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Nowadays there is drastic growth in underwater communication for submarines and also in commercial systems. The challenging communication in underwater is severe attenuation, multi-path effect, and limited power, also complicated for long-distance communications. In this observe an efficient protocol and algorithm is mandatory for the data communication with route discovery. In the underwater sensor, continuous communication is required between the sensor nodes because sometimes it may affect due to the natural disaster, so the data loss may happen in the communication. In this paper, a novel design for underwater communication is proposed by using the Artificial Fish Algorithm (AFISH) with Handshake protocol. The proposed model is evaluated at a particular distance by deploying the sensor nodes and routes constructed between the source and destination. It is clear that the data communication has been done with less delay and loss.

There is no question that the internet has transformed our lives, and we are seeing its importance for creating connection despite forced physical disconnection in the wake of Covid-19. Of course, this is obvious with telemedicine and using Zoom to teach online. However, it also reminds us that online dispute resolution (ODR) is a viable and important avenue for providing access to justice, even if we cannot be in the same room. Indeed, it gives my book with Colin Rule, “the New Handshake,” a whole new meaning. With this in mind, this essay seeks to revive ideas articulated in the book and provide insights on how ODR can be easily deployed to provide access to remedies. People may be “forced” to try ODR in the wake of the epidemic – but that may help usn see how ODR can expand Access to Justice.

Incomplete contracts may involve a hold-up problem, resulting in inefficient levels of investment. In this paper, we model the phenomenon as a sequential move game with asymmetric information regarding quality. Absence behavioral considerations, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium implies zero investment. However, with reciprocal motives, the hold-up problem may be mitigated due to vengeance as a credible threat. We propose a model that incorporates reciprocal motives, and solve for the vengeance equilibrium. In addition, we look at a nonbinding handshake as an alternative mechanism for mitigating the hold-up problem. This mechanism would work under the assumption of relationship norms entering the utility function. We incorporate relationship norms into the model and solve for the handshake equilibrium. Finally, we propose and conduct an experimental test to gauge the value of the analytical predictions in environments with human players.

Paper provides an analysis of the Riyadh Agreement of November 2019 signed between the Yemeni government of President Hadi and the 'South' of Yemen represented by the Southern Transitional Council led by President Zubaydi. Using a comparative methodology and drawing on examples of transitional power-sharing agreements signed elsewhere since 1990 to 2018, this paper analyses the potential trade-offs and weaknesses inherent in the Riyadh agreement, speculating on the difficulties inherent in implementation and proposing the idea of 'implementation as continued negotiation' in relation to agreements that are partial in nature.

In this paper the idea of an enhanced security authentication procedure is presented. This procedure prohibits the transmission of the user’s password over the network while still providing the same authentication service. To achieve that, Kerberos Protocol and a secure password repository are adopted, namely a smart card. The conditional access to a smart card system provides a secure place to keep credentials safe. Then, by referencing to them through identifiers, an authentication system may perform its scope without revealing the secrets at all. This elevates the trustworthiness of the mechanism while at the same time it a achieves to reduce the overhead of the authentication systems due to the elaborate encryptions procedures.

Duopolists anticipating each other’s reactions in a game of repeated interaction do not settle at the Cournot or Bertrand equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game. In this essay I show that there is a process of trial and error driving duopolists to a steady-state equilibrium where they stay until the end of time. I do this for a model with linear demand and constant marginal costs. The equilibrium happens to be the well-known consistent-conjectures equilibrium and does not depend on the strategic variable used during the process. Regardless of whether the duopolists set quantities a la Cournot or prices a la Bertrand the outcome is the same. Surprisingly, Cournot and Bertrand shake hands in the steady state. How it all works is told by the story of Bob, Bernie and the boobles and the way they tacitly coordinate their behavior.

A company manages its human resources from the early recruitment phase till the retirement of employees. Employees especially at upper cadre contribute tremendous efforts to the organization and create values for its well being. Overall mentoring and quality of work life soothes the process of HRM till their leave from the workplace. In the mature career phase of an individual, the golden hello is a signing bonus offered to an employee of a rival firm, usually an executive. The term is also sometimes used more generally to refer to a signing bonus paid to a sought-after recruitment. On the other hand golden handshake is a clause in an executive employment contract that provides the executive with a significant severance package in the case that the executive loses his or her job through firing, restructuring, or even scheduled retirement. It is usually provided to top executives for loss of employment through layoffs, firing or even retirement. The paper seeks to point conceptual framework of golden hello to the golden handshake of executives of the company and explains various issues and aspects of Golden hello and handshake in organizations. The study followed with the conclusion involving points to be concerned while golden hello and handshake in organizations.

Humans use subtle sources of information — like nonverbal behavior — to determine whether to act cooperatively or antagonistically when they negotiate. Handshakes are particularly consequential nonverbal gestures in negotiations because people feel comfortable initiating negotiations with them and believe they signal cooperation (Study 1). We show that handshakes increase cooperative behaviors, affecting outcomes for integrative and distributive negotiations. In two studies with MBA students, pairs who shook hands before integrative negotiations obtained higher joint outcomes (Studies 2a and 2b). Pairs randomly assigned to shake hands were more likely to openly reveal their preferences on trade-off issues, which improved joint outcomes (Study 3). In a fourth study using a distributive negotiation, pairs of executives assigned to shake hands were less likely to lie about their preferences and crafted agreements that split the bargaining zone more equally. Together, these studies show that handshaking promotes the adoption of cooperative strategies and influences negotiation outcomes.

Option to leave is a double-edged sword in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma paradigm. We first show that too much breakup is not necessary in subgame perfect equilibrium distribution. We demonstrate on examples of well-known cooperation inducing solutions that, once an invasion with mixed behavior strategy is allowed in the definition of neutrally stable distribution, breakups on equilibrium path may invite secret-handshake type of invasions.

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments, or (for affluent economies) if the economy is open.

In the spirit of Axelrod's famous prisoners' dilemma tournaments published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, we conducted a "tournament of party decision rules" in a dynamic agent-based spatial model of party competition. Entrants submitted rules for selecting party positions in a two-dimensional policy space with unknown voter locations. Each submitted rule was pitted against all others in a suite of very long-running simulations. The most successful rule 1) satisficed rather than maximized in the short run; 2) was "parasitic" on choices made by other successful rules; and 3) used a "secret handshake" to avoid attacking other agents using the same rule. In additional simulations, we show that the same rule wins when we alter the population of strategies and the method by which new parties are assigned strategies. The most successful strategies stayed away from the center of the voter distribution and they tended to make only small changes to their positions between elections.

The article examines shifts in the role of the State in the information environment, and focuses on the recent, innovative, cooperation between the State and private parties. We argue that while assuming the role of a regulator, the State allowed private nodes of control to emerge and develop in the information environment. We describe how the regulatory regime of the 1990s facilitated this process. When the State now seeks to seize control in the information environment it utilizes these private nodes of control to combat terror. The invisible hand turned out to be very useful for the State, and it is now replaced with a handshake between the State and the private sector. It too, is invisible. The article seeks to make the invisible handshake visible, identifying the legislation that enables the State to seize control in the decentralized borderless information environment. The article traces this intriguing process of recruiting private parties for governing tasks, and analyzes its ramifications for the Internet.