die during an armed conflict, combatant and civilian alike, remain protected by IHL. The laws of armed conflict allow for the burial of those killed during an armed conflict in accordance with their religious rites. There is an understanding that wars render religious faith indispensable in dealing with the suffering and loss associated with conflicts. The comfort of a traditional religious burial at such a time is considerable and plays a role in restoration and healing for societies torn apart by war. Since April 2020, Indian authorities have been burying individuals killed during the occupation in unmarked graves, denying their families the right to give them an Islamic funeral. While the official position is that the bodies are not being handed over due to the coronavirus outbreak, it is clear that the real reason is to prevent protests and unrest at the funerals. There is no question that funerals in politicised communities can become important sites for organised resistance, for instance, political funerals during Apartheid in South Africa served as a scene for calls to action. However, in failing to return the remains of the deceased civilians, India appears to be engaging in a systematic effort to subject them to symbolic indignity in death, and to collectively punish and stigmatise their remaining relatives. It is also acting in violation of international humanitarian law. __________ Editorial note: This paper was sponsored by the Research Society of International Law (RSIL), an International Law and Public Policy think tank based in Pakistan. The paper can be accessed on RSIL's website at: https://rsilpak.org/2021/burial-rites-and-ihl-in-indian-illegally-occupied-jammu-kashmir/

Reverse Distinction: A U.S. Violation of the Law of Armed Conflict in Space By David A. Koplow ABSTRACT The “democratization of space” – referring to the vastly increased private sector engagement in satellite functions – has been one of the most conspicuous and successful recent developments in the field, exploiting the dramatically reduced costs of developing, launching and operating spacecraft for applications such as reconnaissance and telecommunications. The U.S. government has vigorously endorsed this opportunity and is determined to rely upon commercial sources to provide essential support even for crucial national security space operations. Sequential declarations of official governmental space policy – adopted through Republican and Democratic administrations – have embraced this “outsourcing,” intertwining military and intelligence community programs and functions into private sector spacecraft. This integration of governmental and commercial space assets promises significant cost savings as well as offering more rapid uptake of new space technologies. However, this intermingling runs afoul of one of the most central requirements of the traditional law of armed conflict: the principle of distinction (or discrimination), which mandates that in combat, states may lawfully direct their attacks only against military objectives, not against civilians or their property. An important corollary of this principle – referred to in this Article as “reverse distinction” – requires a state to separate its military assets from civilian objects. This precaution is necessary in order to spare civilians and their property from the worst ravages of warfare and also to enable the adversary to carry out its primary obligations under the distinction principle – to aim its attacks only against military targets. This Article examines the growing, persistent U.S. violation of the principle of reverse distinction. As the U.S. national security space assets and functions become increasingly insinuated into private commercial spacecraft, the separation required by the law of armed conflict is ignored. This U.S. practice is both illegal and unwise, as it threatens to make future conflict in space even more devastating than it would inherently have to be.

With more than a third of its population below the age of 18, India has the largest child population in the world. However, India is no paradise for a child to live in irrespective of whether he or she is inside or outside the house. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989, has been ratified by India. Since the Convention is a set of international standards and measures intended to protect and promote the well being of children in society, the Indian legislature has also passed several legislations to give effect to them. However, a quarter century after the adoption of the Convention and its ratification by India it cannot be said that the Indian state has successfully provided protection to its children. The North Eastern parts of India are no different and children in these areas are prone to a host of protection concerns. A prominent but no so popular malady is that of child soldiers. Instead of carving out a bright future in school, children are being taught to operate lethal weapons. However, the issue is not quite in focus as there is lack of actual documentation of cases of child soldiers. This is quite evident in the reply given by the Indian delegation in response to a question posed by an expert member of the Committee on the Rights of the Child during presentation of the combined third and fourth periodic report of India on its implementation of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the initial reports of India on how the country is implementing the Optional Protocol to the Convention on children involved in armed conflict and the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. In response to a question on recruitment of children by non-State armed groups, the Indian delegation said that the Indian Government was aware from various non-governmental organization and media reports that non-state groups had resorted to the recruitment of children from the age of six years old and that there was no way to ascertain the number of children recruited due to the clandestine nature of the activities of those groups. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no government programme providing for the rehabilitation of former child soldiers into the mainstream. Armed with lethal weapons, addicted to alcohol and drugs, dependent on their recruiters, and unable to get away from their clutches, child soldiers are a classic case of being the victims as well as potential perpetrators. There is a huge body of international humanitarian law and international human rights laws, which provides for a plethora of protections against recruitment of children as child soldiers. Nationally, India also has its fair share of laws governing the same. The point of focus of this paper is to decipher the adequacy and effectiveness of the same vis-a-vis international standards.

How does the COVID-19 pandemic affect States’ obligations under international law? This is a question of not just academic interest but real importance for people’s lives. After all, whether States abide by international law—and whether international law is fit for purpose—is vitally important for everyone from refugees exposed to the virus in unsanitary detention centers to national leaders fighting disinformation campaigns and safeguarding vaccine supply chains. International law has been central to the world’s response to the pandemic from the start—even if the participants did not always realize it. International law, after all, required States to take certain actions to detect and prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus. Some governments responded quickly and effectively, significantly reducing the impact on their populations, but many others were far less successful. Many have made matters worse by responding to the virus in ways that exacerbated the toll on the most vulnerable populations, violating their international law obligations in the process. Moreover, some States have used the pandemic as an excuse for delaying elections or for denying arrested persons adequate legal representation. This Article examines the many ways in which COVID-19 is straining the rules and norms of international law. It considers the five main bodies of international law implicated by the pandemic: international humanitarian law, international human rights law, immigration and refugee law, international cyber law, and the rules and regulations of the World Health Organization. It outlines the obligations each body of law impose on States, and how those obligations apply during the current pandemic. It concludes with several proposals for reform to the international legal system so that the world can prepare to more effectively address the next inevitable pandemic.

This article puts forward a novel analogy between animal welfare law and international humanitarian law – two seemingly unrelated bodies of law that are both marked by the aporia of humanizing the inhumane. Based on a comparative analysis with the law of war, this article argues that animal welfare law is best understood as a kind of warfare law which regulates violent activities within an ongoing “war on animals,” and needs to be complemented by a jus contra bellum and peacetime animal rights.

During the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, the rules regulating the conduct of armies during hostilities were internationally codified for the first time. The conventional narrative attributes the codification of the laws of war to the campaign of civil society, especially that of the founders of the Red Cross – Henry Dunant and Gustav Moynier. In what follows, we problematize this narrative and trace the history of the construction of this knowledge. We explore how the leading figures of the Red Cross, who were aware of the shortcomings of their project, were nonetheless invested in narrating its history as a history of success. Their struggle to control the narrative would eventually confer the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with considerable interpretive and agenda-setting authority in the realm of the laws of war. We dwell on the meaning of this conscious exercise in knowledge production and its normative ramifications.

The definition of enforced disappearances in international human rights law includes a state agency element. The question is whether the criminalization of enforced disappearance, especially through the Rome Statute, has retroacted on the definition of enforced disappearance in international human rights law so as to include non-State actors in addition to State actors as perpetrators of enforced disappearance?

This chapter examines the practice of international courts and tribunals and contends that adjudicators, consciously or unconsciously, use the notion of attribution in a narrow and in a broad sense, without however properly distinguishing between nuanced attribution standards. Attribution tests in the narrow sense are drawn from ARSIWA and are applied in the context of establishing the international responsibility of states. Whereas broad sense attribution concepts serve a variety of other legal purposes. This phenomenon will be termed as the fragmentation of attribution. The chapter will map various attribution concepts used in the field of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international investment law. It concludes by raising awareness about the doctrinal inconsistencies that arise from the judicial use of different attribution tests in an interchangeable way and about a corresponding need for doctrinal scrutiny and methodological consistency in dealing with secondary rules of international law.

The September 11 attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda had a substantial impact on the U.S security paraphernalia. It also greatly impacted the global security milieu as the transnational ideology of Islamic radicalism and Jihad challenged the security apparatus of the entire world. To counter this new challenge of radical Islamic militancy which operated beyond the boundaries of a single state, President Bush declared a Global War on Terror, and these actors were designated as the primary enemy of the United States, the West, and the liberal values of freedom, peace and democracy. Under the Bush Doctrine, these radical Islamic terrorists were proclaimed as ‘Enemy Combatants’ and were deprived off of their legal rights as prisoner of war as guaranteed by the International Humanitarian Law. The real challenge lies in determining the legal status of these proclaimed ‘Enemy Combatants’ and the humanitarian crisis that emerged due to the introduction of this concept. Therefore, this research paper attempts to analyze the legal status of Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda under the framework of International Humanitarian Law including the Geneva Convention, Additional Protocols of 1977, and the Vienna Convention as well as the Customary Law including Pashtun-Wali. This paper also endeavors to highlight the humanitarian crisis that emerged as a result of the introduction of the concept of ‘Enemy Combatants’.

Advances in mobile phone technology and social media have created a world where the volume of information generated and shared is outpacing the ability of humans to review and use that data. Machine learning (ML) models and big data analytical tools have the power to ease that burden by making sense of that information and providing insights that might not otherwise exist. In the context of international criminal and human rights law, ML is being used for a variety of purposes, including to uncover mass graves in Mexico, find evidence of homes and schools destroyed in Darfur, detect fake videos and doctored evidence, predict the outcome of European Court of Human Rights’ judicial hearings and gather evidence of war crimes in Syria. ML models are also increasingly being incorporated by States into weapon systems to better enable targeting systems to distinguish between civilians, allied soldiers and enemy combatants or even inform decision-making for military attacks. The same technology, however, also comes with significant risks. ML models and big data analytics are highly susceptible to common human biases. Those biases have the potential of reinforcing and even accelerating existing racial, political or gender inequalities. They can also paint a misleading and distorted picture of the facts on the ground. This article canvasses how common human biases can impact ML models and big data analytics. This article also examines what legal implications these biases can have under international criminal law and international humanitarian law.

Can armed groups socialize combatants to norms of restraint — in essence, train soldiers to adopt norms of civilian immunity on the battlefield? How can social scientists accurately measure such socialization? Despite being the central focus of organizational and ideational theories of conflict, studies to date have not engaged in systematic, survey-based examination of this central socialization mechanism theorized to influence military conduct. This study advances scholarly understanding by providing one of the first comparative, survey-based examinations of combatant socialization to norms of restraint, using surveys and interviews with U.S. Army cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and active duty Army combatants. Additionally, to better understand “restraint” from combatants’ perspective, this study introduces the concept of the “combatant’s trilemma” under which combatants conceptualize the civilian protection as part of a costly trade-off with the values of military advantage and force protection. Survey results hold both positive and negative implications: socialization to norms of restraint can shift combatants’ preferences for battlefield conduct. However, intensive norm socialization may be required shift combatant preferences from force protection to civilian protection norms. Study findings hold significant implications for the study of conflict and for policies to disseminate civilian protection norms in armed groups worldwide.

Greek abstract: Η συμβολή αυτή καταπιάνeται μe το φαινόμeνο των ξένων μαχητών και τα (διοικητικής φύσης) μέτρα που λαμβάνουν τα κράτη ιθαγένeιας/διαμονής για την πρόληψη της ριζοσπαστικοποίησής τους και την παρeμπόδιση του eπαναπατρισμού τους. English abstract: The contribution deals with the phenomenon of foreign fighters and the (administrative) measures enacted by the states of origin in order to prevent their further radicalization or impede their return. The Article examines measures concerning the retreat of nationality from bi-national foreign fighters, but also ones that only have one nationality and highlights the ensuing phenomenon of statelessness. It also elucidates further practices concerning terrorism prevention and investigation measures.

For more than 100 years ago, international law has placed limits on the right of belligerents to cause people pain and injury, as well as destroy objects, including those which are part of the natural environment, and addressed the issue of restricting the use of certain weapons or means of warfare that continues to cause harm even after the war, or able to cause damage to people and property States which are not involved in конфликт. The main goal of environmental law is to conserve the limited resources of our planet. One of its basic principles is that no state should cause serious damage to other States or international public spaces. Another principle is that no state can use shared elements of the environment in such a way as to exclude their use by other States, and that it is necessary to coordinate with each other the various uses that give rise to competition. The problem is that these standards are currently insufficient to protect the existing natural resources that support human life. In order to preserve the planet for present and future generations, it is necessary to restrict or prohibit activities that pose a potential threat to the environment. Since environmental degradation in many parts of the world may result from many minor causes in the future, it is important to consider each of them, even when the impact of each activity is minimal.

Sean Murphy, Professor of Law at the George Washington University and Member of the United Nations International Law Commission (ICL) pressed upon the requirement of “a global convention on crimes against humanity (as it) appears to be a key missing piece in the current framework of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and human rights law”. While the consideration for this is well-founded and is the essence of the hour. One is compelled to consider crimes against humanity as formulated in the Rome Statute forming themselves as parts of customary international law thus vitiating the requirement of a Convention.

The right to life is often said to be mother right and most important fundamen-tal right of all rights. The application and criteria of protection of the right to life differs under international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL). As a general conception, IHL is applicable only during armed conflict and HRL is applicable in all other situations excepting armed conflict. This conception though has been proved to be wrong, however, the primary concern regarding the protection of the right to life during armed conflict is that of IHL. However, it does not mean that HRL has nothing to do with an armed conflict or IHL is having no concern about the protection of the right to life beyond armed conflict, rather it means that standard and criteria of protection of the right to life during armed conflict differs in both these branches of internatio-nal. When the question arises with regard to the protection of the right to life during armed conflict, different answers are found in both these disciplines. The substantive law as well as case law of both the branches differ in this regard to such an extent that a person may lose the protection of his right to life under IHL on the one hand, while still holding such protection under HRL on the other. While Islamic Law does not differentiate between humanitarian law and human rights law, rather in Islam, protection of the right to lie has been ensured on equal footings in and outside an armed conflict. The paper focuses the main causes of differences between IHL and HRL. Consequently, sorting out the best possible manner in which such differences can be removed and resultantly by recommending the standard and criteria as to how the right to life can be best protected.

Over the past two decades, important new rules regulating the conduct of armed conflict have emerged from domestic judicial decisions in several states, including the United States. Courts produced decisions about how to characterize a state’s extra-territorial armed conflicts against non-state actors; who a state lawfully may detain or target during those conflicts; the detention review processes a state must conduct; and what restrictions should attach to detainee transfers. We might term this case law “domestic humanitarian law” (or “DHL”). DHL offered a way to develop international humanitarian law in the absence of new international negotiations. U.S. courts were a major player in this undertaking. The decisions they produced, and the congressional and executive reactions to those decisions, fall squarely within what we think of as U.S. foreign relations law. Notwithstanding the stated interest by the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law’s reporters in updating the Restatement (Third) to better reflect major geopolitical changes since 1987, however, and notwithstanding the fact that DHL is a new, plentiful, and important reflection of those changes, there seems to be an unspoken consensus that DHL would be a poor subject for the Restatement (Fourth) to take up. This chapter considers why this is the case and what it says about U.S. “war on terror” jurisprudence. The chapter first describes basic developments in U.S. “DHL” since the September 11 attacks and shows why this jurisprudence theoretically would fit squarely into a Restatement (Fourth). It then explores why there is no enthusiasm for including the topic in a future Restatement, even from groups whom we might expect to support such an idea. It focuses on academics who support broad executive power, academics who emphasize the importance of U.S. compliance with international law, and officials in the executive branch, including lawyers in the State, Defense, and Justice Departments. Substantively, it surveys why each group may have unique reasons to resist the inclusion of DHL in a Restatement, and why all three groups may share general, strategic reasons to resist. It concludes that this pessimism reflects dissatisfaction from virtually all quarters about the state of U.S. law in this area, even from those actors who ostensibly “won” their cases.

This is a Rejoinder to Jochen von Bernstorff’s Reply to our Article, ‘Monopolizing War: Codifying the Laws of War to Reassert Governmental Authority, 1856–1874’. We challenge von Bernstroff’s assertion that we argued that international humanitarian law is merely a sham and his description of our historical approach as focused on the domestic. Rather than conceiving this history as merely one of power relations between weaker and stronger states, our argument pierces the sovereign veil of states and considers how tensions between governments, elites, and the broader public influenced the history of the laws of war. Furthermore, the thrust of our argument is that democratization processes in this formative period (1856–1874) set in motion civil society initiatives that reverberated in the battlefields of Europe and shaped the content and form of the laws of war. Our project is meant to help us better understand the past and, in doing so, shed light on the meaningful efforts to insert humanitarian values into the interpretation of the laws of war.

Prohibition on the use of force against civilian aircraft is closely associated with the customary international law and the international humanitarian law for preventing the aftermath of gross human rights violations such as loss of life, bodily injuries, or any other damages to humanity. The non- use of force against civil aircraft is for ensuring the safety of the civilian population from suffering, which cannot be justified in any means, and it had evolved continuously since 1998 when the ICAO assembly formally adopted it. It makes the responsibility of the state to protect civil aviation from any threat or unnecessarily shoot down. However, this responsibility is not only of the particular nation where it is flying over but also the international community in general. Prohibition on the use of force should not be confused with or equated with the denial of sovereignty. However, other forms of actions like intentionally shooting down the civilian aircraft by the military forces and even the contrary acts by individuals or rebellion groups could prove to be an indispensable approach for ope-rationalizing the restrictions. With the rise in the number of armed conflicts across the globe, along with intentionally shooting down to oppressive political regimes, the threat of civil aviation is exceptionally high. As Ukraine failed to control the contrary acts within its air space, it translates into a colossal out-flux of human life as around 300 people lost their life’s during the MH-17 shot down by the rebellion group by Russian origin missile in 2014. Coercive action is only to be invoked as a last resort. The stance for an unreasonable mistake cannot be justified under any circumstances except when civil aviation is misused for creating a threat towards public safety and national security is entitled to exercise its right to self-preservation by reasonable care. However, it is not clear if such an obligation of the contrary acts by non-state actors in certain situations can make the state responsible. It appears that international community missed addressing these opportunities so far such as the Malaysia Airlines shot down case where the rebellion group used Russian origin missile to attack the civilian aircraft during the Crimean crisis.

Conflict classification — including identifying when conflict ends — is essential for determining the application of the law of armed conflict and the concomitant protections for persons and obligations of the parties to the conflict or potential conflict. What happens, however, when a conflict ends or appears to end but then violence and hostilities bubble up again? The complexity of conflict identification and classification and the challenges of understanding and analyzing the facts and actors in such new rounds of violence raise interesting and often difficult questions regarding the appropriate approach in assessing whether such new violence constitutes an armed conflict and when. This chapter analyzes the appropriate analytical tools and thresholds for identifying the existence of and characterizing conflict in the face of a resurgence of hostilities. For conflicts between two states, the threshold for such international armed conflict is quite low, such that it could be hard to envision a quicker identification of armed conflict when violence recurs in the aftermath of an inter-state conflict. However, such scenarios pose challenging questions of whether actions by a proxy group or other entity could constitute an international armed conflict and, if so, whether the threshold or standard for such determination might be easier to satisfy if a recent conflict between the two states forms the backdrop for that analysis. In the context of non-international armed conflicts, one overarching question is whether the now-classical Tadic test with the factors of intensity and organization is the right approach in such situations of violence recurring after conflict, or whether some lower threshold or “accelerated analysis” could be more appropriate in these situations. Similarly, the nature of the armed group engaged in the resurgence of hostilities may be consequential, such that the thresholds or framework for hostilities recurring with the same group may not be the same as that for new or reconstituted groups, as well as the location and nature of the conflict. After a brief discussion of the basis for this inquiry and an introduction to the basic legal framework for identification and classification of armed conflict in the first section, the second section explores how the specific problem of violence recurring after the end of armed conflict poses interesting and challenging questions for the conflict classification schematic.

This Chapter critiques emerging norms regarding the use of alleged defensive force by powerful states against violent non-state groups located in the territory of other, typically "weaker" states, sometimes called “transnational self-defense.” Although the contemporary international legal system now formally and universally embraces basic liberal values of sovereignty, equality, and liberty/autonomy, emerging transnational self-defense norms effectively perpetuate a system of de facto inequality traceable to an earlier era. The use of armed conflict paradigms and war measures against “terrorist” groups, including targeted killing in what is effectively preemptive or preventive self-defense, perpetuates a discriminatory international system wherein sovereignty and humanity are deemed equal only between so-called “civilized” nations and peoples. Properly understood, the self-defense principles of necessity and proportionality require that states: (1) resort to defensive measures only when necessary to protect lives and property from relatively certain, significant harm and (2) use only the amount of force which is strictly necessary to neutralize the threat that is reasonably believed to exist at the time force is used. Because self-defense principles constrain both the resort to force and the nature of any force used, the alternate norms posited here do not implicate contested issues involving the extraterritorial application of international human rights law.

In its recent General Comment 36 (GC 36) the Human Rights Committee (HRC) engaged for the first time, in a substantial manner, with the relations between the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the right to life. This article uses the HRC's position on these relations as a platform for a long needed discussion on the theoretical underpinnings, and implications, of a possible human rights law on the resort to force between states. This article identifies and conceptualizes three pillars in GC 36’s position, which subject traditional questions of jus ad bellum to IHRL considerations: First, the view that aggression is not only a violation of jus ad bellum, but also that the killings it entails are ipso facto violations of the right to life – even in cases where these killings would be lawful under the laws of armed conflict (jus in bello). Second, that states bear the ‘responsibility’ to oppose aggression as a matter of human rights; and third, that a state’s failure to reasonably attempt to resolve disputes peacefully could amount to a violation of the duty to ensure the right to life of its people. The article analyses these pillars doctrinally, and then moves to discuss the theoretical commitments required to accept each of them, as well as their costs. Namely, they all require breaking with the traditional view that jus ad bellum is strictly an inter-state issue. Although, as the article argues, this development is based on sound ethical premises, the humanization of jus ad bellum through human rights law carries risks that should not be overlooked: chiefly, the securitization of human rights and the depoliticization of war. The prospects and perils of the humanization of jus ad bellum, as this article demonstrates, open a new area of theoretical inquiry and legal possibilities.

This Chapter presents some of the reasons for the emergence of the law of co-application of IHL and IHRL and discusses the principal difficulties encountered in their harmonization. Beyond questions relating to the method of applying the lex specialis rule, and the propensity of IHL bodies to resort to IHL and IHRL bodies to IHRL, each branch of law also carries with it certain ethoi, normative assumptions and institutional considerations. As a result, harmonization requires engagement with difficult, yet imperceptible value choices. Part Two reviews the road to the introduction of the lex specialis rule by the ICJ. Part Three discusses the significance of the Nuclear Weapons opinion and Part Four describes the slide from lex specialis to cumulative application of IHL and IHRL. Parts Five discusses recent trends in co-application and harmonization, including a cautious return to the lex specialis rule and developing hybrid norms. Part Six concludes.

Weaponization of the pervasive cyber infrastructure and of nascent autonomous technologies poses difficult challenges for individual criminal responsibility for war crimes arising from the military use of these technologies. For cyber technologies, the problem is identifying the perpetrator of the conduct which corresponds to the actus reus of the relevant war crime. For autonomous technologies, there is the problem of the ‘responsibility gap’: if the impugned conduct is effectuated by an algorithm or by a human relying on an algorithm, there is no human being with the mens rea required for the crime. Autonomous cyber capabilities (ACC) compound these two very significant and quite different challenges. This chapter analyses the challenges posed by ACC to criminal responsibility for war crimes. It does so by considering the practicalities of war crimes prosecution and how these challenges might be addressed in practice. On this basis, it presents two arguments. First, the practical impact of the challenge of identifying perpetrators and of the responsibility gap on individual criminal responsibility may be mitigated in some cases by the practice of charging and adjudicating war crimes. Second, for the remaining cases, the impossibility of criminal responsibility should not be seen as diminishing the enforcement of international humanitarian law (IHL) but instead, as indicating the preferability of enforcing IHL in these cases by invoking the parallel responsibility of belligerents. This chapter does not deny the significance of the difficulty of identification or of the responsibility gap and nor does it take on the quixotic burden of resolving them. Instead, it argues for destabilising the unitary and fixed nature of these problems, and for seeing them as variable challenges which may manifest differently in different cases. This differentiated perspective allows for the recognition that in some cases these challenges do not pose insurmountable barriers to prosecution and allows for the refocussing of attention on the residual cases. In turn, the resilience of these challenges in ‘residual’ cases draws attention to the possibility that criminal responsibility is simply inappropriate in these cases, and that these cases are better addressed in terms of the underlying responsibility of belligerents.

The increased use of hybrid warfare opens the door to subversion of human rights and the undermining of our institutions. This short paper argues that key principles, in particular proportionality, must be adapted for utilization in the grey zone to prevent grey zone actors from exploiting international law at the dualistic seams.

This paper was written following the advent of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems that are weapons capable of autonomy in detection, selection and attacking targets. The paper sought to first examine the area of overlap between such weapons systems and current laws and principles of international humanitarian law. It found the major issue arising from such systems is the risk of disproportionate attacks and challenges of distinction between lawful targets of lethal force, especially in highly context-specific situations. The paper thereafter sought to investigate how states with potential for developing such weapons systems had approached this issue and it selected the United States and the European Union as the two jurisdictions to base its study on. The former was chosen because of its regulations concerning the development and use of such systems, and the latter because as a regional block, the European Parliament had adopted a resolution imposing a total ban on the said weapons. The findings were that the United States has taken the path of coming up with policy directives on the development, testing and deployment of such systems and has set up multiple bodies tasked with overseeing various elements of the development and use of such systems. The European Union, on the other hand, took a precautionary stance instead of banning the development of such weapons on the basis that full autonomy of such weapons still does not guarantee compliance with principles of International Humanitarian Law. Therefore, conscious of these concerns but apprehensive that despite these fears, such weapons systems will still be developed; this paper took the path of trying to formulate basic principles to guide the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapons. It recommends not only the adoption of the said principles by states but also the formation of a supranational regulatory body to oversee state compliance with them.

What happens to human rights in time of war/armed conflict, when the most basic of human rights, the right to life, can be denied legally? There are two main types of international human rights mechanisms: International Human Rights Law (IHRL), dealing with rights at all times, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), dealing with rights during the special circumstances of war/armed conflict. The development of mechanisms to promote IHL in times of war began to emerge in the late 19th century culminating in the 1949 Geneva Convention(s) after WW2. IHL was designed by states, established by states, signed by states and enforced by states to serve the purposes of states. It developed historically in response to changes in the nature of war, weaponry, technology and medical advances. It also developed, if much more slowly, to try and cover the increasing involvement of ‘non-state’ forces in armed conflicts, particularly since WW2. However, the latter has posed a number of difficulties at a time when most wars/conflicts now involve non-state forces to some degree or another. While all combatants (state or non-state) have responsibilities to uphold IHL, it is usually only states, which are allowed to sign the IHL treaties. It is also generally up to states themselves to decide whether non-state combatants are recognised as such under IHL and thus benefit from its protections - such as captured combatants being treated as prisoners of war (POWs). Most states are not prepared to offer such ‘legitimacy’ to non-state combatants however.The chapter critically assesses the role of IHL and IHRL in protecting the lives and welfare of people, particularly civilians in conflicts in the world today

The Martens Clause, eponymously named for Russian lawyer and diplomat Feodor Martens, was first introduced in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and has taken an outsized importance for international humanitarian law since. As one of international law’s foundational “myths,” it has come to represent the first expression that humanitarian concerns should be given consideration during armed conflict; that is, the laws of war must be tempered by the “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of the public conscience.” It has been restated in international agreements, cited by international tribunals and domestic courts, and has been invoked by scholars and judges alike as expanding on, or creating entirely new, sources of international law. However, Martens’ intent in drafting the Clause had little to do with humanitarian concerns. Rather, it was a contest of wills between European powers over the rights and obligations of occupying armies and the qualification of lawful belligerents that necessitated Martens’ language. The “particularly ambiguous” and “very loosely worded” text was a compromise proposal that did little more than retrench the great powers’ position and provide a face-saving opportunity for the small powers to capitulate. Moreover, during the era of high legal positivism, the delegates at The Hague would have understood the Clause as imposing no obligations of a legal character. Thus, the objective of this essay is to recover the events surrounding the drafting of the Martens Clause to expose its shaky foundation as a source of normative legal doctrine. Examining the webs of significance and contexts in which Martens made his declaration exposes the contradiction at the heart of humanitarian law, and the irony imbued in the meanings that is has been vested with over the past century.

Law is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. Unable or unwilling to challenge other states militarily, states use legal strategies to weaken the enemy’s legitimacy. Such “lawfare” can be used to achieve a kinetic objective, to forestall one, to degrade the enemy’s will to fight, and to shape the narrative of war. The Chinese military prioritizes lawfare as one of the “Three Warfares” that shape its military’s influence operations. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no similar lawfare doctrine or strategy, even as China is forcing it to fight back. This Article argues that the U.S. needs to develop a lawfare strategy to combat its adversaries. It will first define the concept of lawfare and discuss how its use has evolved and escalated globally in recent years. It will illustrate this phenomenon by examining three different case studies of lawfare between China and the U.S. or its allies: international arbitration over China’s claims to the Spratly Islands, China’s non-uniformed maritime militias, and litigation involving the U.S. and Huawei. After discussing the rise of lawfare globally, including lawfare efforts by Russia and the U.S., the article concludes with some recommendations for a U.S. lawfare strategy.

An important group of contemporary moral philosophers — known as revisionists — think that the morality of war is at odds with our laws of armed conflict. While the morality of war holds that combatants pursuing an unjust war are morally forbidden from killing just ones, for killing just combatants is just like killing the innocent, the laws of war provide all combatants with a legal privilege to target each other, regardless of the nature of the war they are participating in. Faced with this tension between morality and our laws of war, some revisionists provide an instrumentalist justification for our legal rules, commonly known as “the humanitarian view:” they argue that the legal rules are justified because they are better at reducing suffering than laws that would track the revisionist morality of war more closely. In this paper, I argue that if revisionists are right that killing just combatants is just like murdering the innocent, the humanitarian view stands in irreconcilable tension with their conception of the morality of war. However, I argue that this tension does not mean that we should immediately discard all instrumentalist justifications. Instead, in this Article, I offer a richer instrumentalist justification for our laws of war drawing on John Rawls’s distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. I argue that this view provides a better moral justification for our legal regime. Still, as this Article argues, when premised on the revisionist morality of war, this alternative justification remains fragile. This fragility, as I argue towards the end of the Article, might be attenuated by directly contesting the revisionist morality of war and, in particular, by denying that what unjust combatants do is just like murdering the innocent.

This article explores a key challenge towards transitional justice in conflict-affected states and the nexus with international humanitarian law. It reviews empirically grounded studies on the Rohingya conflict in Myanmar. The article considers the development of the concept of accountability and how it relates to the notion of gross human rights violations while applying it to the Rohingya conflict. Upon an analysis of the state’s obligations under human rights law, it is concluded that Myanmar has not provided accountability regarding the Rohingya crisis. It then proceeds to suggest ways in which this could be achieved, at both domestic and international levels. The article, thus, contributes to a broader interrogation of how discourses about the concepts of accountability and transitional justice are constructed and applied in conflict-affected states.

The chapter analyzes different means of implementation and enforcement of international humanitarian law (IHL). This includes traditional means, and new means of implementation. Hence, the use of big data tools and Artificial Intelligence, and new challenges for the implementation of IHL, as the use of autonomous weapons, are tackled. In more general terms the author differentiates between bilateral confrontative means (such as retorsions and reprisals), general non-confrontative means (such as the law of state responsibility) and more specific non-confrontative means (such as decisions and opinions of courts and war crime tribunals, especially the International Criminal Court). Moreover, special forms of implementation and enforcement of IHL are stressed, as the system of collective security, the instruments to secure both interstate and domestic enforcement and the competence and responsibilities of different actors. It is argued by Voeneky that, even though there is no place for the claim ‘inter arma silent leges’, IHL faces two main challenges for its realization: Firstly, IHL, like other areas of international law, is not implemented and enforced via a central body or hierarchical institutions, which leads to implementation deficits of rules protecting common values and an overlap of norms and competences. The second major challenge, relevant for this particular area of international law, is its purpose, aiming at humanizing an area that is per se inhumane. Moreover, by implementing and enforcing IHL rules, a balance has to be struck between the aim to protect certain persons and objects through restricting the means and methods of warfare, and the preservation of the right of self-defense as enshrined in Article 51 UN Charter.

In a decentralized system such as public international law with its many and increasingly specialized subfields, it is well known that the question of how to deal with the relationship and interplay of its distinct subfields is particularly vexed. Moreover, this question becomes more acute when these subfields simultaneously claim authority and arrive at quite different, even conflicting, results for the same facts. Revolutionary upheavals can culminate in civil wars such as those in the wake of the ‘Arab spring’. In the course of such conflicts a foreign investor’s production site may be destroyed. Under international investment law, if government forces are sufficiently responsible for such a destruction, this may lead to a breach of a bilateral investment treaty. However, in remarkable contrast to this, under international humanitarian law of non-international armed conflicts, if the destruction was justified under the principle of ‘military necessity’, then, this state action could be considered lawful. So, how then should the possible tension between international investment law and international humanitarian law with their different objectives and values be conceptualized and importantly be decided by investment arbitration tribunals? Are international humanitarian law and international investment law at all applicable in these case constellations? If a conflict between the norms of both regimes emerges here, should it be resolved by the principle of ‘lex specialis’? On the other hand, one might wonder whether a normative conflict between international humanitarian law and international investment law really arises at all. Are reservations concerning a ‘lex specialis’ approach justified, and should rather a more informative approach be taken in which international humanitarian law’s rules and concepts inform the interpretation of bilateral investment treaties’ norms, and vice versa? Shall therefore the ‘extended war clause’ contained in bilateral investment treaties—which offer compensation for investments demonstrably destroyed in cases in which the destruction was not required by the ‘necessity of the situation’—be interpreted in the light of humanitarian law’s principle of ‘military necessity’? Or, are there compelling arguments for an autonomous treaty interpretation on its own terms? In this context, it is striking that respondent states have, as far as can be seen, apparently not yet attempted to argumentatively use humanitarian law’s principle of ‘military necessity’ in an investment arbitration. In those situations and cases, however, the respondent states are anyway often accommodated by the fact that it is, frequently, challenging for the plaintiff investor to prove attributability and causality. Finally, this raises the question whether is it compatible with the principles of fair trial and procedural equality that in these specific constellations the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff investor?

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a number of questions concerning the law. These legal issues involve not only international law, but also the national laws of the nation-states affected by this global crisis. Commentators from around the world have considered many of these legal issues and offered their insights in a variety of online forums. This matrix brings together all known resources (e.g., journal articles, online commentaries, opinion-editorials, and press statements) on the legal aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and provides internet hyperlinks to all of these online publications. Aggregating nearly 1,000 legal resources, the compilation is organized by 33 topics and subtopics, including: • INTERNATIONAL LAW (International Law: Generally, Advisory Court Opinions, Demographics and Discrimination, Development, Disaster Relief Law, Global Health Security, Human Rights, Information and Cyber, International Criminal Law, International Environmental Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Migration Law and Travel, International Peace and Security, International Trade Law, Investment Treaties, Maritime Security and Safety Law, State Obligations, State Responsibility, Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crime); • NATIONAL LAW (Civil Liability, Employment Law, Intellectual Property); • NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (Civil Liberties and Rights, Continuity of Government, Emergency Powers, Federalism, Immigration, Information and Cyber, Law Enforcement, Military Support, Surveillance); and • LAW-RELATED TOPIC (Teaching Law).

"The Hero and the Victim: Narratives of Criminality in Iraq War Fiction" analyzes several works of literary fiction, and one popular memoir, by American authors about the U.S. military experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. In contrast to the emphasis of most ancient war literature on the figure of the warrior-as-hero, and the growing modern emphasis on the figure of the soldier-as-victim, Iraq War fiction reflects the troubled emergence of a new narrative template for war literature: the story of the ordinary soldier as a wrongdoer or even criminal. Iraq War fiction is haunted by depictions of moral injury and expressions of unresolved guilt. The dissertation argues that the emphasis on criminality in Iraq War fiction can be partly explained by the rise of moral cosmopolitanism and its blurring of the traditional conceptual lines between war and crime.

How does combatant rank influence the adoption of international humanitarian law (IHL) norms—or “norms of restraint”—within military organizations? To date, no studies have examined how combatant rank influences the adoption of norms of restraint within armed groups. This study helps to fill this gap by conducting the first known study explicitly examining the role of combatant rank in shaping the transmission and adoption of norms of restraint in military organizations. To do so, this study conducts one of the first known comparative academic studies exploiting original survey and interview data from two state armed forces—the Australian Army and the Philippine Army. Research results indicate that under some conditions combatant rank can significantly influence the norm socialization process in ways both expected and surprising. Combatant adoption of norms of restraint can vary considerably within the military hierarchy. Australian and Philippine data further suggest that the adoption of such norms may be linked to the nature of command relationships within the military. Such data provides noteworthy new data enhancing our understanding of rank, military culture, and combatant socialization to norms of restraint.

One of the most intriguing and important discussions in international law today is the potential impact of emerging technologies on the law of armed conflict (LOAC), including weapons that incorporate machine learning and/or artificial intelligence. Because one of the likely characteristics of these advanced weapons would be the ability to make decisions implicating life and death on the battlefield, these discussions have highlighted a fundamental question concerning the LOAC: does the law regulating armed conflict require human input in selecting and engaging targets or can that decision be made without human input? This article analyzes views expressed by scholars and NGOs, but focuses on views expressed by States, many of which have been publicized as part of the discussions of States Parties to the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention. As a result of this analysis, It is clear that States have not yet come to a consensus on the issue of the legal role of human decision making in LOAC compliance. Given that lack of consensus, one can only conclude that the law does not currently require a human decision for selecting and engaging targets to be lawful. Though the international community may come to such a decision, it has not yet done so. Therefore, States should continue to research and develop weapons that incorporate machine learning and artificial intelligence because such weapons offer the promise of not only greater compliance with existing norms and processes, but also increased opportunities to provide protections in new and creative ways in the future.

This chapter explores the scope of application of international criminal law (“ICL”) with respect to the repression of international crimes affecting animals during war and considers how war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide could apply. It then reviews all judgments – up to July 2020 – from the ad hoc/hybrid international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court where war crime allegations were adjudged and animals featured therein. In this way, the first ever detailed account of how ICL has been used to address and repress international crimes that affect animals during war is presented. The chapter then explores ICL’s limits and gaps in this area and submits that animal cruelty during war should be recognized under international law in the same way that it is during peacetime under domestic law. It proposes that other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity could be a means to potentially achieve this aim.

The Chapter takes as a focus the interpretation given to the offence of torture given by the UK Supreme Court in the Case of R v Reeves Taylor in 2019. Even though Mrs Agnes Reeves Taylor was not eventually prosecuted for the alleged torture committed in Liberia in 1990, the idea that human rights treaties create offences to be prosecuted in the states parties, even where the individual belonged to a non-state actor, has confirmed that international law attaches to these private individuals and that the international human rights regime contains obligations for these individuals. This goes some way to busting the myth that human rights law derived from UN human rights treaties does not apply to non-state actors. The Chapter also considers the work of UN bodies such as the Security Council, Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Special Rapporteurs and Commissions of Inquiry that have already applied human rights norms to armed non-state actors. Lastly, it considers some factors that would affect a Commission’s choice of whether to describe an act of torture as a war crime or a human rights crime.

Rumors are circulating about China's deliberate plan to make the Coronavirus a bioweapon. These rumors cannot be discountenanced because the science and technologies designed for benign purposes can also be misused. The response of IHL to an unproven rumor is mainly conducting investigations to ascertain the validity of the rumors. However, if it later turned out China deliberately contemplated the Coronavirus to be a biological weapon as an attack against any country, the response of IHL lies in various statutory instruments and retaliatory actions from other States. More options available to indivduals and States are explained in this publication.

This thesis investigates the application of IHL to the armed conflicts arising from Operation Peace Spring, which was launched by Turkey in October 2019, in the de facto autonomous region of Rojava, in northern Syria. The aim of the thesis is to fill the gap in the existing literature which discusses extensively the allegations of war crimes committed by Turkey and its proxy forces during Operation Peace Spring, without addressing the question of application of IHL, although the latter is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of war crimes. The research concludes that OPS initiated three main armed conflicts, which classify as transnational armed conflict, international armed conflict and belligerent occupation and that IHL governs the conduct of the parties to these hostilities. Such conclusions have important consequences for the protection of civilians, combatants and POWs during OPS, as well as a significant impact on the prospects of prosecution of the alleged war crimes. Based on the conclusions drawn in this thesis, it is recommendable to conduct future research on the assessment of the relevant conduct as war crimes and the prospects of state accountability for the wrongdoing of individuals acting on Turkey’s behalf.

In this short essay I will argue that the ‘civilian population’ requirement in Crimes against Humanity (CaH) provisions (e.g. Article 7(1) ICC Statute) must either radically be restricted by way of a teleological (purpose-based) interpretation or – even better – abolished in future CaH provisions. While the traditional International Humanitarian Law (IHL) approach (Section 1) certainly needs to be adjusted with regard to CaH (Section 2), such an adjustment does not resolve the considerable limitation of the protective scope of CaH due to the ‘civilian population’ requirement. The ECCC’s contribution to the debate (Section 3) is to be welcomed and serves as a useful starting point for the more radical interpretation and necessary reform of CaH (Section 4).

In popular culture and imagination, World War I was a bloody, muddy, senseless, almost accidental conflict. International law seems far removed from the causes of the war or the way hostilities were conducted. This seeming irrelevance of international law in popular imagination is rejected in intellectual, literary, and scholarly accounts. However, during the centenary of the war, it is time to rethink the role law played in this first large-scale conflict of the twentieth century. Drawing on recent legal historiography as well as original research, this article will argue, through a look at the conduct of naval warfare, that law was central to how Allied, Central, and neutral states navigated the conflict. Specifically, we examine the role law played in the practices of the warring parties in navigating the interdiction of – and attacks on – the civilian shipping of belligerents and neutrals.