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This paper summarises the outcome of an analysis of stablecoins undertaken by the ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force. At the time of writing, the stablecoin debate lacks a common taxonomy and unambiguous terminology. This paper applies a definition that distinguishes stablecoins from existing forms of currencies – regardless of the technology used – and characterises stablecoin arrangements based on the functions they fulfil. This approach emphasises the role of technology-neutral regulation in preventing arbitrage, as well as comprehensive Eurosystem oversight, irrespective of stablecoins’ regulatory status. Against this background, this paper assesses stablecoins’ implications for the euro area based on three scenarios for the uptake of stablecoins: (i) as a crypto-assets accessory function; (ii) as a new payment method; and (iii) as an alternative store of value. While the first scenario is merely the continuation of the current state of the market and, thus far, has not posed concerns for the financial sector and/or central bank tasks, stablecoins of the type envisaged in the second scenario may reach a scale such that financial stability risks can become material, and the safety and efficiency of the payment system may be affected. The third scenario is both the least plausible and the most relevant from a monetary policy perspective. The paper concludes that the Eurosystem relies on appropriate regulation, oversight, and supervision to manage the implications of stablecoins (and the risks that stem from them) on its mandate and tasks under plausible scenarios. The Eurosystem continues monitoring the evolution of the stablecoin market and stands ready to respond to rapid changes in all possible scenarios.

The path of the policy interest rate expected by financial markets was shifted by the ECB's forward guidance of July 2013. This provides tentative evidence that market expectations had, in advance of the forward guidance, diverged from a path that would have been consistent with the ECB's normal policy reaction function. However, the apparent correction could also have been the result of an unusual revision in market expectations of inflation and growth. The potential for negative side-effects from forward guidance through revised expectations of growth, motivates our assessment of the strength of such effects. We use ECB Staff Projections and the Survey of Professional Forecasters' expectations of inflation and growth to show that forecasts were indeed out-of-line with projections of a fitted policy reaction function estimated before the period of imminent forward guidance. We find that, after forward guidance, market expectations became better aligned with projections based on the same fitted reaction function. Growth and inflation expectations were not as significantly revised as was feared. This substantially confirms the assertion by Praet (2013) that there was a need for reassertion of the policy rule and that this was effective.